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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this common scenario:  A, B, and C are three family mem-
bers or friends who visit a lawyer for help starting a business.  A, B, and 
C tell the lawyer that they only need help in selecting an organizational 
form (“We’ve heard that LLCs are popular”), drafting charter docu-
ments, and making any necessary governmental filings.  Their goal is to 
keep legal fees low, preserving funds for more useful ends like purchas-
ing equipment.  The lawyer advises A, B, and C that their three main 
choices are the partnership, the corporation (preferably an “S” cor-
poration), or a limited liability company (LLC).  After learning that the 
partnership form imposes unlimited personal liability on the partners1 – 
whereas both the corporate and LLC forms generally insulate the owners 
from the debts of the business2 – the parties instruct the lawyer to form a 
corporation (or an LLC) in which they will each own one-third of the 
equity and serve as directors of the corporation (or managers of the 
LLC). 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School.  B.A., 1991, University 
of Michigan; J.D., cum laude, 1994, Wayne State University Law School. 
 1. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.  However, partnerships may be 
organized as limited liability partnerships (LLPs), which may eliminate the partners’ 
personal liability for some or all of the LLP’s debts.  See infra notes 42-48 and 
accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 23-24, 32 and accompanying text. 
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Although each owner expects to be employed by the business and 
earn a salary, none bothers to have the lawyer draft an employment 
agreement for him, if indeed this issue even crossed his mind.3  Instead, 
each owner has a vague belief that his status as an equal owner and a 
director or manager will be sufficient.  Moreover, since A, B, and C are 
family members or friends, none of them foresees or seriously expects 
any major conflicts in the future.  Again, wishing to keep legal expenses 
low, they tell the lawyer to draft a “standard” set of articles of incorpora-
 3. A related issue is that the attorney usually represents the business, not the 
individual owners.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (amended 2003) 
(“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization.”).  
Important planning devices to protect the interests of minority owners could present a 
conflict between the business’s interests and the owners’ interests if there are multiple 
owners.  For example, in negotiating a buy-sell agreement that would obligate the busi-
ness to repurchase an owner’s equity interest upon certain events such as the termina-
tion of that owner’s employment, the business’s desires as to what events will “trigger” 
its obligations and what the purchase price and payment terms will be could materially 
diverge from the owner’s desires, presenting a conflict of interest that makes dual repre-
sentation of the business and that owner impermissible.  See id. R. 1.7, 1.13(e).  As 
such, the business lawyer should make sure that the prospective owners of the business 
clearly understand that the lawyer does not represent them.  One commentator suggests 
that to “further clarify the representation of the client, the attorney preparing any docu-
ment relating to the entity should consider including a provision that indicates that the 
attorney is preparing the document and that each party should confer with independent 
counsel.”  William A. Shaheen, Jr., Business Planning and Financing, in ADVISING 
CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES IN MICHIGAN § 1.2, at 1-3 to 1-4 (Jeffrey S. Ammon et al. 
eds., 2000 & Supp. 2004); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) 
(amended 2003) (“In dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees, 
members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the 
client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization’s 
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.”). 
  The notion that an attorney represents an intangible entity presents the 
additional problem of determining which people “speak” for the entity.  See Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L. J. 1011, 1014 (1997) 
(“Put more colloquially, the problem for an attorney dealing with a corporate official is: 
‘Who is this guy anyway?’”).  See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, Solving the Everyday 
Problem of Client Identity in the Context of Closely Held Businesses, 56 ALA. L. REV. 
181 (2004); Ralph Jonas, Who is the Client?: The Corporate Lawyer’s Dilemma, 39 
HASTINGS L.J. 617 (1988); Thomas D. Morgan, The Client(s) of a Corporate Lawyer, 
33 CAP. U. L. REV. 17 (2004); William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the 
Organization’s Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 57 (2003). 
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tion4 and bylaws5 (in the case of a corporation), addressing typical mat-
ters like the election of directors, board and shareholder meetings, and 
indemnification provisions; or to draft a “standard” set of articles of 
organization6 and operating agreement7 (in the case of an LLC), addres-
sing similar matters. 
After a few lean years, the business becomes very successful, en-
abling A, B, and C to receive substantial salaries and dividends.  Later, 
however, personal and business conflicts align A and B against C and, in 
their capacities as a majority of the directors of the corporation or a 
majority of the managers (or members) of the LLC, A and B decide to 
fire C.  Although a new employee is needed to replace the work former-
ly done by C, a replacement can be found for a much smaller salary than 
C had been receiving.  Not coincidentally, this frees up a lot of cash 
flow, which A and B then use to increase their salaries.  In turn, the in-
creased salaries paid to A and B reduce the funds available to pay divi-
dends to all three owners.  In fact, A and B, who are now earning very 
generous salaries, decide that the business should stop paying dividends 
altogether. 
C now finds himself in the unenviable position of being a “frozen 
out” minority owner who has not done any advance planning to protect 
himself.  Although he owns one-third of the business, that interest is 
essentially worthless as long as A and B remain in control. C’s primary 
reason for starting the business – to create a job for himself – has evapo-
rated.  With dividends discontinued, he receives no return on his invest-
ment.  Cementing C’s dilemma is the fact that there is no market in 
which to resell his ownership interest.  Moreover, even if C could find a 
buyer, that buyer would likely demand steep discounts to reflect the fact 
that C is a minority owner with no control over the business and that C’s 
interest is not liquid. 
This idealized (and very simplified) story is not new; courts, legis-
latures, and academics have been grappling with similar scenarios for 
decades,8 often clumsily.  To date, two primary avenues of relief have 
 4. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02 (1984) (listing the requirements for articles 
of incorporation). 
 5. See id. at § 2.06 (describing the nature of provisions included in bylaws). 
 6. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201 (2006) (listing the requirements for arti-
cles of organization). 
 7. See id. § 110 (listing restrictions for operating agreements and the effect of 
operating agreements). 
 8. See, e.g., F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 1 O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION 
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been developed for a corporate shareholder in C’s situation.  First, he 
may sue A and B, claiming that their actions have breached the fiduciary 
duties that shareholders in a closely held corporation owe to one another.  
This cause of action gained widespread support after the seminal 
Massachusetts decision of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of 
New England, Inc.,9 but is not followed everywhere.10  Alternatively, 
some state statutes permit C to sue to have the corporation involuntarily 
dissolved (or, if possible, to receive other relief) if A and B have acted in 
an “oppressive” manner.11  If C is an LLC member, the law is murkier, 
but appears to be evolving in a similar direction, as the LLC structure 
presents similar dangers to the minority owner who does not engage in 
advance planning.12 
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS:  PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN SQUEEZE-OUTS AND 
OTHER INTRACORPORATE CONFLICTS § 2.02  (2d ed. 1975); Douglas K. Moll, Minority 
Oppression & The Limited Liability Company:  Learning (or Not) from Close 
Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 883 (2005) (“For decades, the law 
has struggled with the plight of the close corporation minority investor.”); Manuel A. 
Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The Case of 
Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1338 (“Since the 1940s, commenta-
tors have made a concerted effort to clearly delineate the ‘distinctive needs’ of close 
corporations and to convince courts and legislatures to change the law to accommodate 
those needs.”) (citations omitted); see also Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 53 N.W. 218 
(Mich. 1892) (granting dissolution of corporation where controlling shareholder paid 
himself an excessive salary and entered into contracts with the corporation that were 
very favorable to himself). 
 9. See 328 N.E.2d 505, 520-21 (Mass. 1975) (holding that stockholders in closely 
held corporations owe fiduciary duties to the other stockholders). 
 10. One commentator, by carefully examining case law in each state, convincingly 
demonstrates that Donahue has not actually received widespread support even though it 
is regularly referred to as a “majority” rule.  Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in 
Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 398-401 (2004).  However, this conclu-
sion is based in part on the assumption that cases decided under involuntary dissolution 
statutes should be considered neither “majority” nor “minority” decisions.  Id. at 389-
90.  As discussed below, a statutory cause of action for involuntary dissolution may be 
an alternative to a minority shareholder pursuing a claim based on Donahue’s fiduciary-
duty analysis.  See infra notes 194-212 and accompanying text.  As such, it should not 
be inferred that a majority of states do not provide oppressed shareholders with any 
avenues of relief. 
 11. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(a)(2)(ii) (1984) (amended 2006) 
(court may dissolve a corporation if it is established that the “directors or those in 
control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, 
oppressive or fraudulent”); see also statutes cited in note 195 infra. 
 12. See, e.g., Moll, supra note 8, at 883; Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in 
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Some will point out that C easily could have protected his interests 
when the business was formed.  For instance, he could have insisted on 
an employment agreement that would allow his termination only for 
“cause” or a buy-sell agreement that would obligate the business to 
repurchase his equity interest upon certain events, such as losing his job.  
Alternatively, he could have insisted that certain actions, such as the 
firing of an owner-employee, only be taken by unanimous approval.  But 
this will come as little consolation to C – when the business was started, 
C may not have realized that these protections were needed,13 may not 
have believed that the expense involved in negotiating and drafting such 
documents was justified, or may have been intimidated by the seeming 
complexity and expense of adequate planning. 
This Article argues that the remedies currently available to C, as 
well as other approaches that have been suggested by commentators, 
have serious shortcomings and are in need of reconsideration.  Suing the 
majority owners under a fiduciary-duty claim or bringing an involuntary 
dissolution claim are avenues that are fraught with uncertainty for all 
parties involved, not to mention the enormous expense, time commit-
ment, and inefficiencies that litigation entails.  Alternatively, the 
“contractarian” school of thought, which generally posits that business 
owners should be free to structure their business relations as they see fit 
with minimal interference from the state, is reflected in many state stat-
utes for close corporations and arguably does not go far enough to pro-
tect minority owners.14  Rather, the contractarian view only works for 
Balancing Contractual Freedom With the Need for Mandatory Constraints on 
Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2004). 
 13. See Moll, supra note 8, at 912 (“Because close corporation owners are fre-
quently linked by family or other personal relationships, there is often an initial atmos-
phere of mutual trust that diminishes the sense that contractual protection is needed.  
Commentators have also argued that close corporation owners are often unsophisticated 
in business and legal matters such that the need for contractual protection is rarely 
recognized.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal 
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 115 (1995) (“Sharehold-
ers in close corporations tend to begin a venture with strong positive feelings toward 
each other, thereby making them less prone to create complex contractual exits.”). 
 14. Although the term “contractarian” is used in different contexts, for purposes of 
this Article it refers to the belief that laws should allow business owners to be complete-
ly, or at least largely, free to decide the terms of their relationship with minimal inter-
ference from the state through “mandatory” statutory provisions.  See Mark J. 
Loewenstein, A New Direction For State Corporate Codes, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 453, 
459-60 (1997) (“Contractarian philosophy [holds] that no mandatory terms are justi-
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sophisticated parties who have the foresight to contract in anticipation of 
future disputes; many small business owners simply do not “order” their 
affairs adequately (or at all) when starting businesses.15  Thus, the long-
standing problem of minority owner oppression in the small business 
context still awaits a solution. 
Granted, no contract, no matter how well thought-out, can antici-
pate and address each and every future dispute that may arise in a small 
business.  This Article argues, however, that small business owners 
should be required to learn about ways to protect their interests when it 
really matters – before forming the business.16  While normally this is a 
function that attorneys should perform, the sad fact is that this does not 
appear to be happening with an acceptable frequency, as demonstrated 
by the never-ending litigation involving minority owner abuse.  To that 
end, this Article suggests that statutes governing both corporations and 
LLCs should require all owners to read several warnings about the dan-
gers of a lack of advance planning before starting a business, or before 
purchasing an equity interest in an existing closely held business.  More-
over, to lessen the expense involved in negotiating and drafting planning 
protections, this Article suggests that “form” agreements and provisions 
protecting minority interests should be widely available, either as freely 
available standard “template” agreements or – as we gather more infor-
mation about the choices actually made by participants in closely held 
businesses – default provisions in statutes.  Further, this Article suggests 
ways in which the bar can better educate prospective business owners, 
not to mention lawyers and other professionals, about the perils of being 
a minority owner and the benefits of planning. 
Finally, this Article recommends that states should begin compiling 
statistical information about the actual choices made by owners of vari-
ous types of closely held businesses and make this information available 
to prospective owners to guide them in their own decision making, or as 
data to use in drafting a set of “form” documents or “default” provisions 
fiable; it trumpets the value of giving the participants in the corporate enterprise – 
managers, shareholders, creditors, employees – the maximum freedom to fashion their 
relations in the way they choose.  In brief, this philosophy holds that the state is ill-
situated to mandate the terms of corporate governance, especially in comparison with 
the parties who risk their capital or livelihoods on the terms.”). 
 15. See Moll, supra note 8, at 952-54. 
 16. The situation for owners who do not purchase their interest in a closely held 
business, such as those who inherit, is somewhat different.  See infra note 411 and 
accompanying text. 
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in statutes.  One of the major debates in the literature on closely held 
businesses is over the extent to which minority owners do – or can be 
expected to – contract to protect their interests.  The collection of such 
information will allow us to answer that question with data, rather than 
anecdotally. 
Part I of this Article reviews the current landscape of available busi-
ness forms and details the many ways in which the majority owners of a 
business can take advantage of the minority owners.  Part I also reviews 
the many ways in which the minority owner could have protected 
himself – if he had the foresight to do so.  Part II then reviews the main 
statutory and judicial responses to the problem of minority owner 
oppression and discusses their inadequacy.  After discussing some other 
suggestions that have been posited, Part III then presents some hopefully 
workable solutions. 
I. A CLOSER LOOK AT MINORITY OWNER “OPPRESSION” 
The topic of “oppression” of minority business owners (particularly 
in corporations),17 as well as the ways in which the astute prospective 
 17. See, e.g., F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 1 O’NEAL AND 
THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 3:6 (Rev. 
2d. ed. 2005); see generally Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close 
Corporation Act and a Proposed Legislative Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817 (1985); 
Krishnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Approach, 10 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 129 (1987); Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of 
Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 25 (1986); J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and 
Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation 
Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The 
Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143 
(1990); Moll, supra note 8; Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-
Fact Contracts:  Is the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989 
(2001) [hereinafter Moll, Reasonable Expectations]; Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder 
Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 749 (2000) [hereinafter Moll, Perspective]; Douglas K. Moll, 
Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation, 60 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 841 (2003) [hereinafter Moll, Dividend Policy]; Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder 
Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close 
Corporation, 54 DUKE L. J. 293 (2004) [hereinafter Moll, Fair Value]; Douglas K. 
Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and 
Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717 (2002) [hereinafter 
Moll, Close Corporation Disputes]; Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective 
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minority owner of a business can protect himself from such abuse (or at 
least have an “exit” if abuse occurs) has already been extensively treated 
elsewhere.18  The following discussion, therefore, does not reiterate that 
comprehensive discussion of these topics.  However, it first would be 
helpful to predict which business forms will be with us in the foresee-
able future.  After all, the 1990s and later years have witnessed a major 
expansion of the choices of forms in which to operate a business.  At the 
same time, old forms that were thought to have become obsolete have 
made a surprising “comeback.”  The situation has become so compli-
cated that some commentators have even suggested eliminating some of 
the available business forms.19 
A. The Spread of New and Modified Forms of Business Organization 
Traditionally, the primary choices for operating a for-profit busi-
ness in the United States were the corporation, the general partnership 
and, to a lesser degree, the limited partnership.  Generally speaking, the 
attributes of each form (and thus the task of choosing between them) 
were relatively simple.  One of the main benefits of the partnership is its 
“flow-through” tax treatment.  In other words, the partnership itself is 
not a tax-paying entity.  Instead, its various tax attributes are passed 
through to the partners; if the partnership earns income, then each part-
ner must report his proportionate share of that income on his income tax 
return, but the partnership itself does not pay taxes.20  The main disad-
 
Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425 (1990); F. Hodge O’Neal, Close Corporations: Existing 
Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873 (1978); Terry A. O’Neill, 
Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested 
Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in Close Corporations, 22 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 646 (1992); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and 
Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L. Q. 193 (1988) [hereinafter 
Thompson, Corporate Dissolution]; Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of 
Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993) [hereinafter Thompson, Cause of 
Action]; Steven Stern, Comment, Proposals to Help the Minority Stockholder Receive 
Fairer Dividend Treatment from the Closely Held Corporation, 56 NW. U. L. REV. 503 
(1961). 
 18. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 Yale 
L.J. 119, 142-44 (2003) (discussing options for minority shareholders suffering from 
oppression); see also articles cited supra note 17. 
 19. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. 
 20. I.R.C. § 701 (2008). 
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vantage of the partnership form is that partners are personally liable, 
jointly and severally, for the partnership’s liabilities, even those caused 
by another partner.21  Thus, if the business’s liabilities exceed its ability 
to pay, the partners’ personal assets could be at risk of unlimited 
liability.22 
In contrast, the corporation offers precisely the opposite character-
istics.  The main benefit of the corporate form is the liability protection 
it provides for the corporation’s shareholders.23  If the business’s liabili-
ties exceed its ability to pay, the shareholders’ personal assets will not 
be at risk of unlimited liability (at least outside of a “piercing the 
corporate veil” claim24).  The worst that likely would happen to a share-
holder is that his stock in the corporation would become worthless if, for 
example, the corporation went bankrupt.  The main disadvantage of the 
corporate form, however, is that the corporation pays income taxes.  If 
the corporation pays any dividends to its shareholders, each shareholder 
is taxed on the amount that he receives.25  Thus, the corporate form in-
volves a “double layer” of taxation.26  The Internal Revenue Code 
allows corporations to avoid this double taxation if they comply with the 
many requirements of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code.27  For 
 21. See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997); see also id. § 15 (1914) (stating 
partners are jointly and severally liable for a partner’s wrongful act, and jointly liable 
for all other obligations of the partnership). 
 22. Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act’s “exhaustion rule,” a judgment 
creditor of a partner may not recover a judgment based on a claim against the partner-
ship from a partner’s personal assets unless the partnership’s assets are insufficient to 
pay the claim, or other exceptions apply.  Id. § 307(d) (1997). 
 23. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1984); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, 
CORPORATION LAW 7 (2000) (“[S]tockholders have no liability for the corporation’s 
debts simply by virtue of being stockholders.  Hence, all they stand to lose by virtue of 
being stockholders if the corporation goes under is whatever they paid to purchase their 
stock.”) (footnote omitted). 
 24. In the typical veil-piercing case, an unpaid corporate creditor seeks to hold one 
or more of the shareholders liable for the claim.  There literally are thousands of 
reported veil-piercing decisions. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate 
Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 379 (1999); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical 
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). 
 25. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (2008) (including dividends in “gross income”). 
 26. Moll, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 17, at 998 n.37 (stating that 
“[corporations are subject to] double taxation – once as business income at the corpo-
rate level, and once as personal income at the shareholder level.”). 
 27. I.R.C. § 1366 (2008); see also JOHN R. MARQUIS ET AL., Overview of Tax 
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the most part, an “S” corporation gets the best of both worlds:  limited 
liability and flow-through tax treatment.  The problem, however, is that 
not all corporations can qualify to be “S” corporations
Thus, the choices were pretty clear.  The partnership traditionally 
was much more “flexible” in terms of allowing partners to structure their 
internal relationship as they saw fit, at least outside some limited areas.29  
With the corporation, however, most statutory rules applied even if the 
parties did not desire them, although over time there was a movement to 
allow shareholders, at least in closely held corporations, to modify the 
statutory rules to some degree.30  As a result, with the exception of some 
relatively exotic business forms such as the business trust or the cooper-
ative, the task of the business lawyer in advising his or her client as to 
which form of business organization to choose wasn’t terribly difficult 
or complicated.31 
 
The Rise of the LLC.  Enter the LLC, a business form that protects 
its owners (the “members”) from personal liability for the LLC’s obliga-
tions while simultaneously providing flow-through tax treatment, mak-
ing it the best of both worlds.32  In addition, the LLC provides the mem-
Issues, in ADVISING CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES IN MICHIGAN, supra note 3, § 9.46, at 
9-33 (“S corporations . . . are generally not separate taxpaying entities. . . .  All of the S 
corporation income (or loss), regardless of whether it is distributed to the shareholders, 
passes through to the shareholders and is included in the shareholders’ personal 
income.”). 
 28. A limited partnership retains flow-through tax treatment, but in most situations 
imposes personal liability for the liabilities of the limited partnership only on the gener-
al partner(s), not the limited partner(s).  See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303(a) (1976) 
(amended 1985). 
 29. See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18 (1914) (“The rights and duties of the partners 
in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between 
them, by the following rules . . . .”) (emphasis added). The Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act is more explicit, providing that “relations among the partners and between the part-
ners and the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement.  To the extent the 
partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs . . . .”  UNIF. 
P’SHIP ACT § 103(a) (1997).  However, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act does con-
tain a relatively short list of rules that may not be modified (or at least not greatly 
modified) by the partnership agreement.  Id. § 103(b). 
 30. See infra notes 231-50 and accompanying text. 
 31. Larry E. Ribstein, Making Sense of Entity Rationalization, 58 BUS. LAW. 1023, 
1023 (2003) (“The world once was a simpler place in to which to form a business.  One 
could choose between the corporation and [the] partnership.”). 
 32. See, e.g., JAMES R. CAMBRIDGE & GEORGE J. CHRISTOPOULOS, MICHIGAN 
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bers with a great deal of contractual freedom in setting the firm’s gov-
ernance rules.33  Today, every state has an LLC statute34 and the LLC is 
viewed by many as the “entity of choice” for small businesses.35 
Given these attractive characteristics, one would think that the LLC 
would have caught on like wildfire in the United States after Wyoming 
became the first state to adopt an LLC statute in 1977.36  In reality, 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 9.1, at 9-2 (1998 & Supp. 2006) (“The principal tax 
motivation for forming an LLC is to obtain the favorable pass-through tax treatment 
that results from the LLC being classified as a partnership for federal income tax pur-
poses. . . .  [T]he use of an S corporation is subject to many restrictions that do not 
apply to LLCs.”). 
 33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2005) (“It is the policy of this 
chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 
103 cmt. (1996) (“[T]he only matters an operating agreement may not control are speci-
fied in [Section 103(b)]. . . .  [E]very section of this Act is simply a default rule, regard-
less of whether the language of the section appears to be otherwise mandatory.”); 
Sandra K. Miller, A New Direction for LLC Research in a Contractarian Legal 
Environment, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 351, 353 (2003) (in creating the LLC, legislators 
“sought a business entity that, through private contracting among participants, would . . 
. reduce legal strife internally among investors, and deter judicial intermeddling”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 34. For a list of citations to each state’s LLC statute, see Nicholas L. 
Georgakoloulos, Contract-Centered Veil Piercing, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 126 
n.18 (2007). 
 35. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 1 RIBSTEIN AND 
KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.1, at 1-1 (2d ed. 2004) (the LLC is 
“the preferred choice for many businesses”); Thomas E. Rutledge, The Alphabet Soup 
of Unincorporated Business Law: What is Happening With LLCs, LPs, LLPs, GPs, 
LLLPs, & BTs and Dealing with RUPA, Re-RUPA, (Re)ULLCA, UNETA, MITA, & 
META, ALI-ABA Video Law Review, VML0202 ALI-ABA 1, at *7 (Feb. 2, 2006) 
(“Today, most choice of entity analysis begins with a presumption that the LLC will be 
the most viable option, and only in relatively narrow fact situations will that presump-
tion not carry though to the final analysis.”). 
 36. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 547 
(codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (Michie 2007)).  
Writing in 1996, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
summarized the history of LLCs: 
Borrowing from abroad, Wyoming initiated a national movement in 1977 by enacting 
this country’s first limited liability company act.  The movement started slowly as the 
[IRS] took more than ten years to announce finally that a Wyoming limited liability 
company would be taxed like a partnership.  Since that time, every State has adopted 
or is considering its own distinct limited liability company act, many of which have 
already been amended one or more times. 
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, prefatory note (1996). 
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however, it took a long time for the LLC idea to gain popularity, due to 
uncertainty between 1980, when the IRS published proposed regulations 
that would have treated LLCs as corporations for tax purposes,37 and 
1996, when the IRS promulgated its “check-the-box” regulations.38  
These regulations basically allow any unincorporated entity, including 
an LLC, to receive flow-through tax treatment unless it chooses to be 
taxed as a corporation or it is treated as a corporation under another sec-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code (such as publicly traded limited part-
nerships39).  The check-the-box regulations rendered obsolete a number 
of provisions in state statutes that had been designed to conform to 
interim IRS regulations and to ensure that an LLC was denied at least 
two of the “usual” four corporate characteristics.40  Nonetheless, LLC 
statutes continue to exhibit a great degree of variation from state to 
state.41 
 
Limited Liability in Partnerships (the LLP).  Aside from the LLC, a 
somewhat concurrent movement resulted in another “best of both 
worlds” entity:  the limited liability partnership, or LLP.  In 1991, Texas 
enacted the first state LLP statute42 in response to a perceived crisis of 
 37. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709, 75,710 (1980).  Three years later, the IRS withdrew 
these proposed regulations.  RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 35, § 1.2, at 1-6. 
 38. 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to .7703 (1996).  These regulations became effective 
on January 1, 1997.  As one commentator explains, the check-the-box regulations were 
a result of the fact that the prior “mandatory tax classification scheme became an ad-
ministrative nightmare.”  Miller, supra note 33, at 360. 
 39. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2008) (treating most publicly traded partnerships as 
corporations); see also CAMBRIDGE & CHRISTOPOULOS, supra note 32, § 9.3, at 9-3 to 9-
4 (“Generally, an LLC is permitted to simply elect whether it will be treated as a 
partnership or as an association taxed as a corporation.”). 
 40. A former Treasury regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1996), listed six 
characteristics that were used to determine whether an unincorporated entity should be 
taxed as a corporation:  (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on business and divide 
the gains therefrom (i.e., a profit motive), (3) continuity of life, (4) centralized manage-
ment, (5) limited liability for owners, and (6) free transferability of interests.  However, 
since the first two factors were common to all businesses, only the last four factors 
really mattered.  In essence, the regulations provided that an entity would be taxed as a 
partnership unless it had three or more of the four “corporate” characteristics.  In other 
words, state law had to deny the entity at least two of the four corporate characteristics 
for the entity to be taxed as a partnership. 
 41. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 42. See 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 901, § 84.  The current statute is TEX. BUS. ORGS. 
CODE ANN. §§ 152.801-805 (Vernon 2006).  Section 152.801 provides a “full shield” 
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liability in many accounting and law partnerships.43  Today, every state 
recognizes some form of LLP,44 either a “full shield” LLP (in which 
partners generally are not personally liable for any of the partnership’s 
liabilities except those they personally caused) or a “partial shield” LLP 
(in which partners are generally not personally liable for the wrongful 
acts of other partners or employees, but remain personally liable for 
other liabilities of the partnership45).  Approximately seventeen46 of the 
by providing that LLP partners are not personally liable for the debts and obligations of 
the LLP.  However, a partner in a Texas LLP will be personally liable for his own con-
duct.  He will also be personally liable for conduct by another partner or a representa-
tive of the partnership, but only if (1) he was “supervising or directing the other partner 
or representative” when the conduct occurred, (2) he was “directly involved” in the 
conduct, or (3) he had notice or knowledge of the conduct “at the time of the occurrence 
and then failed to take reasonable action to prevent or cure” it. 
 43. LLP statutes were the product of a lobbying effort by large accounting firms to 
limit their partners’ personal liability exposure to claims of malpractice by other part-
ners, particularly in light of an increase of securities law violation claims against 
accounting firms.  See generally William H. Clark, Rationalizing Entity Laws, 58 BUS. 
LAW. 1005, 1006 (2003); Rutledge, supra note 35, at *8. 
 44. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, prefatory note (2006) (“[E]very state has some 
form of LLP legislation . . . .  In full-shield jurisdictions, LLPs and member-managed 
LLCs offer entrepreneurs very similar attributes and, in the case of professional service 
organizations, LLPs may dominate the field.”). 
 45. “It is difficult to conceive of many situations where a business lawyer would 
recommend that the client choose the ‘half-a-loaf’ protection that the [Michigan partial-
shield] LLP provides when the client can have the whole loaf with an LLC.”  
CAMBRIDGE & CHRISTOPOULOS, supra note 32, § 2.1, at 2-3.  The Michigan “half-a-
loaf” LLP statute only shields a partner of an LLP from liabilities of the partnership 
“arising from negligence, wrongful acts, omissions, misconduct, or malpractice com-
mitted . . . by another partner or an employee, agent, or representative of the partner-
ship.”  However, the statute does not shield a partner from liability “for the partner’s 
own negligence, wrongful acts, omissions, misconduct, or malpractice or that of any 
person under the partner’s direct supervision and control.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 
449.46 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 46. No attempt is made in this Article to determine how many states have full 
shields and how many have partial shields.  However, commentators have observed: 
The principal effect of a partnership becoming [an LLP] is that partners obtain 
some form of limited liability. . . .  Most states provide that LLP partners are 
relieved from personal liability only for partnership debts and obligations created 
by the negligence or other misconduct of other partners and partnership employ-
ees and agents (partial liability shield).  A few LLP states provide that partners 
are relieved from personal liability for all partnership debts and obligations re-
gardless of how created. 
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state LLP statutes provide for a “full shield,” as does the 1997 version of 
the Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).47  Because in most other respects 
an LLP is the same as a general partnership,48 it receives the same flow-
through tax treatment.49  In fact, one advantage of the LLP over the LLC 
is that it comes with a “built-in” body of case law developed over 
decades in the general partnership context.50 
 
(More) Limited Liability in Limited Partnerships (the LLLP).  Usu-
ally, a general partner of a limited partnership is liable for the limited 
partnership’s debts, but a limited partner is not, unless he or she partici-
pates in the control of the business; even then, the limited partner will be 
liable only to those persons who reasonably believed that the limited 
partner was a general partner.51  Recently, however, many statutes were 
amended to provide that general partners can avoid liability for the 
limited partnership’s obligations if the limited partnership elects limited 
liability limited partnership (LLLP) status.52  Nearly twenty states have 
adopted LLLP statutes.53 
All states expressly or impliedly preserve partner liability for the personal 
misconduct of the partner. 
CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX 
AND BUSINESS LAW § 15.02(1) (footnotes and citations omitted).  The table to this 
chapter indicates that 17 states had “full shield” LLP laws.  It was current as of 2007.  
See id. tbl.15. 
 47. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997). 
 48. LLP status requires a filing with the state, unlike a general partnership.  See, 
e.g., id. § 1001(c) (after required partner approval, a partnership may become an LLP 
by filing a “statement of qualification”).  In nearly all other respects, LLPs are just gen-
eral partnerships.  See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 46, § 15.02(1).  However, 
some states also impose insurance requirements for LLP status.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. 
ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.804 (Vernon 2006). 
 49. In 1992, shortly after the Texas statute was enacted, the IRS confirmed that 
LLPs would receive flow-through tax treatment.  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-29-016 (Apr. 16, 
1992). 
 50. Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Step in the 
Evolution of the Unincorporated Business Organization, 51 BUS. LAW. 147, 149 
(1995). 
 51. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303(a) (1976) (amended 1985).  However, the 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act was amended in 2001 to provide that limited partners 
are not personally liable for the obligations of the limited partnership solely because 
they are limited partners, even if they participate in the “management and control of the 
limited partnership.”  UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (2001). 
 52. Section 404(c) of the 2001 version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act pro-
vides that an obligation of an LLLP is solely the obligation of the LLLP, and that 
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The LLC, the LLP, and the LLLP expanded business owners’ 
choices of business forms that provide both limited liability for the own-
ers from the entity’s obligations and flow-through taxation.  In just a few 
decades, business organization law has gone from a “sleepy” state of 
having only a handful of form choices to having many more.  As one 
commentator observed, “the options facing the business lawyer [have] 
become extremely varied, to the point of almost being bewildering.”54  
The question became:  have we gone overboard? 
 
The Entity Rationalization Movement.  Due to the recent invention 
of certain business forms (such as the LLC), the modification of existing 
forms (such as the morphing of the general partnership into the LLP), 
and the reemergence of business forms that had, until recently, almost 
been given up for dead (such as the limited partnership), some commen-
tators proposed simplifying our business organizations laws.55 Proposals 
have included consolidating some of the currently existing forms, or in-
stead creating a new form of business organization that would replace 
some of the currently existing forms.56  As for the former approach, one 
commentator observed: 
general partners are not personally liable for such obligations “solely by reason of being 
or acting as a general partner.”  Id. § 404(c).  Of course, without LLLP status, the 
general partners of a limited partnership are usually personally liable, jointly and 
severally, for the limited partnership’s debts.  Id. § 404(a). 
 53. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 215/201(a)(4) (West Supp. 2008); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 88.606 (Supp. 2007); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 1.002(50), 
5.055(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007).  Also adopted in the following states: Arkansas, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia. 
 54. Clark, supra note 43, at 1006-07 (footnotes omitted); see also Thomas F. 
Blackwell, The Revolution is Here: The Promise of a Unified Business Entity Code, 24 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 333, 336-37 (1999) (“[C]hoice of entity has now become a complex 
endeavor likely to mystify a prospective business owner or an attorney who has not 
been regularly and recently involved with choice of entity issues.”). 
 55. See generally Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1023-24 (“Lawyers and legislatures 
have started thinking that it is time to clean up the mess created by the proliferation of 
[business] forms.  Specifically, they think business forms can be ‘rationalized’ by using 
common provisions to solve common problems.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 56. See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle & Wayne M. Gazur, What’s in a Name? An 
Argument for a Small Business “Limited Liability Entity” Statute (With Three Sets of 
Default Rules), 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101 (1997) (discussed infra notes 360-74); 
John. H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business Organization Law, 
65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1996) (suggesting the creation of a “standard business organ-
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With the advent of full shield LLPs for both general partnerships and 
limited partnerships, potential movement toward simplification that 
was previously not possible is at least now conceivable . . . .  Any 
governance structure that can be achieved in either a limited 
partnership or an LLC can also be achieved in a full shield LLP.  The 
result may be the possible return to full shield [LLPs] as the sole 
necessary alternative to corporations.57 
This appeared in a 2003 issue of The Business Lawyer which, along 
with the following issue, reprinted several papers that were presented at 
a November 2002 symposium entitled Entity Rationalization: What Can 
or Should Be Done About the Proliferation of Business Organizations?58  
Reading these articles written by prominent practitioners and academics, 
reveals a sense that there truly was a movement afoot that, if carried to 
its logical conclusion, would have reduced the confusing array of busi-
ness entity choices currently perplexing attorneys. 
In May 2006, however, whatever momentum that may have started 
toward the goal of eliminating one or more current business forms 
and/or creating new business forms was dealt a serious blow when the 
Study Committee on an Omnibus Business Organizations Code issued a 
preliminary report.59  The committee, a joint project of the National 
ization” to replace all business organization forms other than the “traditional” corpo-
ration); Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 456, 471-72 (arguing that current trends should 
result in two different business forms: the corporation with “traditional mandatory 
provisions” and “a flexible, limited liability entity – without mandatory provisions”). 
 57. Clark, supra note 43, at 1018. 
 58. Richard A. Booth, Entity Rationalization: What Can or Should Be Done About 
the Proliferation of Business Organizations?, 58 BUS. LAW. 1003, 1003 (2003). 
 59. Another serious impediment to the rationalization movement is that the transi-
tion from a pre-rationalization world to a post-rationalization world would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible.  If, for example, LLCs are eliminated because they are 
viewed as superfluous in light of the LLP form, would all currently existing LLCs be 
required to convert into LLPs or something else?  If so, when?  Even worse, if ration-
alization replaced all of the currently existing forms with new forms, then thousands of 
firms now in existence would need to convert into a new form.  This problem would be 
exacerbated by the fact that revisions to the fifty states’ respective laws would certainly 
not proceed at the same pace.  See Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1039 (“Transition 
problems may, in fact, be the most convincing argument against rationalization.”).  Yet 
another drawback was the concern that the creation of any new type of business entity 
would necessarily involve a great deal of uncertainty as to what to do with existing 
principles of law.  As Professor Blackwell asked, “Will businesses want to utilize a new 
entity form if there is uncertainty whether courts . . . would treat it as a corporation, a 
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American 
Bar Association, had been formed in 2002 to determine whether an inte-
grated business organizations statute that includes corporations and 
unincorporated entities was feasible.60  Specifically, one issue studied by 
the committee was “[w]hether the number of business entity forms 
should be reduced, e.g., one corporate form, [and] one non-corporate 
form, . . . or alternatively, one form for closely-held businesses and one 
form for publicly-traded businesses.”61  The committee concluded that a 
drafting project should be undertaken which would include various 
model and uniform business organizations statutes.62 
As to “whether the number of business entity forms should be 
reduced,” the committee wrote: 
The consensus (but not unanimous) position on this issue was that 
any attempt to do so would be impractical and would make the 
proposed Omnibus Code unenactable. One member [suggested] . . . 
that because of the popularity of limited liability companies, there 
partnership, or something else entirely?  Could an attorney ethically recommend such a 
course of action?”  Blackwell, supra note 54, at 339. 
 60. REPORT OF STUDY COMMITTEE ON AN OMNIBUS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
CODE 1 (May 3, 2006), available at http://www.iaca.org/downloads/BOS/EntityLaw/ 
Omnibus_CommitteeReport_050306.pdf [hereinafter OMNIBUS BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS CODE]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. In February 2007, the Study Committee released a discussion draft of its 
Omnibus Business Organizations Code, which essentially provides the provisions that 
would be common to all business organizations (and thus contained in the “hub” of a 
“hub and spoke” approach), such as the mechanics of filing documents with the 
secretary of state, registered agents and registered offices, qualification of foreign 
entities, etc.  See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW & AM. BAR 
ASS’N, OMNIBUS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CODE DISCUSSION DRAFT (Feb. 26, 2007), 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/oboc/2007marchmeeting_draft. 
htm.  The draft for the Study Committee’s February 2008 meeting indicates that the 
code will eventually also include “spokes” relating specifically to business corporations, 
nonprofit corporations, general partnerships, limited partnerships, LLCs, cooperative 
limited associations, nonprofit associations, and business trusts.  However, these would 
not be new provisions; instead, the act “would ultimately constitute a ‘hub’ linked to 
entity-specific articles as ‘spokes’, with each spoke incorporating those provisions of 
the respective ABA model acts or NCCUSL uniform acts which are not common 
provisions dealt  with in the hub.”  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAW & AM. BAR ASS’N, OMNIBUS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CODE DISCUSSION DRAFT 
(Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/oboc/2008feb_ 
meetingdraft.htm. 
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was really no longer a need for limited partnerships.  Most members 
of the Study Committee rejected this position for two reasons: (1) 
over 50,000 new limited partnerships have been formed in each of 
the three most recent years for which filing statistics are available 
(2002-2004); and (2) there are at least 850,000 existing active limit-
ed partnerships which need a governing statutory framework . . . . 
A related question . . . was whether the Omnibus Code should create 
any new types of entities.  The answer to this was “no.”  If a new 
type of entity is invented in the future and gains tractions [sic] in the 
states, however, the Committee was open to the possibility that it 
might be brought into the Omnibus Code; but no one thought this 
was likely to occur in the foreseeable future.  Practitioners are cur-
rently overwhelmed by the proliferations of existing types of entities, 
all the different statutes that govern them, and the differences, and in 
many cases inconsistencies between similar concepts, in all these 
statutes.63 
Assuming this accurately predicts the near future, it looks like we 
will continue to live in a world with general partnerships, LLPs (both 
partial shield and full shield), LLCs (both member-managed and 
manager-managed), corporations (both “C” corporations and “S” corpo-
rations), LPs, LLLPs, and all of the other currently available forms.  
While some of the other goals of the rationalization movement64 such as 
the promulgation of “hub and spoke” statutes65 may come to pass, it is 
doubtful that any of the current business forms will be eliminated any 
time soon.66  It also appears that few people have any appetite for new 
business forms. 
 63. OMNIBUS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CODE, supra note 60, at 6-7. 
 64. To be fair, the aims of the rationalization movement were more varied.  The 
overall goal of the movement seems to be the elimination of unnecessary differences 
between different business entity statutes.  One aim would have been to examine similar 
provisions in different statutes and determine if the differences in wording between the 
two sections represent “real” differences or merely are a result of the fact that the 
statutes were written by different legislatures at different times.  If there are not “real” 
differences, then the differing language should be harmonized, one statute could 
incorporate provisions of the other by reference, or the rule could be contained in a 
separate section that applies to both corporations and LLCs, such as in the “hub” of a 
“hub and spoke” approach.  See Clark, supra note 43, at 1020.  Not all the papers in The 
Business Lawyer symposium were pro-rationalization, however.  Ribstein, for one, 
wrote:  “[E]ven if rationalization might otherwise be a good idea, transition to a ration-
alized world will lead to more, rather than less, complication, as myriad rationalized 
statutes are added to the mix both across states and within states during the transition 
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Conclusion:  Corporations and LLCs Are Likely “Settings” of 
Abuse.  This brings us to the present question:  in which of the many 
currently existing business forms is abuse of minority owners by majori-
ty owners likely to occur?  On which business forms should this discus-
sion focus?  This Article will focus on corporations and LLCs, and will 
exclude general partnerships (whether “regular” or LLP) and limited 
partnerships (whether “regular” or LLLP). 
This Article disregards limited partnerships because limited part-
ners often are passive or “sophisticated” investors who are not likely to 
work at the business, but who can be expected to contract to protect their 
rights before committing capital to the enterprise.67  The reason for ex-
cluding partnerships (including LLPs) from this discussion, on the other 
hand, is not because partners can be expected to be “sophisticated,” but 
rather because partnership law generally provides important protections 
to owners that corporate and LLC laws do not.  For example, to return to 
the hypothetical situation outlined in the Introduction to this Article, if 
A, B, and C had not formed a corporation or an LLC, but had simply 
started a business without consulting a lawyer or making any state 
filings, they would have formed a partnership.68  Moreover, because 
they likely did not agree on many (if any) of the details of their relation-
period. . . . The time for uniform laws on entity rationalization has not, and probably 
should never, come.”  Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1042. 
 65. See supra notes 62, 64. 
 66. However, the ABA’s web site explains that the mission of the Entity 
Rationalization Committee includes “working to analyze the substantive differences 
among entity forms, and to develop a scheme to integrate existing entity laws into a 
comprehensive code that reduces the number of entity forms . . . .”  AM. BAR ASS’N, 
ENTITY RATIONALIZATION, http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL980000 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
 67. Granted, due to the recent statutory changes discussed above, see supra notes 
51-53 and accompanying text, a limited partner in a limited partnership or an LLLP 
need not be “passive.”  It is also true that a limited partner may not be “sophisticated.”  
Historically, however, the limited partnership form was used for somewhat 
“specialized” transactions involving a general partner who would run the business and 
passive (and wealthy) limited partners who contributed the capital.  See, e.g., Rutledge, 
supra note 35, at *3 (“Occasionally we would encounter a limited partnership, typically 
in one of its traditional applications for real estate or other financing in which the 
investors were expected and expecting to take a passive role . . . .”). 
 68. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997).  No state filings are required to form a 
partnership. 
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ship, the partnership statute would provide a comprehensive set of 
“default
Importantly, these default rules are protective of C, even if he has 
not done any advance planning.  For example, although he has no de-
fault right to be paid a salary,70 C could force the partnership to “buy 
him out” simply by dissociating (withdrawing) from the partnership.71  
Thus, in a partnership, C has important exit rights that he would not 
have in a corporation or an LLC unless he had previously contracted for 
them.72  Furthermore, while C could have been removed from decision-
making positions in an LLC or a corporation,73 each partner in a partner-
ship has equal management rights with respect to the partnership, unless 
otherwise agreed.74  While the usual rule in a partnership is majority 
rule, actions that are outside the ordinary course of business require 
unanimous consent, unless otherwise agreed.75  Partners are also entitled 
to more access to information about the business than are shareholders.76  
Further, long-standing case law holds that partners owe fiduciary duties 
to one another,77 which could be used to challenge abusive majority 
 69. See id. § 103(a) (“[R]elations among the partners and between the partners and 
the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement.  To the extent that the part-
nership agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the 
partners and between the partners and the partnership.”). 
 70. Id. § 401(h). 
 71. Upon a partner’s dissociation, the partnership will either be dissolved or con-
tinue without the dissociated partner.  If A, B, and C have formed an “at will” partner-
ship (as opposed to a partnership for a term or an undertaking), C’s dissociation will 
cause the partnership to be dissolved, unless otherwise agreed.  Id. § 801(1). Upon dis-
solution, the partnership would enter into a period of winding up during which it would 
complete unfinished business, pay creditors, and (funds permitting) distribute any re-
maining funds to the partners according to their interests.  See id. §§ 802, 807.  General-
ly, if the partners had instead formed a partnership for a term or an undertaking, C could 
still dissociate at any time (albeit “wrongfully”) and require the partnership to “buy out” 
his interest.  See id. §§ 701(a), 701(b), 602(b); see also UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(1)(b) 
(1914). 
 72. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. 
 73. A and B, in their capacities as directors, could remove C from officer positions 
and, in their capacities as shareholders, could remove C from the board of directors.  
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.01, 8.08 (1984). 
 74. See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(f) (1997). 
 75. Id. § 401(j). 
 76. Compare UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 403(b), 103(b)(2) (1997) with MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT §§ 16.02(b), (c), 16.20  (1984). 
 77. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Joint ad-
venturers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty 
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tactics.  Although C could have unwittingly bargained away some of 
these protections, this is unlikely.  Thus, partnership law itself is ordi-
narily sufficient to protect C from the more egregious of A and B’s 
actions, or at least give him an “exit” out of an abusive partnership 
relationship.78 
B. How Can I Oppress You?  Let Me Count the Ways 
What is a “Closely Held” Business?  Before cataloging the ways in 
which a majority79 faction in a closely held business can abuse a mi-
nority owner, it may be helpful to define the terms “close” or “closely 
held.”80  One well-known definition is found in Donahue v. Rodd 
 
of finest loyalty. . . .  A [partner] is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior.”).  But see Siegel, supra note 10, at 442 (Meinhard has 
“little specific content”); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (1997) (the “only fiduciary” duties of 
partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, both as delineated in that section).  
Some states have imposed partner-like duties on shareholders in closely held corpo-
rations.  See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text. 
 78. In addition, C is protected from having his interest in the partnership diluted by 
the addition of new partners, because unanimous partner consent is needed to admit 
new partners (absent a contrary agreement).  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(i) (1997).  In con-
trast, shareholders and LLCs members do not usually have preemptive rights.   See infra 
notes 136-37, 170 and accompanying text. 
 79. Two other important terms are used often in this Article:  “minority” and 
“majority.”  These terms obviously refer to the relative percentages of voting equity that 
the various owners (or groups thereof) have in the business.  To take a simple example, 
if A and B are the two shareholders of a corporation that has only one class of voting 
stock, and A owns 51% of the outstanding stock and B owns 49%, then obviously A is 
the majority shareholder and B is the minority shareholder.  Under traditional plurality 
(also known as “straight”) voting, the holder (or holders, if they are acting in concert) of 
a majority of the outstanding shares of voting stock can elect all the directors.  See, e.g., 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (1984); GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 482.  Because A 
can elect all the directors, and the board normally makes the important business deci-
sions for the corporation, A has “control” of the corporation.  Thus, commentators often 
refer to the “majority” as the shareholder(s) who can “control the operations of the 
firm.”  Moll, supra note 8, at 883-84 n.1. 
 80. Although the terms are used interchangeably in this Article, there is a dis-
tinction between a “close” corporation and a “closely held” corporation.  The former is 
a corporation with a small number of shareholders and that qualifies under portions of 
the relevant corporation statute designed for “close” corporations and discussed below 
at notes 199-219 and accompanying text.  “Closely held” corporations, on the other 
hand, also have few shareholders, “but the corporation either has not elected special 
status under its respective statute’s close corporation provisions, does not qualify under 
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Electrotype Company of New England, Inc.,81 where the court wrote that 
a close corporation is “typified by:  (1) a small number of stockholders; 
(2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority 
stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of 
the corporation.”82  Although there does not appear to be any accepted 
level at which a corporation’s shareholders become too numerous for the 
corporation to be considered a “close” corporation, as a practical matter 
the characteristic that most if not all of the shareholders are active in 
management of the corporation will limit this number to probably fewer 
than ten.83  In any event, the close corporation shareholder is obviously 
in a very different situation than the shareholder in a publicly traded 
corporation, who in most cases will simply be an investor who neither 
its respective statute, or its statute does not provide for this separate category of 
corporations.”  Siegel, supra note 10, at 378 n.2. 
 81. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
 82. Id. at 511; see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 325 (9th unabr. ed. 2005) (“Close corporations have only a 
small number of shareholders, and are often characterized by owner-management and 
restrictions on the transferability of ownership interests.  In important respects, close 
corporations resemble partnerships . . . .”); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.06 (1992) (defining a closely 
held corporation as “a corporation the equity securities . . . of which are owned by a 
small number of persons, and for which securities no active trading market exists”); 
Robert W. Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, Corporate Law, and 
Private Ordering with Closely-Held Business Associations, 2005 U. ILL. L. Rev. 171, 
179 (“participants’ investments in [closely held businesses] often are substantial, 
nondiversified and illiquid. . . .  Moreover, these owners may invest their energy as well 
as their money, and a quick glance at a balance sheet assessing capital contributions 
provides only a small measure of what they have actually invested in their firms.”); 
Kleinberger, supra note 17, at 1148 (“Close corporations have a limited number of 
shareholders, and most, if not all, of the shareholders are active in the corporation’s 
day-to-day business.  The corporation typically is an important (and often principal) 
source of income for each shareholder.  Payout is frequently in the form of salary rather 
than dividends.”) (footnotes omitted).  As Professor Thompson observed, closely held 
corporations have the following characteristics: 
(i) participants usually expect to be actively involved in the management and 
operation of the enterprise; (ii) the lack of a market for shares . . . means that a 
minority shareholder has no satisfactory way to leave the enterprise; and (iii) when 
dissension occurs within the enterprise, the norms [of corporate law] of centralized 
control and majority rule . . . may be used by those in control of the corporation to 
undermine the expectations of minority participants. 
Thompson, Cause of Action, supra note 17, at 717 (footnotes omitted). 
 83. Some statutes, however, allow corporations with greater numbers of share-
holders to elect to be considered a statutory “close” corporation.  See infra note 237. 
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works for the corporation nor is involved in its management, and may 
only hold the corporation’s stock for a short period of time.  The close 
corporation shareholder, on the other hand, has a much more “intimate” 
relationship with the corporation and the other shareholders. 84  If the 
shareholders of a close corporation do not get along, serious problems 
are likely to arise. 
 
What Can Go Wrong For the Minority Owner of a Closely Held 
Business?  The following section describes some of the more “popular” 
techniques for taking advantage of a minority shareholder in a close 
corporation.  Because this is a topic that has received much scholarly 
attention, the following discussion is only a brief summary.85  Also, 
given the long history of the corporation compared to the relative upstart 
LLC, most of the reported decisions concern corporations instead of 
LLCs.86  However, commentators have argued that the possibility for 
minority abuse is just as likely in the LLC.87 
 
 Loss of Employment.  Perhaps the most serious blow that can be 
dealt to a minority owner in a closely held business is being fired from, 
or otherwise denied, employment.  While it is true, of course, that there 
are many different types of investors in closely held businesses, a major 
reason why a minority shareholder became a shareholder may have been 
 84. Thompson, Cause of Action, supra note 17, at 702. 
 85. See supra note 17 for a sampling of the articles that have been written on this 
topic.  For a more thorough discussion of common tactics of minority abuse, see 
O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, at 3-1 to 3-198. 
 86. See Miller, supra note 33, at 389 (LLC oppression case law is “still in its 
infancy.”). 
 87. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 6:1, at 6-2 (LLC is “a newer form of 
business that . . . promises to raise many traditional squeeze-out issues.”); Moll, supra 
note 8, at 956 (“[T]he ‘seeds’ of oppression are, in many jurisdictions, present in the 
LLC setting.  The same combination of ‘no exit’ and majority rule – a combination that 
has left minority shareholder vulnerable in the close corporation for decades – exists in 
the LLC.”) (footnote omitted); James R. Cambridge, Minority Member Oppression, 
XXVI MICH. BUS. L.J. 11, 11 (Spring 2007) (“The oppression of a minority owner can 
occur in any business organization – a corporation, partnership or limited liability 
company . . . .”).  The trend among state LLC statutes appears to be in favor of the rule 
that LLC members may not freely withdraw and expect to receive a pay-out unless 
otherwise provided in the operating agreement.  See Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out 
Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the 
Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 426-33 
(2001). 
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to create a job for himself.  Often, a salary is the way a minority owner 
extracts most of his “return” from his investment in the company,88 
especially given that the corporation receives a deduction for salaries 
paid to employees, but not for dividends paid to shareholders.89  But un-
less the minority shareholder has an employment agreement, the majori-
ty may easily fire him with few obstacles.  First, the “at will” rule pre-
vails in United States employment law, meaning that an employer may 
freely fire an employee for any reason or no reason, outside a few 
limitations such as anti-discrimination statutes.90  Second, the entity that 
makes employment decisions in the corporation is usually the board of 
directors, at least insofar as officers or other management-level employ-
ees are concerned.91  Third, a majority shareholder in a corporation will, 
in the absence of a shareholder voting agreement, control the board of 
directors.92 
 88. As O’Neal and Thompson put it: 
A person acquiring a substantial interest in a closely held business often invests a 
large percentage of personal resources to acquire that interest.  Typically such an 
investor enters the enterprise expecting to participate actively in the entity’s affairs as 
a key employee and perhaps as a manager, for example as a director and principal 
officer of a corporation.  The investor may give up employment with accumulated 
seniority and security features to work full time for the new business.  Often the 
participant may have no income other than the salary from the business.  Close 
corporations usually do not pay dividends or pay only small and infrequent dividends 
so that a shareholder excluded from employment is effectively denied anything more 
than a token return on the investment even though that investment may be substantial. 
O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 3:6 at 3-37 to 3-38 (footnotes omitted); see also 
Moll, Fair Value, supra note 17, at 340 (“For many close corporation investors, the 
desire for employment . . . is the principal enticement motivating their decision to com-
mit capital to a venture.”); Thompson, Cause of Action, supra note 17, at 702 (share-
holders in close corporations “usually expect employment and a meaningful role in 
management . . . .”). 
 89. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2008).  Thus, a “C” corporation may lessen its tax liability 
by paying large salaries to its shareholders-employees.  See also GEVURTZ, supra note 
23, at 451 (describing reasons for the “extraordinarily common practice of closely held 
corporations distributing the bulk, if not all, of their income to their owners through 
salaries rather than dividends”). 
 90. GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 460.  See generally Margaret H. Paget, Exceptions 
to the At-Will Employment Doctrine and Its Applicability to Minority Shareholders, 88 
MASS. L. REV. 41, 41 (2003). 
 91. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40(b) (1984) (amended 2000). 
 92. As discussed in note 79 supra, the holder(s) of a majority of the voting stock in 
a corporation will be able to elect the entire board of directors.  Even if cumulative 
voting is used, it is likely that the majority shareholder(s) will be able to elect a majority 
of the directors.  For a discussion of cumulative voting, see infra note 128. 
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 Withholding Dividends.  Another common “squeeze-out” tech-
nique or method of “oppression” is to withhold dividends, particularly if 
this is coupled with a denial of employment to the minority.  As with 
employment decisions, dividend decisions rest with the board of direc-
tors,93 and the majority shareholder(s) will be in control of the board.  
The minority shareholder now finds that, although he is still one of the 
owners of the business and may in fact own a sizable percentage of the 
corporation’s stock, he is no longer receiving any return from that own-
ership:  no salary, no dividends and, due to the lack of a market, little or 
no ability to realize a gain on the resale of his stock. 
 
 Self-Dealing Transactions.  Given that it controls the board of 
directors and that the board is the ultimate decision-making authority in 
the corporation,94 the majority is in a position to engage in a number of 
“sweetheart” deals with itself.  For example, the majority could cause 
the board to increase the salary or salaries of the member(s) of the ma-
jority group (which could easily be done, given that the corporation 
would no longer be using cash to pay a salary to the minority share-
holder or dividends to any shareholders).  Family members could be 
hired at overly generous salaries.95  Corporate assets could be sold to the 
majority for less than their fair market values.96  The corporation could 
buy or lease assets from the majority for exorbitant prices or redeem 
stock from majority shareholders but deny that opportunity to the 
minority.97  The list goes on.98 
 93. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(a) (1984) (amended 1987) 
 94. See, e.g., id. § 8.01(b) (1984) (amended 2005). 
 95. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, at 3-55, and 3-140 to 3-141. 
 96. See id. at 3-122. 
 97. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 
505 (Mass. 1975). 
 98. The self-dealing transactions described in this paragraph would involve not just 
indirect harm to the minority shareholder, but direct harm to the corporation.  Thus, the 
minority shareholder could bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation against 
the wrongdoer(s).  However, derivative actions involve, to say the least, procedural 
“hurdles” not involved in ordinary litigation.  For this reason, a major issue in litigation 
involving close corporations is whether the action must be brought as a derivative 
action (in which event any judgment would be recovered by the corporation) or whether 
it may instead be brought as a director action.  The ALI Principles of Corporate 
Governance provide that most close-corporation disputes may be brought as direct 
actions if they do not “(i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multi-
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 Force-Outs.  Another possibility is to eliminate the minority’s 
ownership interest.  For example, the majority owners could form a new 
company of which they are the sole owners, and merge the existing 
company into the new company in a “cash out” merger, thus eliminating 
the minority’s equity position.  A similar tactic would be to sell the 
assets of the existing company to the new company, and then dissolve 
the existing company. 
C. Why is Combating Minority Owner Oppression Difficult? 
Let’s assume the worst:  A and B take some of the “oppressive” 
actions discussed above against C.  Although C did not engage in any 
advance planning, is it really that difficult for C to combat A and B’s 
conduct under “traditional” corporate law rules?  Unfortunately, it is. 
 
Minority Shareholders Usually Lack “Exit Rights.”  Witnessing the 
breakdown of relations with A and B, C reasonably may conclude that 
the most viable option is to “walk away,” perhaps start a new business 
with a pay-out from the corporation in exchange for surrendering his 
stock.  After all, even if C goes to the trouble and expense of suing A 
and B – and is lucky enough to obtain some form of judicial relief – it 
seems likely that A and B will engage in other forms of abusive conduct 
in the future.  At best, the “atmosphere” at the office will likely be quite 
cold.  The problem, however, is that no pay-out is forthcoming. 
Absent a contractual obligation or a provision in its articles of 
incorporation or bylaws, a corporation has no obligation to repurchase a 
shareholder’s stock.99  For a shareholder in a publicly traded corporation 
(or at least one with a relatively liquid and orderly market), this does not 
present much of a problem:  when the shareholder wants to sell his 
 
plicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or 
(iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.”  AM. 
LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 7.01(d) (1992).  In addition, interested-director transactions that were 
not approved by disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders often must meet a 
“fairness” test.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.61(b) (1984) (amended 2005). 
 99. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 87, at 421 (“[T]he corporate shareholder of a 
private company is very much locked into his or her investment absent a buy-sell 
agreement . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).  Of course, absent a contractual restriction, a 
shareholder may freely resell his shares to a third party. 
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stock, a simple telephone call to one’s broker or a few clicks of a com-
puter mouse and the stock will quickly be sold.  For the minority share-
holder in the closely held corporation, however, this option is by defini-
tion unavailable, meaning that finding a buyer could be a difficult pro-
cess.100  Moreover, once a buyer is found, he is not likely to be willing 
to pay the full “intrinsic” value of the stock, particularly if the reason the 
minority shareholder is seeking to sell his stock is internal dissension.101  
The buyer is likely to reduce his offering price to reflect the fact that the 
stock represents a minority position in a firm controlled by a majority 
group, and that the stock is not liquid.102  Coupled with the fact that 
corporations may have perpetual life,103 this difficulty in finding a buyer 
means that a minority shareholder is often “locked in” to his investment; 
the minority shareholder “who has fallen out with the majority faces the 
prospect of the majority having indefinite use of any capital he or she 
 100. See, e.g., Chittur, supra note 17, at 135 (“The minority in the close corporation 
. . . is left without systemic protection.  This arrangement is the equivalent of a political 
system that does not permit minorities to emigrate.”); Haynsworth, supra note 17, at 29 
(“The illiquidity of close corporation stock is not only a major cause of intra-
shareholder dissension, but it also contributes to the difficulty of remedying dissension 
once it occurs.”) (footnote omitted); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 17, at 6 (“No 
other form of business organization subjects an owner to the dual hazards of complete 
loss of liquidity and an indefinite exclusion for sharing in [profits].”). 
 101. See Kleinberger, supra note 17, at 1148 (“As a business matter, who would 
want to buy a [minority position in a] company when the seller is leaving because 
‘things turned sour’?”); Utset, supra note 8, at 1342 (“A minority shareholder selling 
for a legitimate reason may find it difficult to convince a buyer that his attempt to exit is 
not due to a problem with the business or with the majority shareholder.”). 
 102. Utset, supra note 8, at 1342 (“Valuing close corporation shares is made 
difficult by the non-existence of a liquid market or other objective valuation mechan-
isms.”). 
 103. As discussed above, see supra note 71 and accompanying text, a partner often 
may trigger the dissolution of the partnership by dissociating by express will.  Once a 
partnership goes into dissolution, pays its creditors, and otherwise completes its 
winding up process, any left-over funds will be distributed to the partners.  UNIF. P’SHIP 
ACT § 807(b) (1997).  The dissolution of a corporation is not so easily (or single-
handedly) achieved; under most corporate statutes, it requires a shareholder vote, and 
obviously the holders of a minority of the outstanding voting stock of the corporation 
will not be able to force a dissolution over the objections of the majority shareholder(s).  
See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 14.02(e), 7.25(c) (1984).  Another type of dissolu-
tion is sometimes called “involuntary” dissolution; as discussed below, see infra notes 
194-97 and accompanying text, many statutes allow shareholders to petition the court 
for dissolution of the corporation upon a showing of grounds such as deadlock or 
“oppression.” 
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has contributed to the enterprise with no immediate return.”104  As a 
result, “[m]ore than any other characteristic, this ‘no exit’ phenomenon 
has pushed the law into developing special rules for shareholders in 
close corporations.”105 
 
Majority Control and the Business Judgment Rule.  In most states 
in the mid-twentieth century, the minority shareholder was confronted 
with the following dilemma:  while the corporate statute assumed major-
ity control and limited shareholder involvement in corporate decisions, 
courts often invalidated attempts by shareholders to “contract around” 
these statutory norms.106  Instead, the law offered shareholders protect-
tion in the form of fiduciary duties imposed on directors.107  However, 
the “effectiveness of this fiduciary norm in protecting minority share-
holders was limited by the liberal judicial use of the business judgment 
rule, a doctrine which embodies a broad judicial deference to the corpo-
ration’s board of directors to determine business policy and to conduct 
corporate affairs.”108 
 104. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 17, at 197. 
 105. Kleinberger, supra note 17, at 1149. 
 106. See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text. 
 107. At the risk of vastly oversimplifying a complex topic, directors (as well as 
officers) owe two primary duties to the corporation and, depending on who one asks, 
perhaps to the shareholders as well: a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.  See generally 
GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 273-437.  These duties, coupled with the ability to enforce 
them through the mechanism of the shareholder derivative action (see supra note 98), 
will protect the minority shareholder to some degree.  In addition, other “general” cor-
porate law rules will protect the minority shareholder, such as the prohibition on non-
pro rata dividends or other distributions.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(a)) 
(1984) (amended 2003).  For a forceful argument that existing legal rules and non-legal 
constraints are largely sufficient to protect minority shareholders in close corporations 
with high investments in “match specific” assets (i.e., assets that are more valuable to 
the company’s insiders than to third parties, such as the intellectual property rights to a 
new invention that is still being developed) from opportunistic behavior by the majority 
shareholders, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to 
Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. 
L. 913, 915 (1998-99). 
 108. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 17, at 195 (footnotes omitted); 
see also Kleinberger, supra note 17, at 1152 (“[T]raditional corporate law doctrine 
facilitates the oppression of minority shareholders.  In traditional theory, ultimate 
authority resides with the board of directors, and the business judgment rule makes it 
very difficult for a disgruntled shareholder to challenge the board’s decision.”). 
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While a detailed discussion of the business judgment rule is outside 
the scope of this Article, it may be summarized as a judicial “hands off” 
philosophy; courts will not interfere with business decisions made by 
directors unless the person challenging the action can show some reason 
not to “trust” the board, such as fraud, illegality, or a conflict of interest, 
or that the directors were not reasonably informed when they reached 
their decision.109  Absent these facts, the board’s decision will stand, and 
the directors will not be liable for whatever damages the corporation suf-
fered as a result of the decision.110  One premise of the business judg-
ment rule is that business decisions always involve a degree of un-
certainty, and that courts should not punish directors for poor decisions 
that were made in good faith.  If the rule were otherwise, few people 
would serve as directors for fear of exposing themselves to enormous 
liability, even if insurance and indemnification were available.111  This 
would leave many corporations without competent minds to guide them.  
On the other hand, the business judgment rule does not give the majority 
shareholders (in their capacities as directors) carte blanche to do any-
thing:  “the business judgment rule . . . is not a license for boards to 
exercise unlimited discretion; boards are given great leeway, but they 
must not commit fraud or grossly abuse their discretion.”112 
The problem for a minority shareholder in a closely held corpora-
tion is that most decisions that may adversely affect him, such as the 
termination of his employment and dividends, are director decisions.113  
Thus, the business judgment rule would shield these decisions from 
judicial inquiry unless the plaintiff could show that they were tainted by 
a conflict of interest or other ground for overcoming the business judg-
ment rule.  While it may be easy to show that some director decisions 
were the products of a conflict of interest (e.g., where the majority in-
creases its own salaries), it may be difficult to do so with other decisions 
 109. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (business judgment 
rule is a presumption that the directors made a decision “on an informed basis, in good 
faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company”).  See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998 & Supps). 
 110. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 111. Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and 
Accountability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 58-59 
(2008). 
 112. Siegel, supra note 10, at 452 (footnote omitted). 
 113. See GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 452. 
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(e.g., the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment).  If the plain-
tiff cannot overcome the business judgment rule, he will lose the case.114 
The “no exit” situation, coupled with the business judgment rule, 
means that traditional corporate law makes it difficult for an abused 
minority shareholder who has not engaged in adequate planning to com-
bat the situation effectively.  Partly as a result, the law has developed 
some avenues by which the minority shareholder may attempt to obtain 
some relief.  Before turning to those developments (and their short-
comings), however, we will briefly review some of the planning that 
could have protected the minority shareholder. 
D. How the Minority Could Have Protected Itself in Advance  
1. In the Corporation 
Employment Agreements.  As discussed above,115 many share-
holders in close corporations depend on a salary to earn a return on their 
investment, yet may be easily fired due to the usual “at will” employ-
ment rule.  Thus, the minority shareholder who is an employee would be 
well advised to limit the corporation’s ability to terminate his employ-
ment.  The usual way of doing this is through an employment agreement 
with the corporation, providing that the employee will be employed for a 
specified period of time and that this employment may not be earlier 
 
 114. See generally id. at 452-53 (discussing the difficulties that the business judg-
ment rule presents for the minority shareholder complaining that his employment was 
terminated and/or that dividends were improperly withheld).  For an argument that it is 
inappropriate to apply the business judgment rule in the context of disputes between 
shareholders of close corporations, see Chittur, supra note 17, at 156-61.  See also Moll, 
Dividend Policy, supra note 17, at 863 (The “business judgment rule is an uneasy fit in 
the close corporation context, and its minimal inquiry into the propriety of the major-
ity’s decision is inconsistent with the thrust of the shareholder oppression doctrine.”).  
In Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2000), the court observed: 
[M]any of Hill’s alleged “oppressive” acts, including the . . . termination of employ-
ment, and the cessation of benefits, are classic examples of acts typically shielded 
from judicial scrutiny under the business judgment rule. Generally, employees who 
are adversely affected by such officer and director decisions may not claim oppression 
. . . even if they are also shareholders of the corporation.  Certain actions by a director, 
however, receive much different treatment when the corporation only has a few 
shareholders, including that director. 
Id. at 467 (footnote omitted). 
 115. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
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terminated without some defined “cause.”116  Although an employment 
agreement will not prevent termination altogether, a firing without a 
listed “cause” would constitute a breach of contract.  Damages (typically 
lost wages, subject to an obligation to mitigate damages by searching for 
other employment) would be easy to determine.117 
 
Buy-Sell Agreements.  Because close corporation shareholders lack 
an easy “exit”, it is critical to have a buy-sell agreement that obligates 
the corporation or the other shareholders to buy the minority’s stock in 
certain events, such as when the minority’s employment is terminated.  
Although negotiating and drafting a buy-sell agreement is not a simple 
process because it must address important and thorny issues (such as 
how the price of the stock will be determined and how and when the 
price will be paid118), the minority shareholder’s failure to have a buy-
 116. Stewart J. Schwab and Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO 
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For, 63 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 231, 248-49 (2006).  Even with an employment agreement that limits the “at will” 
status of the employee, incomplete planning can still result in unfortunate results.  In 
Franchino v. Franchino, 687 N.W.2d 620 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004), the plaintiff’s 
employment agreement provided that he could be terminated only by unanimous 
consent of the directors.  Because the plaintiff and the defendant (his father) were the 
only two directors, the plaintiff probably thought that his job was safe – obviously he 
would not vote for his own termination.  However, in 2001, after many disputes, the 
defendant (who owned 69% of the stock) removed the plaintiff from the board and then, 
as the sole director, “unanimously” terminated the plaintiff’s employment.  Id. at 623.  
The plaintiff sued for “oppression” statute but was not successful because the Michigan 
statute provided at the time that oppression meant “a continuing course of conduct or a 
significant action or series of actions that substantially interferes with the interests of 
the shareholder as a shareholder.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1489(3) (2006) 
(emphasis added).  Although the plaintiff argued that his firing constituted oppression 
of his rights as a shareholder because most of his return on his stock was paid in the 
form of his salary rather than dividends, the court disagreed because shareholder rights 
only include “voting at shareholder’s meetings, electing directors, adopting bylaws, 
amending charters, examining the corporate books, and receiving corporate dividends.”  
687 N.W.2d at 628. 
 117. ROBERT S. THOMPSON ET AL., REMEDIES:  DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESTITUTION 
1049 (3d ed. 2002). 
 118. For some important drafting considerations for buy-sell agreements, see Julius 
H. Giarmarco, Succession Planning, in ADVISING CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES IN 
MICHIGAN, supra note 3, §§ 7.2 – 7.13 (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
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sell agreement in place will leave him without a viable exit if things turn 
sour.119 
 
Dissolution Provisions.  Another option is to include a provision in 
the company’s articles of incorporation stating that the company will be 
dissolved if any of the founding shareholders (or some other designated 
group) ceases to be employed by the corporation, either for any reason 
or if a founding shareholder is discharged from employment without 
cause. 
 
Voting and Governance Agreements.  Shareholders may agree how 
they will vote their stock in the future.120  Thus, A, B, and C could have 
entered into a voting agreement that specifies that they would vote their 
shares such that A, B, and C – and no other persons – are elected to the 
board.  This would guarantee C a spot on the board (albeit a minority 
one); if the agreement were breached, he could sue for specific 
performance.121  A limitation on the efficacy of a shareholder voting 
agreement, however, is the fact that the role of shareholders in corporate 
governance is usually limited to voting on the election or removal of 
directors and certain “organic” changes, such as mergers, significant as-
set sales, and amendments to the articles of incorporation.  The decisions 
that are more important for C, such as the selection and compensation of 
officers and the declaration of dividends, are board decisions.  May A, 
B, and C, in their capacities as directors, agree in advance on certain 
matters that would normally be considered board decisions?  For a long 
time, the answer was “no.”122 
 119. This is not really a problem for a partner because the partnership statute gives 
him a “built-in” buy-sell agreement in the form of his ability to trigger dissolution of the 
partnership.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  This power may give the 
partner bargaining leverage to negotiate favorable exit terms. 
 120. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.31 (1984); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & 
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 444 (Del. 1947); see also 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.30 (1984) (voting trusts). 
 121. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.31(b) (1984). 
 122. For example, in McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934), three 
shareholders entered into an agreement that specified they would use their best efforts 
to ensure that each was appointed to a specified officer position and paid a specified 
salary.   The court ruled that “contracts whereby limitations are placed on the power of 
directors to manage the business of the corporation by the selection of agents at defined 
salaries,” are unenforceable.  Id. at 236. 
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Many states’ statutes, however, now permit such an agreement, 
provided certain safeguards are observed.  For example, Section 7.32 of 
the Model Business Corporation Act (the “MBCA”) essentially allows 
the parties to structure corporate governance rules as they see fit.  One of 
the unusual things that could be accomplished with a Section 7.32 agree-
ment is that it may establish “who shall be the directors or officers . . . or 
their terms of office or manner of selection or removal.”123  In other 
words, decisions that traditionally were off-limits to advance agreement 
among the directors, such as the identities of the officers and their 
salaries, can be addressed in a Section 7.32 agreement.  Although a 
Section 7.32 agreement must be in writing and approved by all of the 
shareholders,124 these are not difficult hurdles in a closely held corpo-
ration.125 
 
Cumulative Voting.  The holder of a majority of the outstanding 
voting stock of a corporation usually has the ability to elect all of the 
directors.126  Although cumulative voting will not give a minority share-
holder the power to elect a majority of the board,127 it may be an impor-
tant device to ensure that the minority – assuming that he owns enough 
 123. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a)(3) (1984) (added 1990). 
 124. Id. § 7.32(b)(1). 
 125. Statutes validating such agreements sometimes take a curious approach.  Rather 
than specifically providing that the agreement is enforceable, a statute may provide that 
the agreement will not be viewed as unenforceable because of certain arguments.  For 
example, a Delaware statute provides that that no stockholders’ agreement or charter 
provision “shall be invalid on the ground that it is an attempt . . . to arrange relations 
among the stockholders or between the stockholders and the corporation in a manner 
that would be appropriate only among partners.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (2006).  
This language may have been chosen simply to reject “an early line of cases . . . that 
more often than not invalidated shareholders’ agreements on the grounds captured today 
in the statute.”  JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 14.02, at 386 
(2d ed. 2003).  However, it still “invite[s] the resourceful lawyer to identify a basis not 
already negated in the statute as the missile to sink the shareholders’ agreement.”  Id.  
The MBCA, on the other hand, specifies that such an agreement “is effective.”  MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (1984) (added 1990). 
 126. See supra note 79. 
 127. Thus, the minority should negotiate for a veto power over some board deci-
sions, such as by including unanimous or supermajority approval requirements for cer-
tain actions in the corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws, as discussed below 
infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. 
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shares128 – can elect at least one director (probably himself) to the board 
and have the resulting access to information about the corporation.129  In 
order for cumulative voting to apply, most state statutes require that it be 
specified in the corporation’s articles of incorporation.130  Another way 
to ensure that the minority director could elect someone to the board 
would be to create separate classes of stock that are identical in all 
respects except that each class is entitled to elect a designated number of 
persons to the board, to the exclusion of the other classes.131 
 
Supermajority Voting Requirements.  Yet another alternative for C 
is to have a “veto” over certain corporation decisions.  Statutes typically 
provide that a corporation’s articles of incorporation may increase the 
usual majority voting or quorum requirements necessary for sharehold-
ers to approve an action.132  The same may often be done with director 
decisions.133  Thus, the corporation’s charter documents could provide 
that certain actions, such as a merger or asset sale, the approval of offi-
cer compensation, the issuance of additional shares of stock, or the 
removal of an officer or director,134 can only be taken by unanimous 
director or shareholder consent or at least some percentage of the direc-
tors or shares that will necessitate C’s approval. 
 
Preemptive Rights.  From a “control” perspective (other than cumu-
lative voting), it may not matter a great deal whether C owns 49% of the 
 128. One formula used for cumulative voting is S / (D+1) + “1” = X, where S is the 
number of shares that will be voted at the shareholders’ meeting, D is the number of 
director positions to be elected at that meeting, “1” means to round up to the next 
nearest whole number, and X is the number of shares a shareholder needs to own to 
ensure that he will be able to elect one person of his choosing to the board.  In cumula-
tive voting, a shareholder has a number of votes equal to the number of shares that he 
owns multiplied by the number of director positions.  See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 7.28(c) (1984). 
 129. Although shareholders do have limited rights to inspect corporate books and 
records and receive other corporate information, directors have a much greater right to 
do so.  See GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 194. 
 130. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.28(a), (b) (1984). 
 131. See generally GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 496-98. 
 132. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.28(a) (1984); see also id. § 7.27(a) 
(1984). 
 133. See, e.g., id. § 8.24(c). 
 134. As for the removal of directors, C would also be well-advised to make sure that 
the articles of incorporation require “cause” to remove a director.  See id. § 8.08. 
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outstanding stock or 1%; regardless, as a minority shareholder he is in 
no position to control the corporation, absent the various contractual and 
charter devices now under consideration.  From an economic perspec-
tive, however, C’s percentage ownership does matter when dividends 
are paid or the corporation is sold.135  As such, C should take steps to 
ensure that he retains his one-third ownership percentage in the com-
pany.  C may either prevent the corporation from issuing additional 
stock and thus diluting C’s percentage (which may be done with a super-
majority provision, as discussed above), or insist on preemptive rights, 
i.e., the right of first refusal to purchase additional shares of the corpo-
ration’s stock if the corporation issues shares.136  In most states, share-
holders do not have preemptive rights unless the articles of incorporation 
provide for them.137  Although preemptive rights would allow C to 
maintain his one-third interest, they will be of little use if C does not 
have the funds with which to buy additional shares. 
 
Arbitration Agreements.  Another option is to have an agreement 
that would refer certain disputes to arbitration.  Important terms of the 
agreement include what types of disputes could be arbitrated and how 
the arbitrator(s) are selected.  Although arbitration can be quicker and 
less expensive than litigation138 and allows the parties to choose arbitra-
tors that have expertise in a given area,139 arbitrators seem to have a ten-
dency to render compromise decisions that are not fully satisfactory to 
either party.140  Also, arbitration “seems to work best as a technique to 
 135. Dividends are paid in proportion to the amount of stock owned by the 
shareholders.  Obviously, a shareholder who owns 49% of the outstanding common 
stock would receive 49% of the total dividends paid on the common stock.  See id. § 
1.40(6) (defining “distribution” as “a direct or indirect transfer of money or other 
property . . . by a corporation to or for the benefit of its shareholders in respect of any of 
its shares”). 
 136. Even if C has no preemptive rights or ability to “block” a stock issuance, he 
may – in theory at least – be protected by the fact that statutes require a corporation’s 
board of directors to determine whether the consideration received by the corporation in 
exchange for stock is adequate.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21(c).  Thus, 
although C’s voting power would be diluted, if the corporation were issuing additional 
shares for adequate consideration, C would have a “smaller piece of a bigger pie.” 
 137. See, e.g., id. § 6.30(a); see also GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 136. 
 138. COX & HAZEN, supra note 125, § 14.13, at 410. 
 139. Elizabeth J. Shampnoi, Arbitration: What You Absolutely Must Know, in REAL 
ESTATE  LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 543, 547 (2007). 
 140. Id. at 549. 
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resolve disputes involving essentially factual issues” and is “less suc-
cessful when used in an attempt to resolve deep-seated management 
policy disputes.”141  In other words, arbitration may be practical if it is 
used infrequently and only to decide a limited range of issues.  But if the 
parties are so antagonistic to one another that arbitration must be used 
frequently, or if arbitration is used to decide fundamental issues con-
cerning the company, the business likely won’t survive without a change 
in ownership.  Arbitration is no way to run a business for extended 
periods.142 
 
Provisional Directors.  Many states allow shareholders in certain 
situations to petition the court to appoint a provisional director, i.e., a 
neutral third party appointed to the board, usually for a limited time.143  
Even without a statute, it may be possible to incorporate such a right in 
the corporation’s charter documents.144  However, a provisional director 
likely will be effective only where there is a deadlock (as opposed to 
shareholder oppression) and the vote of the provisional director would 
break the deadlock.  As such, this most likely will not be as valuable an 
option for a minority shareholder as for an “equal” shareholder.  Also, 
like arbitration, if the “dissension among the shareholders is protracted 
and deep seated,” the use of a provisional director likely will not be an 
effective way to resolve disputes.145 
 141. Haynsworth, supra note 17, at 29; see also COX & HAZEN, supra note 125, § 
14.13 at 410 (“Most objections to arbitration of intracorporate disputes are based on the 
supposed unfitness of the arbitral process for formulating corporate policy and making 
managerial decisions.”). 
 142. For a discussion of legal arguments that may be raised against (and for) the 
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate corporate disputes (i.e., decisions normally 
made by shareholders or directors), see GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 511-13; 9A 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4724 (Supp. Sept. 2006).  For 
a brief discussion of the alternative of mediation, see Susanna M. Kim, The Provisional 
Director Remedy for Corporate Deadlock:  A Proposed Model Statute, 60 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 111, 129-31 (2003). 
 143. Kim, supra note 142, at 114 (“[O]ver twenty states have adopted statutes that 
specifically empower courts to appoint provisional directors in cases of corporate dead-
lock, and courts in all states have the equitable power to order the designation of an 
additional director in lieu of dissolution.”) (footnotes omitted).  Closely related to the 
idea of a provisional director are the ideas of “custodians” and “temporary receivers.”  
See id. at 125-27. 
 144. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 7:23. 
 145. Haynsworth, supra note 17, at 27-28; see also Thompson, Corporate 
Dissolution, supra note 17, at 229. 
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Transfer Restrictions.  Finally, no discussion of protections that a 
minority shareholder should consider would be complete without a 
mention of share transfer restrictions.  A shareholder may freely transfer 
any or all of his shares to a third party unless he has contractually agreed 
not to do so or has granted a right of first refusal in the event of a con-
templated transfer.146  Given the intimate relationship of shareholders in 
a close corporation – many of whom will also be directors, officers, and 
employees of the company – it may be important to control the persons 
to whom shareholders may transfer their shares.  An otherwise harmoni-
ous relationship could be strained by the entrance of a new shareholder.  
Fortunately, most states uphold the validity of such agreements, pro-
vided that they are set forth in the articles or bylaws of the company, or 
in a written agreement between the shareholders and the corporation, 
and are for a “reasonable” purpose.147 
2. In the Limited Liability Company 
Three factors make the following discussion fairly general.  First, 
unlike corporation statutes, the LLC statutes of the various states are 
very diverse and so far no popular model or template seems to have 
emerged.148  For this reason, the following discussion will consider the 
laws of the states of California, Delaware, and New York, as well as the 
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (Re-ULLCA).149  
Second, many LLC statutes allow parties a great degree of contractual 
freedom and contemplate that the LLC will have an operating agree-
 146. See supra note 99. 
 147. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 6.27(c) (1984) (share transfer restrictions 
authorized (1) to maintain the corporation’s status when the status depends on the num-
ber or identity of shareholders, such as “S” corporation status, (2) to preserve securities 
law exemptions, or (3) for any other “reasonable purpose”). 
 148. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 33, at 354-55 (“The now famous ‘Check-the-Box’ 
Regulations heralded substantial revision of state LLC statutes, which are now quite 
varied across the country.”). 
 149. Re-ULLCA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in July 2006.  For a discussion of the differences between Re-
ULLCA and the 1996 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, see Daniel S. 
Kleinberger & Carter G. Bishop, The Next Generation: The Revised Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 515 (2007). 
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ment.150  In other words, an LLC is, to a large degree, whatever its oper-
ating agreement says it is.  Third, there are two basic types of manage-
ment structures in LLCs:  (1) member-managed LLCs, where each 
member has a right to participate in business decisions,151 and (2) 
manager-managed LLCs, where most business decisions are made by 
the manager(s).152  The differences between these types of LLCs can be 
significant.  With those caveats in mind, a few words about how a 
minority LLC member may protect himself are in order. 
 
Employment Agreements.  There is no reason to think that a minor-
ity LLC member would be less interested in employment than would a 
minority shareholder.  However, even in a member-managed LLC, a 
member is not entitled to remuneration for services rendered unless the 
operating agreement so provides.153  Thus, the minority LLC member 
should obtain an employment agreement to document the terms and 
conditions of employment, and to establish a measure of damages if the 
LLC terminates his employment. 
 
Operating Agreement Provisions.  LLC members are largely free to 
determine the LLC’s governance rules through operating agreement 
provisions.154  The extent to which the minority owner needs to protect 
himself will depend on whether the relevant LLC statute provides him 
with favorable default rules. 
 150. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  The two LLC charter documents are 
the articles of organization and the operating agreement, which are somewhat akin to 
the articles of incorporation and bylaws of a corporation, respectively.  Most statutes 
require very little information to be included in the articles of organization, leaving the 
operating agreement to contain most of the LLC’s governance rules.  Cf. Kleinberger & 
Bishop, supra note 149, at 520-21.  One recent empirical study suggests that “form” 
LLC operating agreements are common.  See infra notes 346-55 and accompanying 
text. 
 151. J. William Callison, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance: Evolving the 
Limited Liability Company to Finance the Entrepreneurial Business, 26 IOWA J. CORP. 
L. 97, 107 (2000). 
 152. Id. at 108. 
 153. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17004(b) (West 2006); REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. 
CO. ACT § 407(f) (2006); see also id. § 407 cmt.  Member compensation does not 
appear to be addressed in the Delaware statute.  The New York statute addresses this 
issue indirectly, by providing that LLCs have the power to “elect or appoint managers, 
employees and agents . . . define their duties and fix their compensation.” N.Y. LTD. 
LIAB. CO. LAW § 202(h) (McKinney 2007). 
 154. Kleinberger & Bishop, supra note 149, at 520-21. 
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“Exit Rights.”  An LLC will rarely be publicly traded; if it were, 
then it would be taxable as a corporation155 – a result that the owners 
probably were trying to avoid.  Thus, a minority member will likely face 
the same practical difficulties in reselling his interest as would a minor-
ity shareholder in a closely held corporation.156  Moreover, LLC statutes 
may not grant an LLC member the default ability to withdraw volun-
tarily from the business and receive a buy-out.  Although early LLC 
statutes often provided that a member could easily dissolve the LLC,157 
following the check-the-box regulations, there has been a trend toward 
making LLCs more durable.158  In other words, many LLC statutes do 
not provide members with a default right to withdraw from the LLC 
prior to its dissolution and receive a sum of money from the LLC in 
redemption of their interests.159  If that is the case, the minority member 
would be well-advised to include such rights in the operating agreement. 
 
 155. Sandra K. Miller, The Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability 
While Minimizing Judicial Interference, 87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 134 (2008).  See I.R.C. § 
7704 (2008) (taxing publicly traded partnerships as corporations). 
 156. See supra note 100. 
 157. Under the 1996 version of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, an 
LLC member could dissociate by express will from the LLC and receive the fair value 
of his interest in the LLC.  See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 601(1), 701(a)(1) (1996). 
 158. Although Re-ULLCA provides an LLC member has a broad right to dissociate 
by express will from the LLC, upon dissociation a member is treated as a mere trans-
feree of its transferable interest in the LLC.  Essentially, this means that the dissociated 
member is not entitled to any buy-out of his interest in the LLC.  See REV. UNIF. LTD. 
LIAB. CO. ACT § 603(a) (2006); see also id. § 603 cmt. (“[D]issociation does not entitle 
a person to any distribution.  Like most inter se rules in this Act, this one is subject to 
the operating agreement.”). 
 159. None of the statutes under consideration here provide default exit rights.  In 
Delaware, a member who resigns from the LLC is entitled to receive the “fair value” of 
his interest, unless the operating agreement (called a limited liability company agree-
ment in Delaware) provides otherwise.  DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 18-604 (2005).  While 
at first this seems to provide the LLC member with a default exit right, a member may 
resign only as specified in the operating agreement.  Further, unless the agreement 
provides otherwise, a member may not resign from the LLC before dissolution.  Id. § 
18-603.  Thus, the Delaware LLC member is trapped in his investment until the LLC 
dissolves, unless the operating agreement provides otherwise.  California and New York 
are similar.  See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17252(a) (West 2006); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW 
§§ 606(a), 509 (McKinney 2007). 
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Supermajority Vote Provisions.  Another issue to be addressed is 
the usual “majority-rule” principle in LLCs.  In member-managed LLCs 
most decisions are made by a majority vote.160  How one determines a 
“majority” is a point of departure for many state statutes:  “about half of 
the LLC statutes default to members voting on a per capita (one vote per 
member) basis, while the other half default to members voting on a pro 
rata (by financial interest) basis.”161  Either way, the minority member 
will not be able to determine the outcome of most voting, unless the de-
cision requires a unanimous vote.  Thus, he may be well-advised to en-
sure that the operating agreement will give him a veto over certain deci-
sions, such as mergers or conflict-of-interest transactions. 
In a manager-managed LLC, most decisions are made by the 
manager(s),162 with the voting power of members usually reserved to 
electing managers and voting on certain “major” decisions such as 
mergers and asset sales.163  Thus, the member of a manager-managed 
LLC has somewhat similar voting rights to a corporate shareholder.164  
The question, then, is who elects the managers?  Usually, a majority of 
 160. Moll, supra note 8, at 941-42. 
 161. Id.; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 17103 (West 2006) (in absence of contrary 
provision in articles or operating agreement, LLC members vote in proportion to their 
interests in the profits of the LLC; matters other than the amendment of the articles or 
operating agreement are decided by “a majority in interest of the members”); id. § 
17150 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 18-402 (2005) (unless otherwise provided 
in LLC agreement, management of the LLC is “vested in its members in proportion to 
the then current percentage or other interest of members in the profits . . . the decision 
of members owning more than 50 percent . . . [being] controlling”); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. 
CO. LAW § 402 (McKinney 2007) (unless otherwise provided in the operating agree-
ment, members vote in proportion to their respective shares of the current profits of the 
LLC; member decisions are made by a “majority in interest” or “at least a majority in 
interest”); REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(b) (2006) (unless otherwise provided 
in operating agreement, in member-managed LLC, each member has “equal rights in 
the management and conduct” of LLC business; decisions in the ordinary course of 
business are made by majority of the members, and decisions outside the ordinary 
course or involving an amendment to the operating agreement must be unanimous). 
 162. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17150, 17156 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, §§ 18-
402, 18-404 (2005); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 408 (McKinney 2007); REV. UNIF. 
LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(c) (2006). 
 163. REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(c) (2006). 
 164. Shareholders’ voting rights typically are limited to electing or removing direc-
tors and voting on major events such as mergers, large asset sales, and amendments to 
the articles.  Allison D. Garrett, The Corporation as a Sovereign, 60 ME. L. REV. 129, 
136 (2008). 
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the members elect the managers.165  As such, the minority owner may 
want to consider operating agreement provisions that would allow him 
to elect at least some (albeit a minority) of the managers and prevent the 
removal of managers that he elected. 
 
Fiduciary Duties.  State LLC laws vary widely on the question of 
whether members owe one another or the LLC fiduciary duties and, if 
so, the extent to which those duties may be modified or waived by the 
operating agreement.166  In states where the statute does not address this 
 165. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17152(a) (West 2006) (“Election of managers to 
fill initial positions or vacancies shall be by the affirmative vote of a majority in interest 
of the members.”); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §§ 413(a), 402 (McKinney 2007) (unless 
otherwise provided in operating agreement, managers elected annually by majority in 
interest of the members); REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(c)(5) (2006) (in a 
manager-managed LLC, a “manager may be chosen at any time by the consent of a 
majority of the members”).  In Delaware, an LLC may be manager-managed only if its 
LLC agreement so provides.  In that situation, the statute essentially leaves the manner 
of the election of the manager(s) to the agreement, providing only that the manager(s) 
“shall be chosen in the manner provided in the limited liability company agreement.”  
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2005); see also id. § 18-101(10). 
 166. See generally Miller, supra note 12, at 1622-25 (discussing variations in 
statutes concerning the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, if any, owed by LLC 
members and/or managers).  The four statutes under consideration differ considerably.  
California and Re-ULLCA presume that members, at least in their capacities as 
managers, will owe fiduciary duties akin to partnership-based fiduciary duties.  In 
California, the “fiduciary duties a manager owes to the [LLC] and to its members are 
those of a partner to a partnership and the other partners. . . .”  CAL. CORP. CODE § 
17153 (West 2006); see also id. § 17005(d) (fiduciary duties of manager may be 
modified only in a written operating agreement “with the informed consent of the 
members”); id. § 17150 (in a member-managed LLC, each member is “subject to all 
duties and obligations of managers . . . .”). 
  Under Re-ULLCA, if the LLC is manager-managed, a non-manager owes no 
fiduciary duties to the LLC or other members solely by reason of being a member.  
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(g)(5) (2006).  If the LLC is member-managed, 
however, things are more complex.  First, under Section 409(a) members owe the LLC 
and the other members the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  As for the duty of 
loyalty, Section 409(b) does not provide a complete definition, stating only that the duty 
of loyalty “includes” certain aspects.  This is a change from the approach in RUPA and 
the 1996 ULLCA, both of which provided a purportedly complete definition.  See UNIF. 
P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) (1997); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(b) (1996).  According to 
commentators, the “cabin-in” approach of RUPA and the 1996 ULLCA “ignores the 
implicit fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of members to avoid oppressing fellow 
members, . . . and puts inordinate pressure on the concept of ‘good faith and fair 
dealing.”  Kleinberger & Bishop, supra note 149, at 523 (footnotes omitted).  Under 
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issue, courts might not impose fiduciary duties or might do so in un-
predictable ways.  As one author put it, the “growing movement away 
from the judicial implication of broad fiduciary duties makes it in-
creasingly important for the minority LLC member to obtain express 
contractual protections and for the LLC statute itself to provide a variety 
of minimum statutory protections . . . .”167  Of particular concern here is 
to include an operating agreement provision that allows one or more 
members to remove a manager or managers for breach of fiduciary 
duties (or in other specified circumstances).  If state law doesn’t supply 
an acceptable definition, such fiduciary duties must be defined in the 
operating agreement. 
 
“Oppression” Provisions.  As discussed later,168 an important pro-
tection for minority corporate shareholders are statutes that allow suits 
Re-ULLCA, the operating agreement generally may not eliminate the duties of loyalty 
or care or “any other [i.e., uncodified] fiduciary duty,” REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 
110(c)(4) (2006).  But it may restrict – or even eliminate – certain aspects of the duty of 
loyalty if “not manifestly unreasonable.”  Id. § 110(d)(1).  The operating agreement 
may also identify “specific types or categories of activities” that will not constitute 
loyalty violations. 
  New York’s statute imposes on managers a duty to act “in good faith and with 
that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under 
similar circumstances.”  N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 409(a) (McKinney 2007).  It also 
implicitly recognizes that managers owe a duty of loyalty by including provisions 
concerning conflict-of-interest transactions.  See id. § 411.  Delaware’s LLC statute 
does not expressly impose any fiduciary duties.  In addition, it ostensibly allows the 
LLC agreement to eliminate any fiduciary duties that may exist at common law.  See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005) (“To the extent that, at law or in equity, a 
member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to [an LLC] 
or to another member or manager . . . [such] duties may be expanded or restricted or 
eliminated by provisions in the [LLC] agreement; provided, that the [LLC] agreement 
may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”).  
Re-ULLCA, however, “rejects the ultra-contractarian notion that fiduciary duty within a 
business organization is merely a set of default rules and seeks instead to balance the 
virtues of ‘freedom of contract’ against the dangers that inescapably exist when some 
have power over the interests of others.”  REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110 cmt. 
(2006). 
 167. Miller, supra note 87, at 450.  But see infra notes 257-75 and accompanying 
text.  Writing a few years later, Professor Miller observed that courts are “leading the 
way toward balancing the interest in contractual freedom with the need to constrain 
opportunistic and deceptive conduct through the development of a minimum mandatory 
core of acceptable business conduct.”  Miller, supra note 12, at 1613. 
 168. See infra notes 194-212 and accompanying text. 
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for dissolution of a corporation (or other forms of relief such as a forced 
buy-out of the complaining shareholder) if the directors or those in 
control of the corporation are guilty of “oppressive” behavior.  While 
some states include such provisions in their LLC statutes,169 a minority 
member of an LLC in a state without such protection may be well-
advised to include such a provision in the operating agreement. 
 
Other Protections.  Obviously, the degree to which a minority 
member needs to negotiate for protections will depend on the relevant 
statute.  A few other ideas that should be considered include preemptive 
rights,170 dissenters’ rights in the event of certain business combinations 
involving the LLC,171 and arbitration provisions.172 
II. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
A. In Close Corporations 
Fiduciary Duty Analysis and Oppression Statutes.  Although 
“[e]ach state has a unique regime for addressing minority shareholder 
oppression in closely held businesses,”173 it can fairly be said that two 
primary causes of action have emerged in many states for the minority 
shareholder of a closely held corporation who is aggrieved by conduct of 
the majority. 174  The first avenue for relief, which was judicially created, 
 
 169. See infra notes 276-78. 
 170. For example, Delaware law expressly provides that members do not have 
preemptive rights unless the limited liability company agreement so provides.  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-301(e) (2005). 
 171. The existence of dissenters’ rights softens the blow in a “squeeze out” merger; 
although the majority would have sufficient voting power to cause the LLC to be 
merged into another entity in a transaction in which the minority’s equity interest would 
be eliminated, at least the minority would be able to petition the court to determine the 
fair value of its interest in the LLC.  Some LLC statutes provide dissenters’ rights in 
many business combinations.  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17601 (West 2006); N.Y. 
LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 1002(e) (McKinney 2007).  In a Delaware LLC, dissenters’ 
rights are available only if so provided in the LLC agreement or in the merger agree-
ment.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-210 (2005). 
 172. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
 173. John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority 
Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 661 (2006) (noting that 
this is “a surprising state of affairs for such an important area of corporate law”). 
 174. But see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993) (rejecting 
“special, judicially-created rules to ‘protect’ minority stockholders of closely-held 
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was made famous by Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New 
England, Inc.,175 where the court held that shareholders in a closely held 
corporation owe fiduciary duties to one another that are substantially 
similar to the fiduciary duties that partners owe one another.176  The 
second avenue for relief, which is found in several state statutes,177 is to 
sue for dissolution of their corporations (or other relief178) on the basis 
Delaware corporations”); Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39-40 (Del. 
1996) (holding that although majority stockholders have fiduciary duties to minority 
stockholders qua stockholders, those duties are not implicated when the issue involves 
the rights of the minority stockholder qua employee under an employment contract.). 
See generally Hunt v. Data Mgmt., 985 P.2d 730 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (following 
Delaware law).  For a powerful argument that the Delaware approach is preferable to 
the Massachusetts approach, see Siegel, supra note 10.   For the contrary argument, see 
Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099 (1999).  For the argument that Nixon isn’t really very different 
from the Massachusetts approach, see GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 456-58. 
 175. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
 176. The narrow holding of Donahue was the “equal access rule,” i.e., that if the 
stock of a member of the “controlling group” of a closely held corporation is redeemed, 
“the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an 
equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical 
price.”  Id. at 518.  En route to this holding, however, the court observed that “the close 
corporation bears [a] striking resemblance to a partnership,” that “[c]ommentators and 
courts have noted that the close corporation is often little more than an ‘incorporated’ or 
‘chartered’ partnership,” and that “[j]ust as in a partnership, the relationship among the 
stockholders must be one of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty . . . .”  Id. at 512.  As 
such, it is fair to say that Donahue essentially treated close corporations like partner-
ships in many ways, at least insofar as fiduciary duties are concerned. 
  It is easy to criticize Donahue for jumping to this conclusion; partners should 
be held to high fiduciary duties, but should shareholders?  Partners, for one thing, have 
the ability to bind the partnership (and indirectly the partners) through a broad apparent 
authority power, something which shareholders – at least in their capacities as such – do 
not have.  See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301 (1997).  Secondly, all partners are jointly and 
severally liable for all partnership obligations, see id. § 306, which is opposite the 
limited-liability norm for shareholders.  As such, it seems much more important for 
partners to “behave” than shareholders; your partner can get you in a lot more trouble 
than can your fellow shareholder. 
 177. Dissolution of a corporation for oppression may also be available as a common-
law remedy, even in states with an involuntary dissolution statute.  See, e.g., Lewis v. 
Jones, 483 N.Y.S.2d 868 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
 178. As discussed below, some statutes expressly provide the court with other 
remedial options.  See infra notes 300-11 and accompanying text.  Even if the statute 
ostensibly provides that dissolution is the only possible remedy for oppression, courts 
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of “oppression.”  Although these two avenues are technically distinct, 
“the varied state regimes have begun to converge over the past quarter 
century.”179 
 
Fiduciary Duty Analysis.  As noted above, the Donahue court im-
posed fiduciary duties on the shareholders of a closely held corpora-
tion.180  This was a major break from the traditional view that sharehold-
ers, in their capacities as shareholders, owe no fiduciary duties to the 
corporation or to the other shareholders.181  However, this does not mean 
that every adverse effect on a minority shareholder will give rise to a 
claim that the other shareholders breached their fiduciary duties.  In 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,182 decided by the same court 
one year later, the court seems to have realized that a broad notion of 
fiduciary duties could hamper the efficient operation of the corporation, 
a concern initially raised in the concurring opinion in Donahue.183 
often have used their “inherent equity power as the basis for granting alternative reme-
dies not mentioned in the statute.”  Thompson, Cause of Action, supra note 17, at 721. 
 179. Matheson & Maler, supra note 173, at 665; see also id. at 687-89 (arguing that 
statutory and common-law approaches to minority shareholder oppression have become 
increasingly similar in terms of both the definition of oppression and the available 
remedies).  One commentator observed that “it is sensible to view the parallel develop-
ment of the statutory action and the fiduciary duty action as two sides of the same coin 
– i.e., the shareholder’s cause of action for oppression.”  Moll, Fair Value, supra note 
17, at 305; see also COX & HAZEN, supra note 125, § 14.12 at 404 (“It is . . . safe to say 
that over the past two decades there has been an extensive and significant melding of 
fiduciary standards to state involuntary dissolution statutes such that it is difficult to 
isolate the doctrine of fiduciary obligation in close corporations from involuntary dis-
solution.”); Thompson, Cause of Action, supra note 17, at 700 (“The standards used by 
some courts to determine a breach of fiduciary duty . . . are substantially the same as the 
standards used by other courts to define oppression as a ground for involuntary 
dissolution.”) (footnote omitted).  One commentator, however, argues that “[a]lmost no 
oppression statute . . . can be fairly read as a codification of the majority [Donahue] 
rule.”  Siegel, supra note 10, at 430.  For one thing, only two state dissolution statutes 
provide that Donahue-like fiduciary duties are owed by all shareholders to one another; 
instead, most dissolution statutes apply to oppression by directors, officers, or those in 
“control” of the corporation, which would exclude minority shareholders.  See id. at 
430-31. 
 180. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519. 
 181. See GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 452.  But see id. at 347 (discussing duties of 
controlling shareholders); COX & HAZEN, supra note 125, at 252-58 (same). 
 182. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
 183. The concurring opinion in Donahue expressed concern that the notion of 
fiduciary duties could be taken too far:  “I do not join in any implication . . . that the 
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In Wilkes, a minority shareholder had a falling out with the other 
three shareholders and found his employment terminated, with the result 
that he was earning no return on his investment.184  However, because 
the court was concerned that applying Donahue in an “untempered” 
manner would “unduly hamper [the controlling group’s] effectiveness in 
managing the corporation in the best interests of all concerned,”185 the 
court did not blindly grant relief to the plaintiff.  Instead, it established a 
two-part test.  First, when a minority shareholder brings suit for an 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty in a closely held corporation, the court 
must “carefully analyze” whether “the controlling group can demon-
strate a legitimate business purpose for its action.”186  If such a purpose 
is offered by the defendants, the plaintiff-shareholder must “demonstrate 
that the same legitimate objective could have been achieved through an 
alternative course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest.”187  If 
both parties make their required showings, the court must then “weigh 
the legitimate business purpose, if any, against the practicability of a less 
harmful alternative.”188  Thus, the Wilkes court seemingly contemplated 
a lot of judicial involvement in settling disputes among shareholders.  
Not only must the court determine whether the defendants had a 
“legitimate business purpose” for their actions, but if the defendants had 
 
[equal access rule] applies to all operations of the corporation as they affect minority 
stockholders. That broader issue, which is apt to arise in connection with salaries and 
dividend policy, is not involved in this case. The analogy to partnerships may not be a 
complete one.”  328 N.E.2d at 521 (Wilkins, J., concurring). 
 184. See 353 N.E.2d at 659-61. 
 185. Id. at 663.  The court also noted that the majority had “certain rights to what 
has been termed ‘selfish ownership’ in the corporation which should be balanced 
against the concept of their fiduciary obligation to the minority.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  Wilkes could also be interpreted as adopting the “reasonable expectations” 
test (discussed infra notes 201-12) due to the following statement:  “Wilkes was one of 
the four originators of the nursing home venture; and . . . [had] invested his capital and 
time for more than fifteen years with the expectation that he would continue to 
participate in corporate decisions.”  Id. at 664 (emphasis added).  Earlier, the court 
stated that “by terminating a minority stockholder’s employment or by severing him 
from a position as an officer or director, the majority effectively frustrate the minority 
stockholder’s purposes in entering on the corporate venture and also deny him an equal 
return on his investment.”  Id. at 662-63 (emphasis added); see also Brodie v. Jordan, 
857 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 (Mass. 2006) (after reviewing examples of “freeze-outs,” court 
observed that “[w]hat these examples have in common is that . . . the majority frustrates 
the minority’s reasonable expectations of benefit from their ownership of shares.”). 
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such a purpose, the court must then decide whether it is practical or 
likely that the “less harmful alternative” offered by the plaintiff will 
achieve the purpose offered by the defendants.189 
To be sure, Wilkes and Donahue are not the only cases that have 
applied fiduciary duty analysis, and its application can be much more 
nuanced than the above discussion indicates, particularly at the inter-
section between fiduciary duties and the at-will employment doctrine.190  
It is sufficient to recognize that fiduciary duty analysis is an important – 
albeit clumsy, uncertain, and inefficient – avenue for the abused minor-
ity shareholder who has not engaged in advance planning to fight back.  
Donahue is probably incorrectly described as the majority rule,191 parti-
cularly in light of the fact that a majority of states have “oppression” 
statutes that to some degree render Donahue-based claims unneces-
sary.192  But even Donahue’s strongest detractors acknowledge that it 
has been followed in many states.193 
 
Involuntary Dissolution.  The other main approach to remedying 
the abuse of minority shareholders is to allow dissolution of the corpora-
tion upon a showing that “the directors or those in control of the corpo-
ration have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, op-
pressive, or fraudulent”194 or similar phrases.  At least thirty-seven states 
have such statutes.195  If granted, an order of dissolution under such a 
 
 189. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
 190. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351 (Mass. 1996), in which the 
court found that the majority shareholder did not breach its fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiff-minority shareholder by firing him without a legitimate business purpose.  The 
plaintiff had started as an employee with the company before purchasing stock.  
Importantly, the plaintiff’s firing was in accordance with his employment agreement 
and he was adequately compensated when the corporation redeemed his stock.  
Essentially, the case clarifies that fiduciary duty analysis does not automatically protect 
interests, such as employment, that are not “traditional” shareholder interests. 
 191. See supra note 10. 
 192. See infra notes 194-212 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 416. 
 194. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(a)(2)(ii) (1984) (amended 2006).  
Dissolution-for-oppression statutes date back to at least 1933 in Pennsylvania and 
Illinois.  However, two of the more significant developments in this area, which greatly 
influenced other state statutes, were amendments to the California and New Jersey 
corporate statutes in the 1970’s.  See generally Matheson & Maler, supra note 173, at 
665-68. 
 195. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12.56(a)(3) (West 2004); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1489 (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104-
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statute usually is conditioned on allowing either the corporation or the 
other shareholders to forestall dissolution by purchasing the complaining 
shareholder’s shares at “fair value.”196  Also, many statutes provide for 
relief other than dissolution.197 
As one would guess, most of the litigation in this area focuses on 
whether “oppression” has occurred, particularly since that term often is 
not defined in the statute.  Different courts have offered different defini-
tions, with the “earlier interpretations of oppression speak[ing] in terms 
of wrongful conduct, violations of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, breaches of fiduciary duty, and the like.”198  One court defined 
“oppressive” as “conduct by corporate managers toward stockholders 
which departs from the standards of fair dealing and violates the princi-
ples of fair play on which persons who entrust their funds to a corpora-
tion are entitled to rely.”199  While this definition sounds eloquent, it 
isn’t terribly helpful for the planning attorney or a trial court reviewing 
conduct after the fact.  The subjective and vague nature of these stand-
ards can easily lead one to conclude they are “little more than the court’s 
gut instinct.”200 
A more concrete approach to defining “oppression” is found in In 
re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,201 in which the New York Court of Appeals 
adopted the “reasonable expectations” test: 
A court . . . must investigate what the majority shareholders knew, or 
should have known, to be the petitioner’s expectations in entering 
 
a(1)(1) (McKinney 2003); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 7.05(1)(c) (Vernon 2003). 
 196. Such a provision recognizes what often happens in the “real world”; one study 
found that where courts ordered involuntary dissolution, one group of shareholders 
almost always ended up buying out the other group of shareholders.  See Hetherington 
& Dooley, supra note 17. 
 197. See infra note 308. 
 198. GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 471 (citations omitted). 
 199. Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725, 730 (Va. 1990). 
 200. GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 471; see also Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 
Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 393 (Or. 1973) (general definitions of oppression are of “little value 
for application in a specific case.”).  One commentator suggests that the vagueness of 
the term “oppression” could be reduced if statutes contain a (nonexclusive, of course) 
list of factors that are indicative of minority owner abuse or “squeeze-outs.”  See Miller, 
supra note 87, at 464 (listing several suggested factors). 
 201. 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984). 
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the particular enterprise[202].  Majority conduct should not be 
deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner’s subjective hopes 
and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled. Disappointment 
alone should not necessarily be equated with oppression. 
Rather, oppression should be deemed to arise only when the majority 
conduct substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, 
were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the 
petitioner’s decision to join the venture. . . .  [M]uch will depend on 
the circumstances in the individual case.203 
At least two state statutes have codified the reasonable expectations 
test.204 For example, the Minnesota involuntary dissolution statute pro-
vides in part that: 
In determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution, or a 
buy-out, the court shall take into consideration the duty which all 
shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one another to act in 
an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the corpo-
ration and the reasonable expectations of all shareholders as they 
exist at the inception and develop during the course of the share-
holders’ relationship with the corporation and with each other.205 
 
 202. In Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983), the court found that 
the reasonable expectations could evolve, rather than being frozen at the point where 
the shareholder initially became a shareholder. 
 203. Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d  at 1179.  The New York oppression statute 
required a court to determine whether dissolution is the “only feasible means whereby 
the petitioners may reasonably expect to obtain a fair return on their investment” and is 
“reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of any substantial 
number of shareholders or of the petitioners.”  See id. at 1177 n.1.  As a result, the court 
found that it must also determine whether “some remedy short of or other than dis-
solution constitutes a feasible means of satisfying both the petitioner’s expectations and 
the rights and interests of any other substantial group of shareholders.”  Id. at 1180.  
Further, the defendants could demonstrate the “existence of an adequate, alternative 
remedy.”  Id.  If the court orders dissolution, the order must be conditioned on allowing 
other shareholders to purchase the plaintiff’s shares at fair value.  This latter require-
ment, which presumably should satisfy both the plaintiff (who receives some cash for 
his shares, solving his “exit” problem) and the corporation and other defendants (who 
are allowed to continue the corporation’s existence) is somewhat codified in Section 
14.34(a) of the MBCA.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(a) (1984) (added 1990 and 
amended 2006). 
 204. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751, subd. 3a (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
10-19.1-115 (2005). 
 205. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751, subd. 3a (West 2004) (emphasis added).  This 
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In addition, the fiduciary duty approach discussed above can be 
seen as also having adopted a “reasonable expectations” approach, with 
the result that the two different sources of remedies for abused minority 
shareholders (either common law or statutory) are quite similar in 
practice.206 
Although not universally followed,207 the reasonable expectations 
text is popular, having been adopted in approximately twenty states.208  
It also is an improvement over other definitions of oppression and, as 
delineated by Kemp & Beatley, gives the court several specific factors to 
consider.  Its focus is on the effect on the minority, not whether there 
was a business justification for the majority’s actions:  “Under this per-
spective, importantly, oppression can be found even though the conduct 
that frustrates the minority’s expectations does not entail a breach of 
fiduciary duty by the controlling shareholder.”209  In other words, wheth-
er the defendants can show a “legitimate business purpose” for their ac-
tions (which is relevant under Wilkes210) may be irrelevant under the 
reasonable expectations approach.211  The reasonable expectations ap-
statute further provides that “any written agreements, including employment agree-
ments and buy-sell agreements, between or among shareholders or between or among 
one or more shareholders and the corporation are presumed to reflect the parties’ rea-
sonable expectations concerning matters dealt with in the agreements.” 
 206. See supra note 188. 
 207. See, e.g., Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257 (S.C. 
2001) (rejecting use of reasonable expectations as the sole test for oppression under the 
South Carolina statute); see also Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 6 (Wash. 2006) 
(offering two alternative definitions of oppression, and observing that the reasonable 
expectations test “is most appropriate in situations where the complaining shareholder 
was one of the original participants in the venture”). 
 208. Matheson & Maler, supra note 173, at 664 (stating that twenty states use the 
reasonable expectations test, one state uses reasonable expectations “as a factor,” and 
twelve states use a “fiduciary duty approach that . . . could be employed to reach the 
same result as the reasonable expectations standard”) (footnotes omitted); see also 
O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 7:15, at 7-105 to 7-106 (Supp. 2004); Moll, 
Fair Value, supra note 17, at 306 (reasonable expectations test is most popular 
approach to defining oppression); Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 17, at 
208-10 (same). 
 209. Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations: 
Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 371, 
390 (2003). 
 210. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 211. Typically, fiduciary-duty analysis and reasonable-expectations analysis will 
lead to the same conclusion.  However, for an example of how the two approaches 
could lead to different results, see Art, supra note 209, at 396-98; see also Utset, supra 
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proach also provides the minority shareholder who had certain “expecta-
tions” about his relation to the corporation but did not document them in 
writing an escape hatch:  a way to enforce unwritten agreements.  As 
discussed further below, however, it suffers from several flaws.212 
 
The “Contractarian” School’s Effects on Corporate Law.  If fidu-
ciary duty analysis and oppression statutes were attempts to rescue an 
abused minority shareholder – particularly one who had not engaged in 
any advance planning – a parallel development was making it more like-
ly that planning would be upheld by the courts.  A series of intellectual 
leaps was required. 
Historically, corporate statutes made no distinction between public-
ly traded, or widely held, corporations and closely held corporations, 
despite the very real differences between these types of firms.  Thus, 
statutory provisions like Section 8.01(b) of the MBCA213 were 
interpreted as precluding shareholders from participating in business 
decisions affecting the corporation – even if all the shareholders entered 
into a written agreement giving them (in their capacities as shareholders) 
certain management rights.214  A rule reserving managerial authority to 
the board, rather than the shareholders, is a sound rule even today, 
especially for publicly traded firms.  However, the philosophy of 
statutory provisions such as Section 7.32 of the MBCA (which would 
allows the shareholders to eliminate the board of directors and fill that 
void themselves)215 found no place in most early corporation statutes.  In 
other words, one size did fit all – if the founders of a business felt that 
the requirements of corporate statutes were too restrictive, their only 
other real choice was to form a partnership; partnership law has always 
allowed the partners to create their “own law” through partnership 
agreements that dramatically depart from statutory default rules.216 
note 8, at 1399 (“Under the pure reasonable expectations approach, the majority 
shareholder’s justifications for firing the minority shareholder are not relevant to the 
[oppression] inquiry.”). 
 212. See infra notes 293-98 and accompanying text. 
 213. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1984) (amended 2000) (“All corporate po-
wers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the 
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of, the board of directors . . . .”). 
 214. See infra note 228. 
 215. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (1984) (added 1990). 
 216. Partnership law has long recognized the freedom of the partners to structure 
their relationships as they see fit, at least outside of a few narrowly defined circum-
stances.  See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18 (1914) (“The rights and duties of partners in 
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Nonetheless, beginning in the late 1940s, court decisions and aca-
demic literature217 paved the way for more widespread acceptance of the 
“contractarian” school of thought for closely held corporations.  For 
example, in 1964, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that courts have per-
mitted close corporations to deviate slightly from corporate norms, since 
there are no valid reasons to preclude parties in close corporations from 
entering into agreed-upon management agreements.218 
Today, the premise that shareholders in a closely held corporation 
should be free to agree on arrangements that would violate certain 
“fundamental” rules of corporate governance is widely endorsed, reflect-
ed not just in judicial decisions219 and academic commentary,220 but in 
relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them 
by the following rules . . . .”) (emphasis added); Hillman, supra note 82, at 171 
(“Partnership law encourages private ordering through bargaining by providing a set of 
statutory default norms that, with only a few exceptions, yield to agreements negotiated 
by partners.  Corporate law, in contrast, historically has provided a mandatory frame-
work for firm structure which is highly resistant to shareholders’ attempts to define their 
relationships through bargaining.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Carlos D. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL 
L. Q. 488 (1948); George D. Hornstein, Stockholders’ Agreements in Closely Held 
Corporations, 59 YALE L. J. 1040, 1040 (1950) (“There is no reason why mature men 
should not be able to adapt the statutory form to the structure they want, so long as they 
do not endanger other stockholders, creditors, or the public, or violate a clearly manda-
tory provision of the corporation laws.”).  For a discussion of the evolution of the law 
(and legal scholarship) toward the principle that participants in a closely held corpora-
tion should essentially be free to structure their relationship as they see fit, see Hillman, 
supra note 83.  As Professor Hillman notes, not until 1936 did “a significant court 
decision actually mold[] corporate law to the special circumstances of a closely-held 
firm.”  Id. at 174 (citing Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936)). 
 218. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584-85 (Ill. 1964) (citations omitted). 
 219. See, e.g., Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936) (enforcing agreement 
between the only two shareholders of two corporations that one shareholder would en-
sure that the other would remain as general manager of one of the corporations as long 
as he was “faithful, efficient and competent” and that he would receive one-fourth of 
the corporation’s net income, either as salary or as dividends).  According to Professors 
Cox and Hazen, the “courts’ liberal approach toward agreements restricting director 
discretion can be traced to Clark v. Dodge.”  COX & HAZEN, supra note 125, § 14.05 at 
391.  Two important factors that led the court to its holding, which departed from 
precedent, were that the shareholders agreement was unanimous, and that the agreement 
limited director discretion only in certain areas.  Id. at 392; see also Zion v. Kurtz, 405 
N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980) (upholding agreement unanimously entered into by share-
holders of a Delaware corporation that provided that the corporation could conduct no 
business or activities without  the minority shareholder’s consent); EISENBERG, supra 
note 82, at 336 (“In contrast [to partnership law], corporation law traditionally was not 
2009 EAT YOUR VEGETABLES 543 
 (OR AT LEAST UNDERSTAND WHY YOU SHOULD) 
 
many statutory provisions.221  For example, Section 7.32 of the MBCA 
essentially allows shareholders – provided that every one of them agrees 
– to completely rewrite the corporate rule book, going so far as to allow 
the abolition of the board of directors, or agreements governing the cor-
poration and its management.222  Also, one could view LLC statutes, 
which usually give the parties great freedom to structure their relation-
ships as they see fit,223 as a continuation of this trend. 
Although this approach is not without dangers (especially to unwit-
ting minority shareholders224 or those who simply write poor contracts), 
it reflects the view that the parties’ desires are much more important 
than the particular business organization form they have selected.  It also 
as attuned to contractualization, and in the corporate context there was often serious 
question whether such arrangements would be deemed valid.  Today, however courts 
and legislatures have shown themselves increasingly ready to enforce contractual 
arrangements in close corporations. . . .”); COX & HAZEN, supra note 125, at 393 
(“Today, it appears that any limits on the scope or validity of shareholders’ agreements 
are imposed only when there is a clear conflict with the governing corporate statute and, 
more particularly, if there is any fraud in the agreement’s execution or operation.”) 
(citations omitted); Rock & Wachter, supra note 107, at 914 (“The evolution toward 
greater flexibility was long, and at times, hard fought, but it no longer is a central issue.  
Today, participants in the close corporation can largely tailor its terms to their pur-
poses.”). 
 220. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (1989); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. 
Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:  A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 
WASH L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close 
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 299 (1986). 
 221. E.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1306 cmt. (purpose of Pennsylvania statute is 
“to provide the shareholders with the greatest possible latitude in regulating the internal 
affairs of their corporation”). 
 222. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (1984) (added 1990).  Due to the unusual 
things that may be accomplished with a Section 7.32 agreement, the statute requires that 
every shareholder must consent to the agreement in order for it to be valid.  Id. § 
7.32(b)(1). 
 223. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 224. As one commentator observed concerning LLCs, “the move to increasing con-
tract rights has led to a concomitant ability among investors to decrease their fiduciary 
obligations.”  Siegel, supra note 10, at 466 (emphasis added).  However, Professor 
Siegel believes it would be hypocritical to argue that shareholders are not likely to 
engage in advance planning, yet complain about statutes that allow fiduciary duties to 
be decreased.  In other words, this argument “exposes that the real concern is not 
whether shareholders will expend the effort to protect themselves by contract but rather 
disagreement over the choices that shareholders make by contract.”  Id. at 469-70. 
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recognizes that the role of corporate law should be to provide default 
rules “while leaving managers free to customize their companies’ 
charters with legally enforceable rights and obligations.”225 
 
Special Statutes For “Close” Corporations.  In the early and mid-
dle twentieth century some began to believe that general corporation 
laws – designed primarily (or exclusively) to meet the needs of public 
corporations226 – thwarted the ability of shareholders in closely held 
corporations to enter into agreements that would be permissible in the 
partnership context.227  This was particularly so in the wake of several 
court decisions that refused to enforce shareholder agreements (some-
times agreed to by all of the shareholders) because they violated certain 
“statutory norms,” for example by impinging on the statutory authority 
of the board of directors to hire officers and set their salaries.228  As 
Professor Thompson observed:  “If a minority shareholder attempted to 
contract for protection against majority rule, the courts struck down the 
contract as an unlawful interference with the unfettered discretion that 
the ‘statutory norm’ required for directors.”229  On the other hand, some 
courts did recognize the shareholders’ ability to modify traditional 
corporate law rules; the development of the law was not uniform in all 
states. 230 
Thus, recognizing the trend of increasing contractual freedom, but 
perhaps leery of allowing shareholders to go “too far,” some states sub-
sequently adopted special provisions in their general corporation statutes 
for closely held corporations (or, more specifically, non-pubic corpora-
 225. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law:  A Generation 
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 780 (2006). 
 226. See Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the 
United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 663, 668 (1989). 
 227. Id. at 667-69. 
 228. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hooper, 75 A. 568 (N.J. Eq. 1910) (refusing to enforce 
agreement between two 50% shareholders that business decisions would require the 
assent of each shareholder); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 
77 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1948) (invalidating unanimous shareholders’ agreement that 
would have given certain management powers to specified shareholders); see also 
McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934) (refusing to enforce agreement 
between three shareholders that they would each use their best efforts to ensure that 
each of them was appointed to a specified officer position and paid a specified salary – 
decisions traditionally reserved to the corporation’s board of directors). 
 229. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 17, at 195 (footnote omitted). 
 230. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
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tions).231  In 1955, North Carolina became one of the first states232 to 
move in this direction when it adopted a statute that validated written 
agreements that had been unanimously approved by shareholders of 
non-public corporations, even if the agreement treated the corporation 
like a partnership or dictated decisions normally made by the corpora-
tion’s board of directors.233  In other words, unanimous shareholder 
agreements could result in corporate governance at odds with “normal” 
corporate governance.234  This approach can now be found in the statutes 
 231. Commentators had been calling for specialized close-corporation legislation 
since at least 1928.  See Joseph L. Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close 
Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REV. 273, 281-84 (1928). 
 232. But see O’Neal, supra note 17, at 873-74 (stating that N.Y. STOCK CORP. L. § 9, 
which allowed the corporation’s bylaws to set quorum and voting requirements higher 
than the “normal” rules for both shareholder and director action, “was hailed at the time 
of enactment as being the first important legislative recognition of the special manage-
ment problems of close corporations”). 
 233. See id. at 874; Karjala, supra note 226, at 669 (describing the North Carolina 
statute as the “first, cautious step” in this direction).  Another important development 
was Section 620(b) of the New York Business Corporation Law.  When adopted in 
1961, Section 620(b) provided that a provision in a corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation “otherwise prohibited by law as improperly restrictive of the discretion or 
powers of the directors in their management of corporate affairs . . . shall nevertheless 
be valid” (1) if all of the shareholders (or incorporators, before the issuance of shares) 
approve the provision and (2) if shares are thereafter issued or transferred to persons 
who did not have knowledge of the provision, those persons consent to it in writing.  
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (McKinney 1961).  Section 620(b) thus “validate[d] 
shareholder agreements which otherwise could be invalid because the agreement 
restricts the board in managing the corporation – either in that the agreement commands 
certain board decisions or in that the agreement transfers management authority to 
someone other than the board.”  GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 503.  In addition, in 1962 
South Carolina adopted provisions in its corporation law that “expressed a desire to 
permit shareholders in a close corporation to act in the corporation’s internal affairs 
almost as freely as though they were in a partnership.”  O’Neal, supra note 17, at 874. 
 234. A related, but earlier, development was the recognition that one or more share-
holders could enter into agreements among themselves as to how they would vote their 
shares in the future, even if such agreements were not entered into by all of the share-
holders.  Some early decisions invalidated such shareholder voting agreements on pub-
lic policy grounds because they “interfered with a shareholder’s duty to vote according 
to his or her independent judgment and in the best interest of the corporation.”  
GEVURTZ, supra note 23, at 486 (citing Halderman v. Halderman, 197 S.W. 376 (Ky. 
1917)).  However, courts in the mid-20th century found shareholder voting agreements 
enforceable.  E.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 
53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947). 
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of several states (albeit, in varying degrees),235 as well as Section 7.32 of 
the MBCA.236  While many of these statutes are applicable to any non-
public corporation, the requirement of unanimous shareholder approval 
limits the usefulness of these statutes to corporations with small num-
bers of shareholders.237 
Other states, the first “wave” being Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, 
and Pennsylvania,238) took a different approach,239 adopting provisions 
 235. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1488 (2008); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE 
ANN. § 21.101 (2007).  For the current statute of North Carolina, the pioneer in this 
area, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-31(b) (2008).  The other states include: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, South 
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 236. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (1984) (added 1990). 
 237. This highlights the difficulty of actually defining a “close corporation” for 
purposes of these statutes – a “point of contention for decades.”  Chittur, supra note 17, 
at 145.  There are at least four approaches that states have taken:  (1) self-selective 
(where a corporation can declare itself to be a close corporation in its charter), (2) 
permissive (where a corporation with certain characteristics is permitted to use the 
special statutory provisions for close corporations), (3) numerical restrictive (where a 
close corporation is defined by the number of shareholders), and (4) share transfer 
restrictive (where a close corporation is defined in terms of the restrictions on transfers 
of its stock).  See id. at 145-46.  Note, however, that a focus on the number of 
shareholders can sometimes produce inequitable results.  For example, in Sundberg v. 
Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the court held that 
the corporation was not a “close corporation” within the meaning of Minnesota’s 
buyout statute, which applied to corporations with 35 or fewer shareholders.  In that 
case, 70% of the corporation’s stock was owned by the members of one family and 10% 
of the stock was owned by the members of another family, but the rest was owned by 
90 other shareholders. 
 238. See O’Neal, supra note 17, at 875-78.  In 1978, Professor O’Neal noted that 
many statutes adopted since World War II, even if not designed specifically for close 
corporations, contained provisions that gave the participants in a close corporation more 
flexibility in structuring their affairs, such as permitting high quorum and voting 
requirements for shareholder and director actions and validating shareholder agreements 
that addressed decisions normally made by the board.  See id. at 879.  In addition, by 
then most state statutes made agreements to arbitrate future disputes enforceable, a 
departure from the common law.  Id.  For the current versions of the Delaware, Kansas, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania statutes, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (2002); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7201 to 17-7216 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 
4-201 et seq. (2008); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301 et seq. (West 1998). 
 239. This is not to suggest that states have only taken two statutory approaches to 
close corporation problems.  Instead, “close corporation statutes vary widely not simply 
in the approach each takes toward meeting the unique needs of close corporations but 
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in their statutes that only apply to close corporations, as defined by the 
statute (which usually requires the corporation to “opt in”240 to the 
statute).  A subchapter of the Delaware statute, entitled “Close Corpo-
rations; Special Provisions,”241 varies the provisions of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”):  (1) only to the extent speci-
fied in the subchapter, and (2) only as to corporations that have followed 
a specified procedure to be governed by the subchapter.242  Although 
Delaware is a much more popular state of incorporation for publicly 
traded corporations than for closely held corporations,243 given 
Delaware’s prominence in the corporate law field,244 this statute 
deserves discussion. 
also in the legislature’s perception of what areas of the close corporation merit special 
treatment.”  COX & HAZEN, supra note 125, § 14.02, at 387.  For the argument that such 
statutes provide very few benefits to shareholders, while also resulting in various harms, 
see Karjala, supra note 226, at 689-702. 
 240. See Karjala, supra note 226, at 691 (“Nearly all of the special close corporation 
legislation is enabling and elective; that is, it permits deviations from the traditional 
forms by those who elect to make use of it.  These . . . statutes do nothing more for 
parties who know what they want and hire a competent lawyer to effect their desires in 
appropriate legal instruments than do flexible general corporation statutes.”) (footnote 
omitted).  As a result of the opt-in requirement, “only a tiny fraction of newly formed 
corporations elect to become statutory close corporations.”  EISENBERG, supra note 82, 
at 338 (citing 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S 
CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 1.20 (rev. 3d ed. 2004).  “The result is that for 
practical purposes, statutory close corporation provisions are much ado about very 
little.”  Id.; see also Rock & Wachter, supra note 107, at 929 (“[F]ew firms avail 
themselves of the opportunity to organize under such statutes.  On the contrary, close 
corporations seem to stubbornly adhere to organizing under the general corporation 
codes.”); Michael E. Brown, Comment and Note, Missouri Close Corporations:  
Proposals to Strengthen Protections for Minority Shareholders, 68 UMKC L. REV. 145, 
166 (1999) (“Currently, there are 3,573 active close corporations out of 116,528 
corporations in the State of Missouri.”). 
 241. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (2002). 
 242. See id. §§ 342, 343. 
 243. See Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s Vantagepoint:  The Empire Strikes Back in 
the Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 Nw. U.L. Rev. 91, 130 (2008) (noting that in contrast to 
its dominance amongst publicly traded corporations, Delaware captures only a small 
fraction of the closely held corporations). 
 244. See State of Delaware, The Official Website for the First State, Department of 
State:  Division of Corporations, available at http://www.corp.delaware.gov/about 
agency.shtml (“More than 50% of all publicly-traded companies in the United States 
including 63% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their legal home.”) (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
548 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
One important provision in the DCGL is Section 350, which 
validates written agreements among the holders of a majority of the out-
standing voting stock even if they relate to the conduct of the corpora-
tion by limiting the powers of the board of directors.245  Section 350 
allows the shareholders (“stockholders” in Delaware) to agree in ad-
vance who will be the officers of the corporation and what their respec-
tive salaries will be, even though these determinations are ordinarily 
made by the directors.246  Similarly, under DGCL Section 351, the 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation may provide for its business to 
be managed by the stockholders instead of the directors.247  In fact, the 
corporation may eliminate the board altogether.248  Even more permis-
sive, Section 354 provides that the shareholders essentially can treat the 
corporation like a partnership, stating that no written agreement or char-
ter provision will be considered invalid on the ground of treating the cor-
poration like a partnership or the relations among or between the stock-
holders and the corporation in ways that are only appropriate for 
partners.249 
Thus, under the DGCL, shareholders may change many funda-
mental rules of corporate governance.  If the shareholders do not want a 
board of directors, they do not have to have one; if they want to limit the 
directors’ discretion to choose the officers, they may do so.  The sub-
chapter thus is a delight for those in the contractarian school of thought 
because it allows businesspeople to “write their own ticket.”  However, 
with the exception of Section 353,250 none of the substantive special 
provisions for close corporations provides any “default” rule.  Instead, 
each provides the shareholders with an opportunity to change certain 
“fundamental” rules of corporation governance; the DGCL does not, 
however, actually require that they do so, or even that they consider do-
ing so.  In this sense, the Delaware statute may only be advantageous for 
 245. See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 350 (2001). 
 246. See id. 
 247. See id. § 351. 
 248. Section 352(a) would allow any shareholder to petition the court for the 
appointment of a custodian when the shareholder-managers are deadlocked, resulting in 
the corporation suffering or being threatened with irreparable injury.  See id. § 352(a). 
 249. See id. § 354. 
 250. Section 353 would allow the court, upon petition by certain parties, to appoint a 
“provisional director” (an impartial third party) when the directors are deadlocked “with 
the consequence that the business and affairs of the corporation can no longer be con-
ducted to the advantage of the stockholders generally.” Id. § 353(a). 
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sophisticated parties, in that it does not suggest any provisions for the 
shareholders to consider.  For example, a layperson may wonder what, 
exactly, would be an agreement that would treat the corporation as if it 
were a partnership.  Even if the statute were more helpful in actually 
suggesting some of the substantive provisions, it gives no guidance on 
how to draft them. 
B. In Limited Liability Companies 
Although commentators have recognized the potential for minority 
owner abuse in an LLC,251 there are very few LLC oppression cases.  
One reason is that the LLC is relatively new.  Additionally, “early LLC 
statutes adopted easy exit and shared power governance procedures,”252 
which made abuse of minority LLC members somewhat less likely.253  
They also allowed LLC members to address their expectations contrac-
tually in the operating agreement.254 
Statutory responses to potential problems of abuse of minority LLC 
members are highly varied from state to state.  Nonetheless, there are 
some indications that the development of LLC oppression law will pro-
ceed along the same lines as close corporations.  Some states will use 
fiduciary duty analysis,255 particularly if the LLC is member-managed, 
some states will adopt “oppression” statutes,256 and some will do 
neither.  Due to the unique nature of the LLC, though, this statement is 
probably an oversimplification. 
 
 
Judicial Responses.  Some cases have found that LLC members 
owe fiduciary duties to one another and/or the LLC in the same manner 
as partners (or close corporation shareholders).  In Anest v. Audino,257 
for example, the court found that a member of a member-managed LLC 
owed fiduciary duties to another member, even though the first member 
owned only a minority interest.258  The court found the role of a member 
 251. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 252. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 17, § 6.2 at 6-3. 
 253. See Moll, supra note 8, at 956. 
 254. See id. at 954. 
 255. See supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 194-212 and accompanying text. 
 257. 773 N.E.2d 202, 209 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002); see also Bishop of Victoria Co. Sole 
v. Corporate Bus. Park, LLC, 158 P.3d 1183, 1190 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
 258. Anest, 773 N.E.2d at 209. 
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of a member-managed LLC to be essentially akin to that of a corporate 
director or officer.259  Furthermore, a Rhode Island court found that the 
members in a manager-managed LLC owed partner-like fiduciary duties 
to both the LLC and to one another, due in part to the “paucity” of mem-
bers in that LLC.260  Thus, members could pursue an oppression claim 
based on “reasonable expectations.” 
In Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone,261 the plaintiff LLC sued a 
former member who had been the LLC’s sole operating officer, claiming 
that she had violated her fiduciary duties to the LLC by competing with 
it while still a member.262  In determining what fiduciary duties, if any, 
LLC members owed to one another, the court broke new ground under 
Indiana law: “Because [LLCs] are relatively new business entities, 
courts are forced to grapple with financial and liability issues in terms of 
LLCs’ similarities to partnerships and corporations.”263  Thus, due to the 
 259. Id. at 210.  The Illinois LLC statute at the time did not address fiduciary duties, 
but did state that members are liable for the debts of the LLC in the same circumstances 
as shareholders are liable for a corporation’s debts (i.e., veil-piercing situations), and 
that managers of an LLC are liable to the same extent as directors of corporation.  See 
id.  The court read these provisions as instructing it to look to corporate law to 
determine whether LLC members owe fiduciary duties to one another and eventually 
found that they did, analogizing the situation both to that of a closely held corporation 
and that of a director or officer’s duties to a corporation.  See id. at 209-10; see also 
Dickens v. Alliance Analytical Labs., LLC, 111 P.3d 889, 891 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) 
(in LLCs, a fiduciary duty “exists between the company, its members and its 
managers”). 
 260. See Marsh v. Billington Farms, LLC, 2006 WL 2555911 (R.I. Super. Aug. 31, 
2006).  In Marsh, the court held that the manager of the LLC owed the LLC and the 
other members a “fiduciary duty akin to the duty owed by directors to their 
corporation.”  Id. at *5.  In addition, because the manager was also a member, the court 
found that he owed partner-like duties to the LLC and the other members, reasoning in 
a manner similar to the Donahue court decades earlier.  As the court stated:  “Due to the 
paucity of members, the active participation by the [plaintiffs], and the intimate 
relationship between the four [members], the members of the LLC assumed a height-
ened fiduciary duty not only to the LLC, but to each other – a duty of utmost care, 
loyalty, and good faith.”  Id.;  see also Sports Imaging of Arizona, LLC v. 1993 CKC 
Trust, 2008 WL 4448063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (trust that owned 15% of LLC and 99% 
of corporate co-manager of the LLC owed fiduciary duties to the LLC due to its signifi-
cant control over the LLC). 
 261. 230 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Ind. 2002). 
 262. See id. at 896-97.  The court also found that the defendant’s activities violated 
the operating agreement.  See id. at 896-98. 
 263. Id. at 898. 
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LLC’s “hybrid nature,”264 the court applied fiduciary concepts from both 
partnership law (because LLCs have some characteristics in common 
with partnerships265) as well as close corporation law (the LLC in 
Calderone, had it been a corporation, would have met the definition of a 
close corporation under Indiana case law266).  In 2006, an Indiana state 
court followed Calderone, holding that “common law fiduciary duties, 
similar to the ones imposed on partnerships and closely-held corpora-
tions, are applicable to Indiana LLCs.”267 
In Anderson v. Wilder,268 a Tennessee decision, the defendants 
owned 530 ownership units in the LLC, or 53% of the total number of 
units.269  The defendants expelled the plaintiffs from the LLC and repur-
chased the plaintiffs’ membership interests at the price set forth in the 
operating agreement, which was $150 per unit.270  Less than a month 
later, however, the defendants resold these units (as well as a few of 
their other units) to a new investor for $250 per unit.271  Although their 
expulsion was expressly permitted by the operating agreement, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties to 
them.272  The Anderson court’s decision distinguished a prior case, 
which had held that members in a Tennessee LLC owe fiduciary duties 
only to the LLC.273  The Anderson court held that “a majority share-
holder [sic] of an LLC stands in a fiduciary relationship to the minority. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See id. (citing, e.g., Ruggio v. Vining, 755 So. 2d 792, 795 n.2 (Fla. Dis. Ct. 
App. 2000)). 
 266. See id. at 899 (citing G&N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 236 n.2 
(Ind. 2001)). 
 267. Purcell v. S. Hills Invs., LLC 847 N.E.2d 991, 997 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 268. 2003 WL 22768666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 269. Id. at 1. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48, 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).  The McGee court 
based its holding on a provision of the Tennessee LLC statute that described what 
duties members owe to the LLC, writing that the statute “defines the fiduciary duty of 
members of a member-managed LLC as one owing to the LLC, not to individual 
members.  We cannot contravene the intent of the Legislature.”  Id.  The Anderson 
court, however, apparently did not view the statute as providing an exclusive list of the 
fiduciary duties owed by LLC members.  The Anderson court also observed that McGee 
was “in essence an employment dispute and did not involve an allegation of oppression 
by a majority shareholder group.”  Anderson, 2003 WL 22768666, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
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. . .  Such a holding does not conflict with the statute, and is in keeping 
with the statutory requirement that each LLC member discharge all of 
his or her duties in good faith.”274  The court based this holding on the 
fact that Tennessee law imposes fiduciary duties on partners, as well as 
majority shareholders in closely held corporations, finding no reason to 
single out LLCs (or at least closely held LLCs) for different treatment.275 
 
Oppression/Dissolution Statutes.  At least eleven state statutes 
allow LLC members to sue for oppression,276 much like shareholders 
can sue for oppression in corporations.277 In addition, Minnesota and 
North Dakota use an “unfairly prejudicial” standard, coupled with 
references to the “reasonable expectations” of the LLC’s 
 274. Anderson, 2003 WL 22768666, at *6 (citing Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643 
(Tenn. 1997)). 
 275. See id. at *5-6; see also Holland v. Burke, 2008 WL 4514664 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
2008) (applying Donahue-based fiduciary duty analysis to claim by plaintiff that he was 
wrongfully removed from positions with LLC, as well as two corporations); Perry Golf 
Course Development, LLC v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta, 670 S.E.2d 171, 
178 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (members of LLC owed fiduciary duties to one another). 
 276. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 180/35-1(4)(E) (West 2008); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4515(1) (2008); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-6-02(2)(ii) 
(2008) (liquidation is permitted if “reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights 
or interests of the complaining member”).  The Michigan LLC oppression statute is 
extremely similar to the Michigan corporate oppression statute.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 450.1489(1) (2008).  One commentator believes that courts will look to author-
ity under the corporate statute for guidance in interpreting the LLC oppression provi-
sion.  See Cambridge, supra note 87, at 12; see also CAL. CORPS. CODE § 17351(a)(5) 
(2008) (LLC member may bring an action for dissolution of the LLC if, among other 
things, “those in control of the company have been guilty of, or have knowingly coun-
tenanced persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority.”).  The 
other states include:  Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 277. See supra notes 194-212 and accompanying text. 
 278. Minnesota and North Dakota allow for involuntary dissolution if those in 
control of the LLC have acted in a “manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more 
members in their capacities as members or governors of any limited liability company, 
or as managers or employees of a closely held limited liability company.”  MINN. STAT. 
§ 322B.833, subd. 1(2)(ii) (Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-119(1)(b)(2) (2008).  
The Minnesota statute also provides: 
In determining whether to order relief . . . the court shall take into consideration the 
duty that all members in a closely held limited liability company owe one another to 
act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the limited liability 
company and the reasonable expectations of all members as they exist at the inception 
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C. Benefits of These Approaches 
To review, courts and legislatures have developed two methods to 
protect the abused minority shareholder (or LLC member) who did not 
engage in advance planning: fiduciary-duty analysis279 and statutes that 
allow involuntary dissolution for oppression.280  Meanwhile, develop-
ments in the contractarian school of thought as well as the enactment of 
special statutes for closely held corporations encouraged planning and 
assured its enforceability.281  These developments are major intellectual 
achievements; a minority business owner is much better off today than 
his predecessors in previous generations.  Before discussing some 
criticisms of these approaches, it is useful to review in more detail their 
benefits. 
 
Solves the “Exit Problem.”  As noted above, in a closely held busi-
ness it is difficult to escape oppression by selling one’s ownership 
interest to a third party, due to the lack of a market for such interests and 
the fact that a buyer – if one is found – will demand steep minority and 
lack-of-marketability discounts. 282  As such, the minority owner whose 
employment is terminated likely will receive little return on his invest-
ment, and cannot demand that his interest be redeemed without a buy-
sell agreement.283  Fiduciary-duty analysis and involuntary dissolution 
statutes provide a remedy because the most common result in such cases 
is that the court will order the majority to “buy out” the complaining 
shareholder.284  This effectively solves the “exit problem.” 
 
 
and develop during the course of the members’ relationship with the limited liability 
company and with each other. 
MINN. STAT. § 322B.833, subd. 4.  The North Dakota statute contains nearly identical 
language.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-119(4).  This reasonable expectation test is similar 
to what these states have included in the involuntary-dissolution provisions of their 
corporate statutes.  See supra note 205 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the 
similarities between the term “oppressive” and the phrase “unfairly prejudicial” in these 
statutes, see Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Dev., LLC, 2006 WL 2433410, at *37-39 (D. 
N.D. 2006). 
 279. See supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 194-212 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 226-50 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 284. Moll, Fair Value, supra note 17, at 308-10. 
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Solves the “No Written Contract” Problem.  Many of the reported 
decisions involving minority shareholder oppression feature a plaintiff-
shareholder who did not memorialize any understandings that he had 
with the majority faction. 285  There are many reasons for this failure, 
especially the desire to avoid attorney fees and the “trusting,” optimistic 
and unsophisticated nature of many small business owners. 286  The rea-
sonable expectations test, however, does not require any of the minor-
ity’s expectations to be in writing, so long as he can show (among other 
things) that the majority faction knew, or should have known, of these 
expectations.287  Similarly, fiduciary-duty analysis does not demand any 
written documentation, which may be particularly important where the 
matter at issue is one that the parties could not have foreseen when the 
business was formed. 
 
Discourages Oppressive Behavior by the Majority.  If the majority 
faction knows that the minority has effective legal remedies, it may de-
cline to pursue its planned oppressive activities, or it may come to the 
bargaining table before doing so.  Even if the oppressive conduct occurs, 
the minority shareholder will likely have better settlement leverage in 
litigation. 
 
Allows the Parties to Customize Their Relationships.  The contrac-
tarian movement and the development of special statutes for close cor-
porations both allow entrepreneurs to plan their relationship while ob-
taining the benefit of limited liability for owners.  This is important be-
cause it fosters capital formation and makes dispute resolution more 
efficient.  If there is an enforceable contract to follow, a court does not 
need to rely on vague and shifting notions of fiduciary duties or rea-
sonable expectations.  In fact, litigation may not be necessary at all.  
Furthermore, “one of the reasons that ex ante agreements are preferred is 
that, at the time the agreement is made, the parties do not know which 
 285. “[S]hareholders’ expectations in a close corporation . . . may not always be re-
flected in articles of incorporation, bylaws, shareholders’ agreements or other writings.  
Participants often expect to participate in management and that their contribution will 
be recognized in the form of salary even though those matters are not contained in any 
written document.”  Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 17, at 214. 
 286. See infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text. 
 287. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984). 
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side [of a dispute] they will be on; therefore, they are more likely to be 
reasonable in the negotiation.”288 
D. Problems With These Approaches 
Despite the significant benefits of the above-described approaches, 
they have serious shortcomings, some of which are discussed below.289 
 
Litigation is Inefficient and Uncertain.  Few would dispute that 
most litigation in modern-day America is expensive and time-
consuming.290  Even when armed with a clearly defined legal right or an 
express written contract, enforcing one’s rights through litigation can be 
inefficient.  Fiduciary-duty analysis and the reasonable expectations text 
exacerbate this problem by injecting added unpredictability.291  A simple 
breach of contract lawsuit is likely to take a lot less time – and a lot less 
money – than a lawsuit based on a nebulous concept like breach of 
fiduciary duty or frustration of reasonable expectations.  Moreover, even 
if the plaintiff is ultimately successful, justice delayed is justice denied, 
as the saying goes. 
Consider the Wilkes test, which basically requires the defendants to 
establish that they had a “legitimate business purpose” for taking the 
action of which the plaintiff is complaining and, if the defendants do so, 
allows the plaintiff to establish that that legitimate business purpose 
could be achieved through a less harmful alternative.292  Could a better 
recipe for judicial intrusion be devised?  In many cases, a court may 
need to engage in extensive fact-finding and entertain hours of testimony 
from experts to determine if a business purpose is “legitimate.”  Even 
worse, the court essentially must try to predict the future when it has to 
 
 288. Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 204 (2004). 
 289. Due to the relative dearth and/or infancy of statutory and judicial responses to 
oppression in LLCs, the following discussion focuses on the drawbacks of these 
approaches in the context of corporations. 
 290. Cf. James M. Van Vliet & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty 
Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 239, 242-43 (remedies “require court proceedings that are too expensive in terms 
of cost or time, or both, to be a practical solution” for minority shareholder). 
 291. See Shannon W. Stevenson, The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of 
Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, 51 Duke L.J. 1139, 1177 (2001). 
 292. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text. 
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“weigh the legitimate business purpose . . . against the practicability of a 
less harmful alternative.”293 
The “reasonable expectations” test suffers from a similar flaw.  This 
test often focuses on the parties’ understandings when the corporation 
was formed but the litigation may not occur until many years later; 
therefore, it injects unreliability into the process due to the fallibility of 
human memory.  The “reasonable expectations” test also seems overtly 
subject to manipulation by the minority shareholder who may falsely 
claim that certain “understandings” were reached during formation.  
Further, the test focuses on what the majority “knew or should have 
known” were the plaintiff’s expectations and whether those expectations 
were reasonable; either or both of these factors may not always be clear.  
It is also unclear how to treat the “expectations” of those who acquire 
their shares from one of the corporation’s founders, such as through 
inheritance or a divorce settlement.  While many areas of the law suffer 
from similar imprecision, this will come as small consolation to the 
parties litigating over the meaning of such terms.  As one commentator 
observes: 
The proper protection of expectations presupposes . . . their accurate 
identification. . . .  Memories can fade and recollections can differ, 
especially when money is on the line.  When the law seeks to protect 
expectations elsewhere, it takes at least some care with the identifi-
cation of the problem. . . . 
If not carefully applied, the doctrine of shareholder expectation will 
destroy one of the most important expectations a business person can 
have – predictability in the rules of the game.294 
Going back to the hypothetical example at the beginning of this 
Article,295 assume that A and B, in their capacity as a majority of the 
directors or managers, decide to terminate C’s employment.  It is tempt-
ing to jump to the conclusion that A and B have done this so that, in 
effect, the business will pay or distribute more of its earnings to them 
than to C.  Suppose, however, that other “red flags,” such as a con-
 
 293. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
 294. Kleinberger, supra note 17, at 1155-56; see also Matheson & Maler, supra note 
173, at 688 (“critics of the emerging [reasonable expectations] model can rightly point 
to its flaws, such as its vague standards and the nearly boundless discretion it puts in the 
hands of trial courts . . . .”). 
 295. See discussion supra Introduction. 
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current increase in A’s and B’s own salaries and suspension or reduction 
of dividends, are not present.  Suppose further that A and B argue that 
C’s performance was sub-par or even incompetent or dishonest.  Did A 
and B have a “legitimate business purpose” for firing C?  Can C show 
that there are other means to achieve this legitimate business purpose 
that would be less harmful to his interests?  Alternatively, did C have a 
reasonable expectation of continued employment even if his perfor-
mance was poor?  Are the parties able, years later, to recall accurately 
their reasonable expectations when they became shareholders?296  How 
is a court to figure out whether C was satisfactorily performing his job 
or not?297  Is the focus on the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations unfair 
to the defendants?298  These determinations are intensely fact-specific.  
Courts have even sometimes found that firing a minority shareholder for 
unsatisfactory job performance did constitute oppression.299 
 296. See Sean R. Matt et al., Comment, Providing a Model Responsive to the Needs 
of Small Business at Formation:  A Focus of Ex Ante Flexibility and Predictability, 71 
OR. L. REV. 631, 685-86 (1992), for a proposal that would allow shareholders to specify 
their expectations in writing by obtaining the approval of all other shareholders. 
 297. As two commentators observed: 
The Wilkes case is a good example of the difficulties courts have with the 
employment issues that frequently overlay close corporation cases.  For example, 
was the court correct in saying that there was no legitimate business purpose in 
terminating Wilkes’ employment? On the one hand, we are told that there was no 
misconduct and that Wilkes “had always accomplished his assigned share of the 
duties competently.”  The court, however, made no attempt to determine whether 
Wilkes’ services were still needed. Apparently he was not replaced, suggesting 
overstaffing. By not appreciating the norms of the employment relation, the court 
stumbled badly, inferring a right to continued employment, subject only to proof 
of misconduct. Such a right is so far at variance with employment practice 
anywhere that its insertion in the case undermines the logical application of the 
legitimate business purpose standard. 
Rock & Wachter, supra note 107, at 934 (footnotes omitted); see also Kleinberger, 
supra note 17, at 1154 (“[T]he contours of [oppression] are imprecise, and ‘good guys’ 
and ‘bad guys’ alike suffer from that imprecision.”). 
 298. Professor Dalley argues that if reasonable expectations are determined when 
the parties invest, “some disproportionate rights and benefits [for the] majority holder 
should be part of those expectations.”  Dalley, supra note 288, at 180 (footnote 
omitted).  Also, restricting those rights will reduce the “control premium” that a future 
investor would be willing to pay, which will eliminate some investment opportunities 
and raise the cost of capital.  See id. at 221-22. 
 299. See, e.g., Hughes v. Sego Int’l Ltd., 469 A.2d 74, 77 (N.J. Super. 1983); In re 
Imperatore, 512 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (“While the petitioner could 
not reasonably complain if his salary were reduced based upon inadequate performance, 
in this case his salary was totally eliminated.”); see also Matheson & Maler, supra note 
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Dissolution or Buy-Out May be an Inappropriate Remedy.  While 
some oppression statutes provide remedies other than dissolution,300 
many are not so flexible.301  Even if a buy-out right is recognized as an 
alternative to dissolution, the “minority member who has spent years 
building a business may not want to relinquish the enterprise at any 
price. . . .  A fair market value buy-out may not adequately compensate 
for lost opportunities.”302  Alternatively, at least one court applying fidu-
ciary duty analysis has found that a forced buy-out of a minority share-
holder’s shares was an improper remedy because “it placed the plaintiff 
in a significantly better position than she would have enjoyed absent the 
wrongdoing, and well exceeded her reasonable expectations of benefit 
from her shares.”303  In other words, because stock in a closely held 
corporation inherently lacks a trading market, ordering a buy-out may be 
viewed as giving the plaintiff a windfall. 
Further, a dissolution-only scenario could actually prevent the 
aggrieved shareholder from obtaining relief.  For example, assume that 
the majority shareholders have effectively looted the company by paying 
themselves exorbitant salaries or entering into “sweetheart” transactions 
with related entities.304  If the corporation were dissolved, the sale of its 
assets on dissolution would likely fetch only a fraction of what the com-
pany would have been worth but for the majority’s misconduct.  
Furthermore, if the “extreme” remedy of dissolution305 is the only reme-
173, at 671 (“In Minnesota, for example, case law began to suggest that a minority 
shareholder who was also employed by the corporation simply could not be fired.”) 
(discussing Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)).  See generally 
Art, supra note 209, at 398 (concluding that “the focus on the minority’s expectations 
rather than on the majority’s duties tends to subvert the principle of majority rule in cor-
porate governance and to penalize conduct of the majority even when justified”).  But 
see Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super. 1979), aff’d, 414 
A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. 1980), cert. denied, 425 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1980). 
 300. See infra note 308. 
 301. See, e.g., Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733-34 (Va. 1990) (finding 
dissolution exclusive remedy for oppression under the Virginia statute). 
 302. Miller, supra note 87, at 463. 
 303. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1081 (Mass. 2006).  See infra notes 339, 
342-48 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
 305. Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980) 
(“Liquidation is an extreme remedy . . . .  Absent compelling circumstances, courts 
often are reluctant to order involuntary dissolution.”). 
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dy for oppression, the majority may be reluctant to offer equity interests 
to employees, thereby reducing the likelihood of widespread employee 
ownership of businesses.306  For these reasons, and because dissolution 
is viewed as less necessary for corporations than for partnerships,307 
many statutes authorize alternative remedies308 and courts – even in the 
absence of statutory authorization – have granted other remedies in 
oppression cases.309  The strategy of these statutes is to cause courts to 
aid minority shareholders more often by promoting orders not as drastic 
as buyout or dissolution orders.310  In other words, “[b]y permitting 
courts to provide lesser equitable remedies, especially a buyout, 
[legislatures] made it easier for the minority shareholder to prevail on 
the underlying claim.”311 
 
Equity Buy-Back Issues.  The usual remedy in a minority sharehold-
er oppression case is a court-ordered buy-out of the plaintiff’s stock at 
 306. Brown, supra note 240, at 166. 
 307. Unless otherwise agreed in a partnership agreement, a partner in an at-will 
partnership can trigger the dissolution of the partnership simply by withdrawing by 
express will. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  Historically, this dissolution 
right (or power) was more necessary to a partner than a shareholder because partners 
are jointly and severally liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership.  Share-
holders, not facing personal liability outside a veil-piercing situation, have less need for 
“easy” dissolution.  See Bradley, supra note 17, at 825. 
 308. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1489 (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
302A.751 subd. 1 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (2008). 
 309. See, e.g., Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993); Balvik v. 
Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. 
Va. 1980); see also Art, supra note 209, at 402-04; Moll, supra note 8, at 893-94 (“As 
the alternative forms of relief have broadened over the years, orders of actual dissolu-
tion have become less frequent.”) (citations omitted); Thompson, Corporate 
Dissolution, supra note 17, at 194 (“[C]ourts increasingly grant alternative remedies 
even in the absence of specific statutory authorization.”); Matheson & Maler, supra 
note 173, at 679 (many states concluded “that their courts have broad powers to impose 
a range of equitable remedies”). 
 310. See Bradley, supra note 17, at 824.  However, Professor Bradley finds such 
provisions troublesome because they “seem[ ] to reinforce the cavalier attitudes of 
many judges toward the plight of abused minority close corporation shareholders.”  Id. 
 311. Matheson & Maler, supra note 173, at 670 (discussing the New Jersey statute).  
The authors continued:  “Although as a theoretical matter the determination of whether 
a minority shareholder has been oppressed involves an inquiry separate from what 
remedy is appropriate, as a practical matter the harshness of the remedy inevitably plays 
a role in the initial finding of oppression.”  Id. 
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“fair value.”312  Unfortunately, the involuntary dissolution statutes that 
contain this phrase typically fail to define it, resulting in “significant dis-
agreement about what fair value means.”313  Even if the statutes did pro-
vide a definition, the lack of a public market for the stock makes valuing 
the stock of a closely held business extremely difficult.314  Further, even 
if the aggrieved minority shareholder recovers the value of his shares 
(whatever that amount may be), “fair value” only measures the value of 
the stock.  But it is likely that one of the main reasons why the share-
holder became a shareholder was the promise of a job.315  As Professor 
Moll writes:  “the fair value buyout fails to provide any compensation 
for the value of a lost job or a lost management position – two central 
components of the close corporation shareholder’s investment return.”316  
Finally, requiring the buy-out of a minority shareholder, who may own a 
very substantial interest in the business could impose steep and unantici-
pated costs on the remaining owners or the corporation.  Oftentimes, this 
could require the corporation to take on debt to raise funds with which to 
 312. See Moll, Fair Value, supra note 17, at 295. 
 313. Moll, Fair Value, supra note 17, at 310.  Two positions have developed on the 
meaning of fair value.  One school of thought posits that the fair value of a minority 
shareholder’s shares is the price that a willing buyer would pay for it in an arm’s length 
transaction, i.e., its fair market value, and that a “minority discount” and/or a 
“marketability discount” is therefore appropriate.  A competing school of thought posits 
that the fair value of a minority’s shares should be his proportionate share of the value 
of the entire business, and that discounts would not be appropriate.  For support of the 
latter view, see id. 
 314. Valuing a closely held business is more an “art” than a “science” because there 
is no built-in appraiser in the form of a stock market and there is no universally agreed-
upon measure of value.  Thus, many valuation disputes will become a “battle of the 
experts.”  See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 107, at 939-40 (customary valuation 
techniques do “not work well in most close corporations because the required data is 
not available.  The company may have very limited past performance, the management 
may be too untested to allow reliable future predictions, and the company’s products or 
services may be too novel to allow easy comparisons with seasoned firms.”). 
 315. “For many close corporation investors, the desire for employment (and, to 
some extent, for management participation) is the principal enticement motivating their 
decision to commit capital to a venture.”  Moll, Fair Value, supra note 17, at 340. 
 316. Moll, Fair Value, supra note 17, at 342 (footnote omitted); see also Douglas K. 
Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment at Will in the Close Corporation:  The 
Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517.  This concern would also apply to 
a “squeeze-out” merger where the minority shareholder is only granted appraisal rights 
(also known as dissenters’ rights) to receive the fair value of his stock, but cannot 
pursue other claims.  See, e.g., Sound Infiniti, Inc. v. Snyder, 186 P.3d 1107 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
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pay the plaintiff, unless the parties can agree on other payment and 
collateral terms.317 
 
Current Relief Doesn’t Prevent Future Problems.  If a remedy other 
than dissolution or a buy-out is awarded, a likely shortcoming is that it 
will be inherently short-term and fragile – it will not make the de-
fendants and the plaintiff “get along” in the future.  For example, con-
sider the recent case of Brodie v. Jordan,318 decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the same court that had decided 
Donahue319 and Wilkes320 about thirty years earlier.  In Brodie, the plain-
tiff was a widow who had inherited one-third of the shares of a closely 
held corporation from her deceased husband.321  After the husband’s 
death, the defendants (the other two shareholders) froze the plaintiff out 
of the business by refusing to pay dividends or repurchase her shares, 
and by not allowing her access to company information, which she 
claimed would have facilitated selling her shares to a third party.322 
The defendants did not appeal the finding that they had breached 
their fiduciary duties; instead, the issue before the court was the proper 
remedy.323  Although the court acknowledged that many other juris-
dictions had considered a buy-out the proper remedy in such a situation, 
it noted that the reason they did so was because most of those cases 
arose in states that have involuntary dissolution statutes (unlike 
Massachusetts).324  Thus, the Brodie court noted that other state courts 
“have understandably inferred the power to order the lesser remedy of a 
buyout.”325  However, the Brodie court found that a buy-out was not a 
proper remedy because it would have unduly rewarded the plaintiff by 
 317. As Professor Thompson noted:  “A mandatory buyout statute would permit any 
minority shareholder to impose on the majority the costs of replacing the minority’s 
capital even if the minority had played a substantial role in bringing about the break-
down of relations.”  Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 17, at 223. 
 318. 857 N.E.2d 1076 (Mass. 2006). 
 319. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 
(Mass. 1975). 
 320. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 352 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
 321. Brodie, 857 N.E.2d at 1078-79. 
 322. See id. at 1079. 
 323. Id. at 1080. 
 324. See id. at 1082 n.7. 
 325. Id. 
562 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
providing a buyer for her stock, something that she would have had 
trouble finding in a closely held corporation.326 
So, what magical remedy did the court award instead?  The court 
remanded the case, but gave the lower court “guidance”:  “Prospective 
injunctive relief may be granted to ensure that the plaintiff is allowed to 
participate in company governance, and to enjoy financial or other 
benefits from the business, to the extent that her ownership interest 
justifies.”327  Given that the defendants had previously treated the plain-
tiff so poorly that she had to sue them, we can be fairly sure that the 
defendants will not comply with whatever prospective injunctive relief 
is awarded.  We will also likely see the parties back in court in the near 
future. 
 
Professor Dalley’s Objections.  Professor Paula Dalley argues that 
it is a mistake to impose fiduciary duties on shareholders at all, calling it 
“a judicial invention stimulated by a desire to provide relief to minority 
stockholders who later regretted their own or their decedent’s bargains 
and encouraged by scholars advocating a neo-marxist view of invest-
ing.”328  Professor Dalley believes that traditional corporate law is suffi-
cient to protect minority shareholders329 and that the usual justifications 
given for imposing fiduciary duties on shareholders have “serious weak-
nesses.”330  For example, one common justification is that closely held 
corporations resemble partnerships in many ways.  Professor Dalley 
 
 326. See id. at 1081-82. 
 327. Id. at 1082 (emphasis added; footnotes and citations omitted).  To be fair, the 
court also noted that the lower court could compel the payment of dividends; reasonable 
expectations of ownership could be found by an evidentiary hearing; and money 
damages are appropriate for breaches that create quantifiable deprivations. See id. 
 328. Dalley, supra note 288, at 222. 
 329. For example, controlling shareholders likely will also serve as directors, which 
would subject them to the fiduciary duties that corporate law imposes on directors.  
Professor Dalley uses the example of the denial of employment to a minority share-
holder.  Ordinarily, this board decision would not involve a conflict of interest and thus 
would likely be protected by the business judgment rule.  However, if the termination of 
the shareholder was followed by salary increases for the other directors, then “they 
would be interested and the transaction would be subject to an entire fairness standard.”  
Id. at 215.  One wonders, however, whether the directors would be so blatant about 
increasing their own salaries shortly after terminating a minority shareholder, or if the 
increased salaries could not be justified if they are required to work harder as a result of 
the absence of the terminated shareholder. 
 330. See id. at 186. 
2009 EAT YOUR VEGETABLES 563 
 (OR AT LEAST UNDERSTAND WHY YOU SHOULD) 
335 
 
reminds us, however, that partners face unlimited personal liability for 
the obligations of the business, which means that they should have a 
greater ability to expel other partners or exit the business and curtail 
their own liability than should shareholders.331  Additionally, due to the 
broad powers of partners to bind the partnership,332 it makes sense to 
subject them to the same fiduciary duties that agents owe to principals 
under general agency law rules.  In sum, the differences between part-
nership rules and corporation rules “have important purposes related to 
the nature of liability, and should distinguish partnerships not only from 
publicly held corporations, but also from close corporations.”333  
Further, partnership law itself is not terribly protective of a partner’s 
right to work at the partnership and be involved in management.334  
Professor Dalley also observes that imposing fiduciary duties on 
shareholders conflicts with many other principles of American law.  For 
example, with respect to contract law, courts apply default rules when 
there is no written agreement; when there are no relevant default rules, 
courts look to what the parties would have agreed to, not what the courts 
believe the parties should have decided.
Although Professor Dalley raises several good points, her sugges-
tion to return to more traditional rules does not seem to hold much 
promise of reducing strife in closely held corporations.  For one thing, it 
does not make advance planning any more likely.  Moreover, under 
Professor Dalley’s approach an aggrieved shareholder must still sue the 
defendants and prove that a board decision was motivated by a conflict 
of interest to overcome the business judgment rule and invoke entire 
fairness review.  Also, even if the plaintiff is successful, director duties 
have traditionally been interpreted as running to the corporation and not 
to the shareholders, so it is unclear whether such actions must be 
brought as derivative actions and whether relief would be available to 
the plaintiff. 
 
Do People Actually “Contract”?  The literature is replete with 
statements that minority shareholders in closely held businesses often 
fail adequately to plan their investment.336  As reasons for this, commen-
 331. See id. at 187-93. 
 332. Id. at 187. 
 333. Id. at 189. 
 334. See id. at 191-92. 
 335. See id. at 202 (footnotes omitted). 
 336. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
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tators often cite the following characteristics that are common among 
shareholders of close corporations:  (1) a relative lack of sophistication, 
(2) their failure to anticipate the possibility that they will be unfairly 
treated by the majority, (3) their optimism and overly trusting nature, (4) 
their hesitancy to raise difficult issues during the business’s formation 
for fear of damaging the trust between the owners, and (5) their desire to 
avoid the legal fees that would be involved in drafting protective provi-
sions.337  Another frequently invoked explanation is incompetent coun-
sel.338 
On the other hand, some commentators are skeptical that the lack of 
advance contracting was the result of ignorance or similar causes.339  
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1805 (“[P]artici-
pants in closely held corporations often decline to draft complex contracts to control 
their future dealings, instead preferring to deal with conflicts informally as they arise.”); 
Matheson & Maler, supra note 173, at 660 (closely held “business relationships often 
begin with little or no pre-planning for an eventual (if not inevitable) breakup.”). 
 337. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 17, at 840 (lack of advance planning may be 
explained as “a naive complacency, an overly trusting nature, bad legal advice or a 
blunder”); Chittur, supra note 17, at 131 (“Because people generally avoid complex and 
expensive planning in small businesses, certain problems are difficult to anticipate even 
when the parties attempt to articulate mutual expectations.  Absent an adversarial 
setting, they keep lawyer involvement to the minimum . . . . Given the desire to curtail 
start-up costs, and the personal relationship of the parties, the minimal articulations 
leave gaps that surface in due course.”) (footnote omitted); O’Neal, supra note 17, at 
881 (“[M]inority participants in a close corporation may not anticipate dissension or 
oppression, and indeed may be unaware of their vulnerability . . . .”); Siegel, supra note 
10, at 447-48 (excuses for not engaging in advance planning “seem limited to situations 
where (i) the parties are unwilling to write contracts due to their harmonious relation-
ship, (ii) the minority is too unsophisticated to appreciate the need for protection, or (iii) 
the minority could not get the majority to agree to such provisions”); Thompson, 
Corporate Dissolution, supra note 17, at 224 (“Parties entering into a business 
relationship are not always willing to fully explore the ramifications of possible dis-
putes if things were to go wrong.”). 
 338. To put it humorously: 
Poor drafting in LLC and partnership agreements is endemic.  Too often the agree-
ments are based upon forms and lack the necessary customization to the needs and 
expectations of the parties.  Too often the agreements fail to address likely fact 
changes . . . .  None of us would “take a stab” at drafting a defined benefit plan or try 
to “throw together” a Form S-1 registration statement.  But all too often partnership 
and operating agreements are drafted by attorneys who have some idea of what they 
are doing.  Just not enough of an idea. 
See Rutledge, supra note 35, at *18. 
 339. Transaction costs can also impact whether parties decide to contract.  See 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 220, at 299. 
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They point out that the shareholders were savvy enough to choose the 
corporate form to limit their personal liability, which evidences an 
awareness of at least some legal rules.  It is logical, then, to assume that 
the investor will be aware of other legal rules.340  Therefore, if a person 
became a minority shareholder without engaging in any advance plan-
ning, that should be viewed as a rational choice to rely on the normal, 
default rules of corporate governance.341  Further, even if it was not an 
informed choice, the minority and majority may still not have chosen to 
adopt (or been able to agree on the terms of) protections for the minority 
shareholder. 
In an insightful 2003 article, Manual A. Utset argued that two “self-
control” problems were also responsible for the widespread lack of 
planning in closely held corporations:  procrastination and “projection 
bias.”  Basing his arguments on psychological, economic, and other 
social science research, Professor Utset argued that an intertemporal 
decision-maker (i.e., a person making a decision about his future actions, 
or that will affect his future well-being) often will exhibit “time-
inconsistent preferences” (i.e., his later preferences will not match his 
earlier preferences).342  This can lead even a well-informed shareholder 
to repeatedly procrastinate entering into contracts that he believes will 
be beneficial over the long-term.  For example, if a prospective minority 
shareholder will incur immediate costs in drafting an employment 
contract (such as attorney fees), but will not realize the benefits from the 
contract until some future period (such as when the majority attempts to 
terminate the minority’s employment), he will repeatedly procrastinate 
in entering into the contract if he believes that the benefits of postponing 
the agreement date by X amount of time (by deferring the costs associ-
ated with drafting the agreement) will exceed the loss from delaying the 
agreement date for X amount of time.  The result is that even a well-
informed shareholder may never get around to entering into contracts 
that he believed were necessary and beneficial or may procrastinate in 
gathering the information necessary to make decisions.343  And if he 
 340. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that when investors are aware of the tax cones-
quences of the corporate forms they select, they are usually knowledgeable of other 
consequences as well.  See id. 
 341. See generally Utset, supra note 8, at 1347. 
 342. To put it differently, if a decision-maker has time-consistent preferences, 
“when the future arrives and it is time to act, the decision-maker will follow through in 
accordance with her original preferences.”  Id. at 1351. 
 343. See id. at 1350-51. 
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does enter into a contract, it will likely be incomplete or inappropriate 
because a “projection bias” may cause him not to appreciate the extent 
to which future conditions may vary from present conditions.344  
Because of such self-control problems, many minority shareholders 
“who leave their contracts incomplete . . . do so, not based on complex 
strategic considerations, but on fairly straightforward human motiva-
tions.”345  An approach to minority owner oppression that advocates 
increased planning, such as the one set forth in this Article, will need to 
recognize these psychological motivations in order to be effective. 
Empirical evidence also indicates that investors often fail to engage 
in advance planning.  In 2003, Sandra K. Miller reported the results of 
an empirical study designed to determine, among other things, whether 
the “unparalleled frontier of contractual freedom”346 in LLCs was 
actually resulting in well-drafted operating agreements negotiated on a 
“level contractual playing field.”347  To that end, Professor Miller dis-
tributed a questionnaire to more than 3,000 business attorneys in 
California, Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania.348  Some of the 
results suggest that minority LLC members remain at risk for majority 
abuse, despite their ability to bargain for protective provisions.  For ex-
ample, the survey respondents indicated that they represent majority 
LLC members much more frequently than minority LLC members.349  
 344. Professor Utset also argued that “projection bias” leads to nonexistent or 
incomplete contracts.  In other words, in deciding now whether to enter into a contract 
that will affect his future (and, if so, the terms of the contract), a person must make a 
prediction about his future “preferences.”  Often, however, a person’s ability to predict 
his future preferences is very limited, and people often mistakenly assume that their 
future preferences will be the same as their current preferences.  These incorrect pre-
dictions will lead to poor contracts.  Incorrect predictions of future preferences are par-
ticularly likely if a person is in a “hot” psychological state (e.g., anger, fear, etc.) either 
at the time of the original decision or the time in the future that is affected by the deci-
sion.  See id. at 1368-80.  In the context of close corporations, Professor Utset argues 
that at the time of forming the corporation, “a shareholder will project her current cold-
state preferences and will tend to underappreciate the full magnitude of her own and the 
other party’s temptations to take harmful actions in future hot states.”  Id. at 1374. 
 345. Id. at 1335. 
 346. See Miller, supra note 33, at 360. 
 347. Id. at 355. 
 348. Id. at 355-56.  Approximately 25% of the recipients completed the survey. 
 349. Consolidating the responses from all four states, Professor Miller found that an 
average of 56% of the respondents “frequently represent majority LLC owners . . . 
while an average of only 20% reported frequent representation of minority LLC 
owners.”  Id. at 388.  Although some of this difference can be explained by the fact that 
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Also, only 8% of the respondents indicated that their “usual” LLC oper-
ating agreement “contains an absolute buy-out provision exercisable by 
minority owners,” but 73% of the respondents said that it did not.350  
Tellingly, 20% indicated that their “usual” operating agreement gives 
the “majority owners the absolute right to force the LLC to buy them out 
at the fair market value.”351  The study also suggested that many practi-
tioners are unfamiliar with the “default” buy-out rights of LLC mem-
bers, as very high percentages incorrectly answered questions concern-
ing their states’ LLC statutes on this topic.352  Further, only about 14% 
of the respondents indicated that their “usual” operating agreement 
allows for judicial dissolution of the LLC upon illegal, fraudulent or 
oppressive conduct.353  Finally, more than two-thirds of the respondents 
believed that “many” operating agreements “are based on form agree-
ments that are not extensively negotiated.”354 
Although Professor Miller cautions against drawing broad generali-
zations from a limited study, these results are sobering.  She believes 
continued judicial monitoring will be necessary because greed and self-
interest can flourish in contractarian relationships, especially where 
there is unequal bargaining power.355 
 
Problems with Special Close Corporation Statutes.  Many statutes 
for close corporations do not apply unless the corporation elects to be 
governed by the statute, or “opts in.”356  This is unfortunate because it is 
many LLCs have only one member (who, of course, would be the “majority” member), 
Professor Miller nonetheless found this disparity “somewhat disturbing, both because of 
the traditional vulnerability of the private minority investor and also because of the 
statutory and judicial emphasis on, and deference to, the contractual operating agree-
ment.”  Id. 
 350. Id. at 391. 
 351. Id.  To be fair, Professor Miller points out that, due to the wording of the 
questions and other factors, it is “difficult to draw clear conclusions about practitioners’ 
practices regarding buy-out clauses.”  Id. 
 352. See id. at 392-93. 
 353. Id. at 397. 
 354. Id. at 399. 
 355. See id. at 404.  Although an initial goal of the contractarian movement was to 
limit unwarranted judicial interference, even-handed judicial review is now more im-
portant due to flexible statutes.  Id. 
 356. See supra note 240.  One professor finds that the opt-in requirement is “incon-
sistent with a remedial approach to close corporation laws and is a mistake.”  Bradley, 
supra note 17, at 820.  Further, the opt-in requirement “preclude[s] the realization of the 
remedial goals in nonelecting corporations.”  Id. at 843. 
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likely that the shareholder who has done little or no planning – and thus 
is probably a shareholder in a corporation that has not elected statutory 
close corporation status – is the one that needs the most protection from 
his lack of foresight.  Furthermore, even if a corporation does “opt in,” 
there are few default rules that come with this election:  “these statutes 
simply enable the parties to create contracts or to specify in the cor-
porate charter a panoply of options that deviate from the standard format 
of corporate governance.  These ‘self help’ provisions”357 give the par-
ties little guidance on what they should do, except hire an attorney. 
III. PROPOSALS 
A. General Considerations 
What Does the “Typical” Minority Owner Want?  Do We Know?  It 
is easy to list several ideas a prospective minority owner should con-
sider:  an employment agreement; a buy-sell agreement; a provision in 
the articles of incorporation allowing the minority to dissolve the busi-
ness upon certain events; a guarantee of representation on the managing 
body of the business; and a veto power over certain major business deci-
sions.358  These ideas are important because both the corporation and the 
LLC otherwise provide the majority with many ways to abuse the 
minority. 
Upon reflection, however, it seems these ideas may be appropriate 
only for the “typical” closely held business, i.e., one with two to four 
founders, all of whom are actively involved in management and expect 
to have an “equal say” in business decisions.  While this type of closely 
held business is certainly common, it is by no means the only type.  
What about businesses with more centralized management and passive 
investors?  What about businesses that are investment vehicles for 
sophisticated owners?  What about businesses owned by the descendants 
of the original founders?  Is it possible to create a “one size fits all” solu-
 
 357. Siegel, supra note 10, at 385; see also Bradley, supra note 17, at 830 (“The 
election to be a close corporation alone does not assure the realization of shareholder 
expectations.  Governance, employment, salary or other economic-return allocation 
rights are not automatically prescribed for individual shareholders.  A bargain must still 
be struck . . . .”); Karjala, supra note 226, at 691-92 (arguing it is difficult or impossible 
to “determine a ‘default setting’ for closely held enterprises that better meets the 
parties’ expectations than does the general law”). 
 358. See supra notes 119-78 and accompanying text. 
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tion that addresses more than a few topics,359 or must we further differ-
entiate closely held businesses, not by whether they are corporations, 
LLCs, or something else, but by their management and ownership 
characteristics?  Is it feasible to create different default rules for differ-
ent types of businesses? 
 
Different “Management Styles” in Different Businesses.  In a 1997 
article,360 Professors Dale Oesterle and Wayne Gazur proposed rejecting 
the current “bizarre system of small business classification”361 in favor 
of a new type of business entity: the limited liability entity (LLE).  The 
authors envisioned an LLE statute that would provide three sets of de-
fault rules from which business owners could choose when forming an 
LLE:  one for firms where all of the equity owners are active in the 
business (“Type I businesses”); one for firms with several active equity 
owners and some passive investors (“Type II businesses”); and a third 
for firms with a substantial number of “sophisticated,” but passive in-
vestors (“Type III businesses”).362  The goals of this system would be to 
“minimize the confusion of parties who are not legally sophisticated, 
and . . . minimize the opportunities for deceit.”363 
For the Type I businesses, the authors envisioned a “modern adap-
tation of the rules of a general partnership,”364 but with limited liability.  
The authors suggested, among other things, that the Type I default rules 
would provide (in most cases, absent a contrary agreement) that:  (1) all 
owners participate equally in the management of the firm; (2) all owners 
receive equal salaries; (3) that any payments in return of one owner’s 
capital must be made to all owners; (4) if an owner becomes incapa-
citated or dies, he or his estate could require the company to redeem his 
ownership interest; (5) ownership interests are not freely transferable; 
(6) a majority of the owners must agree to “major firm decisions”; and 
(7) managers owe a duty of loyalty.365  Importantly, an owner-manager’s 
 359. Professor Moll has attempted to articulate a series of “hypothetical under-
standings” concerning dividends where close corporation shareholders have failed to 
articulate or formalize their “understandings” on this issue.   Moll, Dividend Policy, 
supra note 17, at 876; see id. at 876-923. 
 360. Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 56. 
 361. Id. at 104. 
 362. Id. at 131. 
 363. Id. at 129. 
 364. Id. at 145. 
 365. Id. at 145-46. 
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removal for cause would allow the firm to stop paying his salary, and 
pay a “risk-free rate of return” on his capital account or force the re-
moved manager to leave the firm for a cash payment equal to his 
“allocated share of the firm’s assets, based on liquidation values and net 
of damages caused by his or her misconduct.”366  However, if an owner-
manager were removed without cause the default rules would allow him 
to sue for breach of contract or request a court to dissolve the com-
pany.367 
As for the default rules for Type II businesses, Oesterle and Gazur 
felt that the passive investors needed “special protections from oppor-
tunistic behavior by the insiders,”368 particularly a continuing right to 
have the firm repurchase their ownership interest for “cash equal to a 
proportionate share of the firm’s value.”369  The precise nature of this 
put option could be controlled by contract, particularly if it was triggered 
by any misconduct by the insiders.  Other important provisions would:  
(1) impose on the insiders a duty to report periodically to the passive 
investors, (2) subject the insiders to duties of loyalty, and (3) require the 
insiders to refrain from reckless or intentional misconduct.370 
As discussed above,371 a proposal calling for a new type of business 
entity, whether in addition to or in replacement of the current forms,372 
probably will not receive a warm reception today.  Although the current 
“alphabet soup”373 of business organizations is confusing and redundant, 
it is probably here to stay.  Nonetheless, this approach does aptly identi-
fy different “management styles” of closely held businesses and many 
default rules that would be appropriate for each.  These differences, and 
the risks prevalent in each, can be used to effectively inform the choices 
that prospective business owners make.374 
 366. Id. at 146. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. at 147. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. 
 372. Oesterle and Gazur did not advocate replacing all of the currently existing 
business forms with the LLE structure.  See Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 56, at 124. 
 373. “The term ‘alphabet soup’ gained currency in the early days of the New Deal as 
a description of the proliferation of new [government] agencies such as WPA and 
PWA.”  Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 286 n.4 (1979). 
 374. See Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 56, at 130 (summarizing the three groups and 
describing investor and management styles).  Type I businesses are comprised of a 
small number of equity investors all of whom actively participate in the business.  Id.  
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Should Prospective Business Owners Be Forced to Engage in 
Advance Planning?  Are Better Default Rules the Answer?  Given that 
corporations and other business forms exist by legislative grace, the state 
may impose any conditions on their formation or use as it sees fit.  For 
example, the state could require the prospective owners of all closely 
held businesses, before forming their business entity, to engage in pre-
formation negotiations or discussions about any or all of the planning 
techniques discussed above.  The state could even go so far as to require 
that certain agreements or charter provisions be in place before the entity 
is formed. 
Although such an approach may result in many business owners 
having appropriate protections in place, its pitfalls are overwhelming.  
Any attempt to require negotiations or to mandate certain charter pro-
visions – even if somewhat tailored to the different “management styles” 
of small businesses – would be both over- and under-inclusive given the 
myriad and particularized needs of small businesses and their individual 
owners.  For example, although it may be appropriate in many cases to 
consider whether an employment agreement is needed, this certainly is 
not always the case – so why should the state require pointless discus-
sions?  Also, there certainly will be situations that call for “unusual” 
planning that would not be reflected in any state requirements.  In other 
words, a finite list of mandated discussions could give prospective 
business owners the false impression that these are the only topics that 
should be addressed.  Moreover, the costs involved in such a system 
would likely be prohibitive for many prospective business owners in 
conducting statutorily-mandated negotiations or discussions,375 not to 
mention the state’s costs and difficulties in monitoring compliance. 
A possible solution would be to change the various statutory default 
rules to be more protective of minority owners, but allow the parties to 
“contract around” those rules if they so choose.  This is basically the ap-
Type II businesses include passive equity investors who demand protections from ma-
jority control of the business by insiders.  Id.  Type III businesses would be “completely 
open-ended” due to the sophistication of their owners and their likely use of counsel.  
Id. at 147-48 (discussing the potential for investment bankers and venture capitalists to 
refine and tailor complex entities to their needs). 
 375. Cf. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 17, at 224 (“For those hearty 
investors willing to undertake such a search, the costs can be prohibitive, both from the 
increased involvement of an attorney and the seemingly open-ended nature of trying to 
protect all participants’ interests from all possible evils.”). 
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proach that Oesterle and Gazur used to create sets of LLE default rules 
that seem to capture fairly well the risks to the minority owner in busi-
nesses with different management styles.  One problem, however, is ap-
plying those rules to several different statutes, which Oesterle and Gazur 
avoided by using a new business form (the LLE).  For example, if a state 
has separate statutes for corporations, LLCs, and partnerships (and 
LLPs) and adopts sets of default rules only for Type I and Type II busi-
nesses, it must apply those rules to three different statutes, resulting in 
six different sets of default rules.376  Given the number and complexity 
of current business organization statutes, this approach would likely 
breed more confusion than assistance.  And this assumes that we only 
need two sets of new default rules. 
More importantly, would legislatures be good at writing default 
rules to protect minority owners without unduly burdening the majori-
ty’s right to some “selfish ownership”377 or giving the minority a 
weapon rather than a shield?  Outside of partnership statutes and a few 
other examples, there isn’t much reason to believe that legislators would 
be.  After all, the “law assumes that parties know their own interests 
best.”378  Even if it were otherwise, the costs to determine what the 
default rules should be and evaluating them over time – probably based 
only on anecdotal evidence – would likely be high.  For these reasons, 
today there are few statutory attempts at rules that are themselves 
protective of minority shareholders or LLC members, other than 
involuntary dissolution statutes; most statutes instead allow shareholders 
 
 376. See Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 56, at 127-28.  To be fair, RUPA would like 
not require much modification because its default rules are more protective of a minor-
ity owner than are corporate and LLC statutes.  See supra notes 68-78 and 
p
ble with the principle that stockholder 
t 1015. 
accom anying text. 
 377. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (citing Alfred Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 
70 HARV. L. REV. 986, 1013-15 (1957)).  According to Professor Hill, insiders owe a 
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders to refrain from engaging in “selfishly motivated 
conduct which exceeds certain bounds of fairness,” such as overcharging the corpora-
tion for property or services, freezing minority stockholders out of the enterprise, or 
devising a corporate transaction “which is technically legal but yields what are deemed 
unconscionable advantages to the insiders.” Hill at 1014-15. “[I]t is clear that the 
controlling stockholders are not fiduciaries in the strict sense; and indeed they could not 
be, for the classic fiduciary concept is incompati
majorities shall effectively govern.” Id. a
 378. Dalley, supra note 288, at 205. 
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LC members to create protective provisions without concern about 
their enforceability.379 
This approach recognizes that the best person to decide what a 
small business owner needs is the owner himself.  So perhaps the best 
the state can do from an ex ante perspective is to make sure that pro-
spective business people are adequately warned of the risks that they are 
undertaking, and then rely on the fact that most people will act in their 
rational self-interest to protect themselves from these risks to the extent 
that they feel appropriate.  Although it is true that this should be the job 
of lawyers and that many people still will not do what is “good for 
them,” under the current system prospective business owners too often 
rush headlong into business without appreciating these risks, or even 
being aware of them at all.  This needs to change.  States also need to 
make it much easier and less expensive for business owners to engage in 
advance planning.  Lastly, we must also provide incentives to reduce the 
an” m
ers to fail to adequately plan. 
 
Would a “No Fault Divorce” Statute Be a Better Idea?  Professor 
John H. Matheson and R. Kevin Maler recently proposed a model statute 
that would function like a “statutory buy-sell agreement” for all non-
public companies. 380  Essentially, this proposed statute would give a 
minority shareholder a “put” option to require the company to repur-
chase all (but not less than all) of his shares at any time for any or no 
reason.381  Generally, the purchase price of the stock would be at its fair 
market value, including discounts for “minority and marketability 
reasons.”382  However, if the sale were “in connection with the resigna-
tion or removal of the [minority] owner as a director, officer, manager, 
or employee of the business,” then full value (i.e., no discounts) must be 
paid.383  Payment would be made in cash, unless the company convinced 
a court that a cash payment was impractical, in which case the court 
would determine the payment terms.384  Also, the company would have 
a “call” option to purchase all (but not less than all) of the minority 
 379. See supra notes 356-57 and accompanying text. 
on & Maler, supra note 173, at 691. 
2. 
id. 
 380. Mathes
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. at 694. 
 383. Id. at 69
 384. See 
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er, but if the shareholder “prefers a buyout, the incentive to 
litiga
ngage in 
some examination of their objectives, understandings, and concerns 
before starting a busine e decrease. 
shareholder’s shares at any time for “full value” in cash.385  In either 
case, the price (either fair market value or full value) would be 
determined by the parties or, if they could not agree, by one or more 
appraisers.386  This statutory buy-sell provision would not apply if the 
parties had a written buy-sell agreement.387  It also would not preempt 
any remedies for oppression otherwise available to a minority 
sharehold
te is in most cases reduced to the amount of the discount” between 
full value and fair market value.388 
This approach is rather attractive:  it would provide the minority 
shareholder who did not engage in advance planning with a built-in “exit 
strategy” and remove the problem of having to litigate whether the 
majority’s acts were oppressive.  Still, by focusing exclusively on a buy-
out remedy and the termination of the minority shareholder’s interest in 
the business, this approach seems too concerned with “the end” and not 
concerned at all with the parties’ relationship before that point.  As dis-
cussed above, a buy-out may not be an appropriate remedy if the busi-
ness has struggled for many years and now is about to “take off.”389  In 
such a case, the present value of the business may not be an accurate 
measure of its actual worth to the owners.  In sum, this approach seems 
part of a still-to-be-discovered comprehensive approach.  While admira-
ble, it is not complete; it makes it easier to get a “no-fault divorce,”390 
but does not give the marriage a better chance of succeeding in the first 
place.  A more comprehensive approach would involve “pre-marital 
counseling.”  In other words, if the parties can be required to e
ss, the chances for later strif
B. A Proposed Approach 
The following section:  (1) proposes a method to systematically 
inform prospective owners of closely held businesses about the dangers 
of oppression, common forms of planning that may address those dan-
 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at 695. 
 388. Id. at 697.  Litigation to establish oppression would still be necessary if the 
shareholder wanted relief other than a buy-out. 
 389. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
 390. See Matheson & Maler, supra note 173, at 699. 
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 of minority owner oppression can be perfect, 
however, the following also considers some shortcomings of this ap-
proa
those persons constitute all of the persons who are currently contempla-
ted to be owners,391 it should refuse to accept for filing any business’s 
gers, and the importance of consulting an attorney when forming a busi-
ness; (2) proposes a method to track confidentially the “choices” that 
prospective owners make; (3) suggests that the statistical results of those 
choices should be compiled and made known to future prospective busi-
ness owners to guide them in making their own choices; (4) argues that 
several different “standard form” agreements and provisions should be 
made easily available without cost to prospective business owners (with, 
of course, conspicuous warnings that form agreements should not be 
used blindly without the assistance of counsel); and (5) argues that more 
continuing-education programs concerning advance planning are need-
ed.  The following section further considers the benefits of LLPs and re-
visits the question of whether default rules that are protective of minor-
ity business owners may some day be realistic.  Because no system for 
addressing the problem
ch and argues that fiduciary-duty analysis and oppression statutes 
must remain in place. 
 
Educating Prospective Business Owners: a “Buyer-Beware” 
Approach.  As argued throughout this Article, prospective business own-
ers often are unaware of the risks of oppression in closely held busi-
nesses.  As such, a central suggestion made in this Article is that before 
any business organization whose existence requires a state filing may be 
formed, all of the prospective equity owners of the organization must be 
required to read and sign a “warning” document.  This document would 
be prepared by the state government, reviewed periodically by the 
state’s bar association (or an appropriate subcommittee thereof) for 
accuracy and made available on the web site of the state agency that 
handles business formations (typically the secretary of state).  Until the 
secretary of state receives a copy of the document that is signed by all of 
the prospective owners of the business, along with a representation that 
charter documents.392  Importantly, this filing process would not allow 
 
 391. If the contemplated business will have only one owner, then these warnings 
would be unnecessary. 
 392. Professor Utset argues that any change to the incorporation process should not 
increase the chance that prospective investors would be subject to pre-incorporation 
(promoter) liability.  For that reason, he suggests a two-tier incorporation process in 
which corporations would continue to be easily formed – and thus get the immediate 
576 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
the state to reject a filing if the prospective owners chose to ignore the 
advice; instead, it only would require them to acknowledge that they 
have been made aware of the information contained in the document.  In 
this sense, it is akin to the Surgeon General’s warnings on packages of 
cigarettes, as opposed to an unenforceable ban on smoking. 
What information should the warning document contain?  Appen-
dix A to this Article contains a prototype of such a document loosely 
based on Michigan statutes, but an explanation of the general principles 
that should be used to guide the drafting process is in order.  First, the 
document should advise the prospective owners that even though they 
can form a business organization without an attorney, the state strongly 
suggests that they hire an attorney.393  It should also advise them that 
they should consult an attorney who is experienced in business law and 
that they should be aware that such an attorney likely will be engaged to 
represent the business rather than the individual owners.394  Thus, the 
warning should advise that each of the prospective owners should 
consider engaging separate counsel. 
Here, a reader of the document who is either relatively unsophisti-
cated or unwilling or unable to spend money on attorney fees may 
become alarmed; he may wonder whether he is able to afford to form a 
business and whether the process is overly complicated and time con-
suming, making the business formation infeasible.  As such, the warning 
should state that there are several issues that the prospective owners 
should discuss among themselves before visiting an attorney (if they 
choose to do so) and, to the extent that they can work out some of the 
issues among themselves, they will save money on attorney fees.395 
benefit of limited liability.  However, the second tier, which could be “used as a vehicle 
to provide disclosure to shareholders about applicable default rules and to address 
potential shareholder procrastination,” would involve the filing of an amendment to the 
articles of incorporation.  The second tier could also be used to educate shareholders 
about the dangers of minority oppression and give them a forum to discuss their re-
spective expectations concerning the business.  Until the amendment is filed, Professor 
Utset’s envisioned system would allow any shareholder to dissolve the corporation at 
will for any or no reason.  Utset, supra note 8, at 1392-93. 
ant 393. “Minority particip s should be informed of the importance of retaining legal 
rather than later on, and of drafting buy-out 
.”  
Mi
 39
 39
counsel at the inception of the business 
provisions and other protections necessary in the event of a future disagreement
ller, supra note 33, at 407. 
4. See supra note 3. 
5. As Professor Kleinberger wrote: 
Clients on tight budgets can do much of the initial discussion on their own.  The 
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Next, the warning would be divided into two sections, one for Type 
I businesses and one for Type II businesses.  This distinction would ap-
ply regardless of whether the parties were contemplating forming a 
corporation, an LLC, or some other entity.  After explaining the differ-
ences between these different types of businesses, the document would 
direct the reader to the appropriate section explaining the risks and plan-
ning opportunities associated with each.396 
For Type I businesses, the document would explain the assumptions 
that are being made about the parties’ expectations.  These assumptions 
would include that each owner expects to:  (1) be employed by the busi-
ness and draw a reasonable salary; (2) have an “equal voice” in business 
decisions, similar to a member of the board of directors in a corporation, 
a member in a member-managed LLC, or a manager in a manager-
managed LLC; and (3) have his equity repurchased by the company if he 
were to be fired, die, etc.  The document would then explain how the 
statutory default rules in place (both for corporations and for LLCs) 
would not protect those expectations if one of the minority owners had a 
falling out with the majority owners.  The document would also briefly 
explain the various planning techniques that would address those con-
cerns (again, both for corporations and LLCs).  In an effort not to appear 
overwhelming, the document would clearly state that standard form 
agreements and provisions, which the parties could use as a starting (but 
not ending) point in their own drafting, are available in the manner des-
cribed below. 
The section addressing Type II businesses would proceed along 
similar lines.  It would begin with a discussion of the assumptions being 
made about the parties’ expectations, divided between the prospective 
active owners and the prospective passive owners.  As for the active 
owners, the assumptions are likely the same as above:  expectations of 
employment, having a say in management, etc.  Thus, the document 
could refer them back to the sections dealing with Type I businesses.  
 
lawyers can supply a letter describing the issues in plain English terms and giving 
examples of problematic solutions.  The clients can then discuss matters among 
themselves, and for each issue either reach a tentative agreement on an approach or 
develop specific concerns for further discussion.  The lawyers can then rejoin the 
process, to clarify and test the understanding and eventually to develop a legal 
structure to effectuate the business objectives. 
Kleinberger, supra note 17, at 1166. 
 396. With Type III businesses (firms with a large number of sophisticated, passive 
equity owners) or other types of businesses where extensive attorney involvement is 
likely, a warning probably is not necessary. 
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ons 
likel
gain, the document will encourage readers to 
cons
n may no longer be possible.  One 
method to address procrastination is to include a worksheet where 
read
 
The passive investors, while not desiring employment, may or may not 
wish to serve in some management role, such as serving as a director, 
but not an officer, of a corporation.  They should also consider “special 
protections from opportunistic behavior by the insiders,”397 such as buy-
out rights triggered on demand or upon specific events, as well as rights 
to access information about the business.  As above, the document 
would then explain how, even with the ability to sue, these expectati
y will not be realized if there is a falling out with the other investors 
they have not engaged in advance planning.  It would also describe some 
of the available methods of planning to protect the owners’ interests. 
The document should not be overly long or unnecessarily complex; 
if it were, many prospective business owners may be inclined to ignore 
it or only skim it.  It should also be written, for lack of a better term, in 
plain English with a minimum of legal terminology, a maximum of 
bullet points and short, declarative sentences.  The goal of this document 
is not to explain the law comprehensively; rather, the goal is to put 
investors on notice of their risks and some of their options.  The next 
step will be up to them.  A
ult with an attorney and will also attempt to allay their fears that 
they cannot afford an attorney or that attorney consultations would be a 
waste of time and money. 
The other goal of this document would be to encourage readers to 
overcome their natural procrastination.  Studies have shown that, even 
when a person realizes the benefit of taking an action, he nonetheless is 
likely to procrastinate in taking the action.398  Before long, it may be too 
late, as the benefits of taking the actio
ers can record the actions that they wish to take and set deadlines, as 
suggested at the end of Appendix A. 
 
Measuring the Choices Made by Business Owners and Publishing 
the Statistical Results.  What choices about advance planning do prop-
erly informed small business owners make when they start their busi-
nesses?  We seem to have very little data on this question, although 
commentators have argued (without much empirical evidence) that there 
is a widespread lack of planning in closely held businesses.399  We can 
 397. Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 56, at 147. 
 398. See generally Utset, supra note 8, passim. 
 399. See supra note 336 and accompanying text. 
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because the other 80% may not have been 
suffi
information?  One obvious choice 
wou
that the resistance of the owners would be too high, and decide not to 
 
measure how many corporations do or do not elect to be governed as 
statutory close corporations under a given state’s law, but the evidence 
that we have about the prevalence of more important planning tech-
niques, such as employment agreements and buy-sell agreements, is 
mostly anecdotal.  How many minority shareholders in closely held 
businesses have employment agreements and/or buy-sell agreements?  
We do not really know.  Moreover, even if we did know that say, 20% 
of the minority owners of Type I businesses obtained employment 
agreements, that would not necessarily mean that the other 80% found 
such agreements unimportant, 
ciently aware of the need for such an agreement.  Statistics thus 
could result in a false impression about the “market voting” on the im-
portance of such agreements. 
But what if we could be sufficiently confident that all prospective 
business owners had been given an opportunity to consider the costs and 
benefits of obtaining an employment agreement and/or a buy-sell agree-
ment?  What if we also knew that a high percentage decided to pursue 
one, thus indicating that the “market” considers these agreements impor-
tant?  What could we do with this 
ld be to use it to draft “default” rules in the relevant business entity 
statutes.  As discussed above, however, this Article argues against that 
approach, at least for the time being. 
Instead, a beneficial use of this information would be to use it to 
educate other prospective business owners.  For example, if a prospec-
tive business owner knew that a high percentage of business owners who 
have preceded him chose to get an employment agreement and/or a buy-
sell agreement, or undertake other forms of advance planning, he very 
likely would take notice and seriously consider whether he should do the 
same.400  On the other hand, if he knew that only a very small percentage 
had chosen to obtain a provision in the articles that would allow disso-
lution of the business at the request of a minority owner, he may deter-
mine that the benefits of obtaining such a provision are too remote, or 
 400. For the argument that observing the contractual choices made – and not made – 
by parties in the close corporation context may not be an accurate indication of which 
choices are appropriate or beneficial for large numbers of close corporations, see Utset, 
supra note 8, at 1386.  However, if a system is designed to counter the dangers of share-
holder procrastination and “projection bias” about which Professor Utset is concerned, 
see supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text, then over time it should prove to be a 
more accurate reflection of what “good” choices are. 
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m deci-
sion
es-
tionnaire (based on the Michigan corporate and LLC statutes) appears in 
 of it should be required as a 
cond
g are popular among similarly situated owners.  Finally, 
the state must publish the information, preferably on a Web site, and 
keep
 
pursue that option.  Although the business owner should make these 
decisions with his attorney, prior “market voting” can help infor
s about advance planning.  Presently, there is very little, if any, such 
statistical information available to prospective business owners. 
Of course, to make this information available, it must first be 
gathered.  This Article therefore proposes that states require the owners 
of a business to complete a questionnaire concerning their advance-
planning choices, as a condition to forming a business entity.  The state 
should then use the information from all such questionnaires to compile 
a continuously updated database.  Although a suggested form of qu
Appendix B of this Article, a few primary observations are in order. 
First, it is vitally important that the questionnaire be kept confi-
dential by the state – and that business owners are so assured.  If pro-
spective owners of a closely held business believe that the public could 
access information about their private affairs, they will be reluctant to 
complete the questionnaire honestly.  To that end, the questionnaire set 
forth in Appendix B conspicuously states that it will be kept confidential 
and only used for statistical purposes.401  At the same time, the question-
naire cannot be left optional – completion
ition of forming a business entity so that the data gathered by this 
process is reasonably accurate and robust. 
In addition, the questionnaire needs to be segregated into different 
categories, based both on:  (1) whether the business will be a corpora-
tion, an LLC, a partnership, or some other entity; and (2) which of 
Oesterle and Gazur’s types the business will be.402  This will allow the 
data to be compiled so that future prospective business owners may 
easily locate their prospective type of business and see what forms of 
advance plannin
 it current. 
 
Making “Form” Agreements Easily Available and Educating 
Professionals.  Taking the steps described above will help improve the 
likelihood that prospective owners of closely held businesses will be 
 401. It would probably also be necessary to amend the relevant statutes to provide 
that such questionnaires must be kept confidential by the state, and not be subject to dis-
closure under applicable freedom of information (FOIA) statutes.  Appendix B contem-
plates that questionnaires would be destroyed after they are processed. 
 402. See supra notes 362-63 and accompanying text. 
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to water but cannot make it drink, more 
mus
 This should reduce transaction costs (i.e., attorney fees) and 
may
uld come with a conspicuous 
warn
tions offer such programs, particularly in states with continuing-legal-
educ
best choice for a prospective minority business owner may be the 
properly informed of the risks they face and the steps they can take to 
protect themselves.  But making people aware that they need to do 
something does not necessarily mean that a large percentage of them 
will actually follow through, particularly if the task is complex and very 
likely should be done with the assistance of an attorney.  And while it is 
true that one can lead a horse 
t be done to make the actual implementation and execution of 
planning easier to accomplish. 
To this end, the bar association of each state should undertake to 
make available form agreements and charter provisions for the various 
types of entities.  These forms should be drafted and periodically re-
viewed by the appropriate committee of the bar.  To be sure, this is not a 
revolutionary idea; form books are widely available.  However, form 
books vary greatly in quality; instead, a sort of “official” bank of forms 
would be a valuable resource for prospective business owners and their 
attorneys, particularly attorneys who are not well-versed in business 
formation. 
 reduce owner procrastination by making the task seem less 
imposing. 
But form agreements are just that – forms.  Most of them will serve 
as useful starting points but will need to be tailored to the parties’ needs 
by a knowledgeable attorney.  Also, if prospective business owners (or 
their attorneys) thoughtlessly use the forms like simple fill-in-the-blanks 
documents, they likely will end up with agreements that do not work 
well or that conflict with other agreements or the company’s charter 
documents.  As such, all the forms sho
ing that they do not constitute legal advice and should not be used 
without the advice of competent counsel. 
A related suggestion is that bar associations should undertake more 
comprehensive educational programs about advance planning opportu-
nities in closely held businesses, not just for lawyers, but for other 
professionals, such as accountants, that may be involved in forming 
small businesses.  Although many bar associations and private organiza-
ation requirements, an increase in the offerings would be beneficial. 
 
What About LLPs?  In states that have “full shield” statutes,403 the 
 
 403. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text. 
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ess owners should be aware of the LLP 
form f a full-shield version is available.406 
it if they wish.  Obviously, any recommendations need to await the data. 
even a “large-scale boom”408 in planning will not anticipate every future 
LLP.404  The LLP is just a general partnership with a slight but 
important modification, which results in partners not being liable for the 
partnership’s debts.  In most other respects, LLPs are subject to the same 
rules as partnerships, which in their default form are very protective of 
partners.405  Thus, planning to protect a minority owner is far less critical 
in an LLP than in a corporation or LLC, and LLPs may be less 
expensive to form, even if a partnership agreement is needed.  At the 
very least, prospective busin
 i
 
Default Rules in the Future?  For many reasons, it would not be 
wise at this time to try to create default rules that would protect minority 
owners of closely held businesses. 407  Nonetheless, as more statistical 
information becomes available concerning the actual choices made by 
prospective business owners, certain choices may appear overwhelming-
ly popular.  For example, if data were to indicate that 90% of owners in 
Type I businesses obtain buy-sell agreements specifying that they are 
entitled to have their stock repurchased at fair market value if they are 
ever terminated from their employment, then it might make sense to 
draft a statutory default rule that so provides but let the parties opt out of 
 
Drawbacks.  One shortcoming of the approach advocated in this 
Article is that it does not address currently existing businesses.  Thus, 
this approach should not be used as to replace the current remedies in 
close business disputes; fiduciary-duty analysis and oppression statutes 
will still be needed.  A related problem, and another reason that the 
current remedies available to minority owners must remain intact, is that 
 
 404. J. Mark Meinhardt, Note, Investor Beware:  Protection of Minority Stakeholder 
Interests in Closely Held Limited-Liability Business Organizations:  Delaware Law and 
Its Adherents, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 288, 304 (2001) (after finding that Delaware LLCs 
and non-statutory close corporations do not offer sufficient fiduciary-based protections 
to minority investors, the author states that “investors may, therefore, look to [LLPs] to 
ity, control, and default baseline 
t LLPs because Michigan has 
provide the proper mix of single taxation, limited liabil
fiduciary duties between investors”). 
 405. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text 
 406. Appendix A does not contain information abou
only a “partial shield” LLP statute.  See supra note 45. 
 407. See supra notes 375-79 and accompanying text. 
 408. Chittur, supra note 17, at 139 (“Careful planning could forestall some conflicts 
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dispute between owners of a closely held business.  The reported cases 
repeatedly have shown that owners of closely held businesses find re-
markably “creative” and unanticipated ways to oppress one another.409  
The most that probably can be accomplished is to identify the major 
areas of concern and hope that the parties adequately address them.  
Nevertheless, this would be an improvement over the current system, in 
which many prospective business owners do not engage in any advance 
planning. 
An additional problem with this Article’s approach is that a court 
may interpret the absence of a particular agreement as authorizing or 
immunizing particular conduct by the majority.  For example, assume 
that a minority shareholder, despite being warned that he should have an 
employment agreement, does not obtain one.  Does that mean that the 
majority can freely terminate the minority’s employment without worry-
ing that they might be acting in an oppressive manner?  It seems to be a 
compelling argument for the majority to make:  (1) the minority owner 
was expressly warned about the importance of having an employment 
agreement, yet decided that he did not need one; and therefore (2) the 
minority owner impliedly agreed to at-will employment.  Nonetheless, it 
probably would be unwise to accept this argument automatically.  The 
minority owner’s failure to obtain an employment agreement might be 
still be explained by reasons other than that he accepted at-will employ-
ment and it would still be necessary to determine why there was no 
employment agreement in place.410  However, this Article’s approach 
should lead to more advance planning, which in turn should lead to 
fewer disputes arising, or at least fewer litigable issues. 
Other possible objections are that the proposed system will unduly 
scare prospective business owners, or that it will lead to unacceptably 
high “transaction costs” (e.g., attorney fees) if parties who likely would 
 
and resolve some others.  Nevertheless, inadequately planned close corporations will al-
ways remain part of the picture . . . . The necessity for a meaningful approach to the 
conflicts remains strong, and will not be obviated by even a large-scale boom in plan-
ning.”). 
 409. For some “inventive” means of oppression, see Van Vliet & Snider, supra note 
300, at 258-61. 
 410. The minority owner’s failure to obtain an employment agreement could be due 
to:  (1) wanting to avoid the time and expense involved in negotiating the agreement 
and having an attorney reduce it to writing; (2) a simple oversight; (3) a failure by the 
minority owner to see why it would be a good idea to have an employment agreement; 
or (4) laziness or procrastination.  Of course, if the parties did address an issue in an 
agreement, it presumptively should be controlling. 
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ld be easily available to help “jump start” the 
parti
e small prices 
for the societal benefit of reduced conflicts and litigation in closely held 
businesses. 
 
have foregone negotiating advance-planning documents are frightened 
into insisting on them.  In the worst-case scenario, the parties’ negotia-
tions could lead to an impasse and a promising business would never be 
formed.  This objection does not appear overly persuasive; the proposed 
warning document in Appendix A is designed to reassure minority own-
ers that they can easily avoid some of the worst types of oppression by 
relatively straightforward planning.  In any event, with decisions as 
momentous as quitting one’s “real” job, forming a business with other 
investors, and contributing a large portion of one’s life savings to the 
venture, prospective owners should be given as much information as 
reasonably possible.  Again, the current system does not ensure that this 
information transfer actually takes place consistently; too often it de-
pends on the quality of the prospective owner’s attorney, if he even 
hired an attorney.  Increased transaction costs are certainly possible if 
the proposed system works; advance planning is not free, either in terms 
of money (attorney fees) or time (client attention).  If these costs are not 
acceptable in light of the anticipated benefit of reducing future disputes 
and litigation, steps should be taken to help minimize these costs.  As 
such, one of the proposals in this Article is that form agreements, based 
on the gathered data, shou
es’ planning process. 
Further, this Article’s proposals do not address “second generation” 
owners,411 such as those who inherit their ownership interest or acquire 
it in a divorce or other proceeding.  It thus may help to require 
businesses and/or transferors to take reasonable steps to ensure that these 
types of “later” owners receive the disclosure document set forth in 
Appendix A at or before the time that they acquire their interest 
(although they may not have sufficient bargaining leverage to insist on 
anything).  Finally, the state’s costs would increase as a result of 
monitoring compliance, keeping the disclosure document appropriately 
updated, and compiling the statistics resulting from the questionnaires 
set forth in Appendix B.  These, however, would seem to b
 411. Second-generation owners who inherit minority interests in LLCs may lack the 
foresight or ability to renegotiate an existing LLC agreement.  See Miller, supra note 
33, at 401. 
2009 EAT YOUR VEGETABLES 585 
 (OR AT LEAST UNDERSTAND WHY YOU SHOULD) 
 
CONCLUSION 
Small businesses constitute the vast majority of American busi-
nesses.412  Countless individuals and families depend on them for their 
livelihoods.  Yet often the closely held business can become a vehicle 
for minority owner oppression.  While the law provides the minority 
owner some avenues of relief through the innovations of fiduciary duty 
analysis from the Donahue and Wilkes cases and their progeny, as well 
as involuntary dissolution statutes, these are blunt instruments that 
should be used only as a last resort.  Advance planning offers a much 
more viable, appropriate, and cost-efficient alternative.  Too often this 
tool gathers dust instead of being used. 
Will the solution advocated in this Article put an end to abuse of 
minority owners in corporations and LLCs?  Of course not.  No amount 
of planning will cover all situations and developments that occur in the 
future, so the current remedies provided to minority owners must remain 
in force.  The law must remain flexible to deal with unforeseen situa-
tions:  “For centuries, the law has assumed that (1) power creates oppor-
tunities for abuse and (2) the devious creativity of those in power may 
outstrip the prescience of those trying, through ex ante contract drafting, 
to constrain that combination of power and creativity.”413  But few 
would likely disagree that an increase in advance planning by minority 
owners will make their abuse less commonplace, or that advance plan-
ning would at least provide a more efficient mechanism to remedy the 
abuse than protracted litigation over vague, fact-intensive concepts such 
as “legitimate business purposes,” “oppression,” “reasonable expecta-
tions,” and the like.  Although it has long been recognized that careful 
planning offers the minority owner a much better chance of avoiding or 
remedying abuse, the time has now come to make that planning more 
likely to actually occur. 
 412. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 378 (“[C]lose corporations constitute the vast 
majority of American businesses.”).  Cf. Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder 
Dissension:  Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 287 
(1990) (“[f]amily-owned businesses alone represent [95%] of all United States 
businesses. . . .”); Moll, Dividend Policy, supra note 17, at 844 (“the vast majority of 
corporations in this country are close corporations”). 
 413. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 46, § 14.05[4][a][ii]; see also GEVURTZ, 
supra note 23, at 457-58 (“a major justification for fiduciary duty rules is that the law 
cannot expect individuals to anticipate all of the circumstances in which they should 
have contracted for protection from abuse”). 
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APPENDIX A 
Proposed Pre-Formation Disclosure Document 
(Based on Michigan corporate and LLC statutes) 
 
FORMING A SMALL BUSINESS IN MICHIGAN 
INTRODUCTION 
CONGRATULATIONS!  You have taken the first step toward 
forming your small business.  While we strongly suggest that you 
consult an attorney, we have compiled this booklet to highlight some 
important things that you should think about before you form your 
business if you are not going to be the only owner of the business.  In 
fact, we think that these things are so important the State of Michigan 
will require you to (1) sign an acknowledgment that you have received 
this booklet and (2) complete a questionnaire – on a completely confi-
dential basis, of course – about your decisions.  We use these question-
naires to compile a database so that future business owners can see what 
others decided to do.  You can review the database at www._______. 
*Note:  If you are going to be the only owner of the business, then 
you do not need to complete the questionnaire. 
 
Visit an Attorney.  Again, we strongly advise you to consult an 
attorney when forming a business.  You should consult an attorney who 
is experienced in business law.  Ask friends and family members for 
suggestions, or consult your local or state bar association.  You should 
also be aware that most attorneys represent the business – not the 
individual owners.  It may be in your best interests to hire your own 
attorney to represent your interests. 
You may think that hiring an attorney will be too expensive and 
time-consuming.  While that’s possible, we believe that the benefits 
usually are greater than the costs.  If you form your business carelessly, 
problems could be in store down the road – not just for the business, but 
for you personally too.  Also, we have made several “form” agreements 
and documents available for you and your attorney to use for free, which 
may reduce your costs.  And do not forget that the more the business 
owners can discuss what their expectations about the business are and 
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decide “business issues” before consulting an attorney, the less their 
expenses will be. 
 
What Kind of Business Should You Choose?  One of the first 
choices that you need to make is whether you want to form a corpora-
tion, a limited liability company (LLC), or some other type of entity.  
There are advantages and disadvantages with each business form, and 
this document is not meant to give you advice about that topic.  You 
should consult with a professional (attorney or accountant) to decide 
what type of business you should form. 
 
What Will the Management of Your Business Be Like?  The rest 
of this document is divided into two sections: (1) the first is for what we 
call a “Type I business,” a small business where all of the owners expect 
to be active in the business as employees and/or managers, and (2) the 
second is for what we call a “Type II business,” a small business where 
some of the owners will be active in the business as employees and/or 
managers but there will be one or more passive (non-active) owners.  
Which of the following correctly describes your planned small business? 
 
? Type I: all of the owners (e.g., shareholders or LLC members) 
will be active in the business as employees and/or managers – 
Read Part I 
 
? Type II: some of the owners (e.g., shareholders or LLC 
members) will be active in the business as employees and/or 
managers but some of the owners will be passive (non-active) 
investors – Read Part I AND Part II (starts on page ___) 
 
? Other: Read Part I AND Part II 
 
PART I:  SMALL BUSINESSES WHERE  
ALL OWNERS ARE ACTIVE 
What Are Your Expectations?  Whether you are forming a 
corporation, an LLC, or some other type of entity, if you are like many 
prospective owners of a business, you may have the following 
expectations: 
? Your Employment: you may expect to work for the business and 
be paid a salary. 
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? Others’ Employment: you may expect that the other owners will 
also work at the business and be paid the same salary as you if 
they work as hard as you do. 
? Role in Management:  you may expect to have a role in 
management, such as by being a member of the board of 
directors (if a corporation) or a manager (if an LLC). 
? No Self-Dealing:  you probably do not want the company to 
engage in conflict-of-interest transactions with the other owners 
(such as hiring relatives or buying property at an inflated price), 
unless the terms are fair and the transaction benefits the 
company. 
? Stock Buy-Backs:  you may expect that the company will buy 
back your stock (if a corporation) or membership interest (if an 
LLC) if you die, become disabled, or simply want to leave the 
business to do something else. 
? Transfer Restrictions:  you may want to restrict the other own-
ers’ ability to transfer their stock (if a corporation) or member-
ship interests (if an LLC) to outside parties. 
 
These may or may not correctly describe your expectations, and 
you may have additional expectations.  Regardless, the point is that the 
Michigan corporation and LLC statutes do not automatically protect 
these expectations, unless you take steps to protect your expectations. 
 
How Your Expectations May Be Frustrated:  Without any 
advance planning, the expectations described above could go “up in 
smoke” if you are a minority owner and you have disputes with the other 
owners (who own a majority of the company).  This is because 
Michigan corporation and LLC statutes assume “majority rule.”  Here 
are some things that could go wrong for you if you are a minority owner 
and do not plan ahead: 
? Your Employment:  business owners are not guaranteed employ-
ment.  Instead, you will probably be an “at will” employee who 
can be fired for any reason – or no reason. 
? Others’ Employment:  the majority can increase their own 
salaries over your objections. 
? Role in Management:  the majority has no obligation to elect you 
as a director or manager, or they could remove you from those 
positions. 
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? No Self-Dealing:  the majority can engage in conflict-of-interest 
transactions over your objections. 
? Stock Buy-Backs:  neither the company nor the other owners 
have to buy back your stock (if a corporation) or membership 
interest (if an LLC) if you die, become disabled, or want to leave 
the business.  In a Michigan LLC, you have no right to withdraw 
from membership unless your LLC’s operating agreement gives 
you that right. 
? No Transfer Restrictions:  stock (if a corporation) and member-
ship interests (if an LLC) may be freely transferred to outside 
parties. 
 
Some Ways You Can Protect Your Expectations:  The above 
discussion isn’t intended to scare you – it’s meant to help you under-
stand how to protect yourself.  Of course, even if you do not take any of 
the actions briefly described below, things may still turn out well for you 
because you may always “get along” with the other owners and even if 
you do not, you may be able to sue them.  But if starting a business is a 
major event in your life and you want to protect your investment of time 
and money, here are a few things to consider.  Because your circum-
stances may be unique, we again strongly recommend that you consult 
an attorney.  The following isn’t meant to be legal advice and it’s only 
a partial list of things to consider. 
 
? Your Employment:  an employment agreement could specify 
your salary (or how it is determined) and could provide that you 
may only be fired for “cause.” 
? Others’ Employment:  a provision in the company’s articles, 
bylaws, or an agreement signed by all the shareholders (if a 
corporation) or operating agreement (if an LLC) could provide 
that all salary increases must be approved by all of the directors 
(if a corporation) or members or managers (if an LLC). 
? Role in Management:  In a corporation, a shareholder voting 
agreement could obligate the other owners to elect you to the 
board of directors.  Instead, the articles of incorporation could 
provide that “cumulative voting” is used to elect directors – in 
that case, even if you are a minority shareholder you may have 
enough shares to guarantee your election to the board.  In a 
manager-managed LLC, the operating agreement could be 
drafted to provide that you will be one of the managers. 
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? No Self-Dealing:  A provision in the bylaws (if a corporation) or 
operating agreement (if an LLC) could require that all conflict-
of-interest transactions must be disclosed and can only be ap-
proved by all of the directors, managers, or members, as the case 
may be. 
? Buy-Sell Agreements and Transfer Restrictions:  A buy-sell 
agreement could obligate the business to buy back your stock (if 
a corporation) or membership interest (if an LLC) if you die, 
become disabled, leave the business, or other conditions occur.  
Also, a buy-sell agreement could prevent the owners from trans-
ferring stock or membership interests to outside parties, unless 
the business or the other owners are given a right of first refusal 
to buy it.  The drafting of a buy-sell agreement involves impor-
tant tax and other considerations and should be done in con-
junction with an attorney.  Alternatively, a provision in the 
articles of incorporation or articles of organization could give a 
minority owner the right to dissolve the business upon certain 
events, such as the termination of employment. 
 
Do not worry if the above discussion sounds overwhelming.  Many 
attorneys routinely deal with these sorts of agreements and documents.  
In addition, to help “jumpstart” your planning process, you should 
review the many standard form agreements and provisions which we 
have made available at www._______________.  These documents, 
which are available for free, may be used a starting point for – but not 
the final result of – your own planning.  Like any “generic” document, 
forms should be used carefully. 
PART II:  SMALL BUSINESSES WHERE MOST OWNERS  
ARE ACTIVE, BUT SOME ARE PASSIVE INVESTORS 
What Are Your Expectations?  A “Type II” business is a small 
business where some of the owners will be active in the business as 
employees and/or managers but there will also be one or a few passive 
(non-active) owners. 
Active Owners.  If you are one of the “active” owners, you may 
have the expectations described in Part I of this document. 
Passive Owners.  If you are one of the “passive” owners (such as an 
investor who will rely on others to run the business), not only should you 
read Part I above, but you should also consider the following: 
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? Management Issues:  you may want to have the ability to re-
move the active owners from any role in the management of the 
business if they engage in some form of misconduct or perform 
poorly.  You may also expect to have a limited role in manage-
ment, such as by being a member of the board of directors (if a 
corporation) or one of the managers (if an LLC). 
? Stock Buy-Backs:  you may want to obligate the company or the 
other owners to buy back your stock (if a corporation) or mem-
bership interest (if an LLC) upon certain events, particularly if 
the active owners engage in some form of misconduct. 
? Informational Rights:  you may want to have access to a great 
deal of information about the company’s finances, business, and 
other issues. 
 
How a Passive Investor’s Expectations May Be Frustrated:  
Without any advance planning, the expectations described above could 
go “up in smoke” if you are a minority owner and you have disputes 
with the other owners (who own a majority of the company).  This is 
because Michigan corporation and LLC statutes assume “majority rule.”  
Here are some things that could go wrong for you if you are a minority 
owner and do not plan ahead: 
 
? Management Issues:  you will not have a right to remove the 
active owners from management.  In addition, the majority has 
no obligation to elect you as a director or manager, or they could 
remove you from those positions. 
? Stock Buy-Backs:  neither the company nor the other owners 
have to buy back your stock (if a corporation) or membership 
interest (if an LLC) at any time.  In a Michigan LLC, you have 
no right to withdraw from membership unless your operating 
agreement gives you that right. 
? Informational Rights:  in a corporation, if you are only a share-
holder, you have limited access to information about your 
corporation, and may be required to demonstrate a “proper 
purpose” for accessing information.  In an LLC, if you are only a 
member, many times your requests for information must be 
“reasonable.” 
 
Some Ways Passive Investors Can Protect Their Expectations:  
Here are a few ways to consider protecting the expectations described 
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above.  Because your circumstances may be unique, we again strongly 
recommend that you consult an attorney.  The following isn’t meant to 
be legal advice and it’s only a partial list of things you might consider. 
 
? Management Issues:  A provision in the bylaws (if a corpora-
tion) or operating agreement (if an LLC) could provide that the 
active owners may be removed from management upon certain 
conditions. 
? Buy-Sell Agreements:  A buy-sell agreement could obligate the 
business to buy back your stock (if a corporation) or member-
ship interest (if an LLC) upon certain conditions.  The drafting 
of a buy-sell agreement involves important tax and other con-
siderations and should be done in conjunction with an attorney.  
Alternatively, a provision in the articles of organization could 
give a minority owner the right to dissolve the business upon 
certain events, such misconduct by the active owners. 
? Informational Rights:  a provision in the articles of incorporation 
or bylaws (if a corporation) or the operating agreement (if an 
LLC) could specify that all owners are entitled to inspect all of 
the company’s records, provided they give adequate advance 
notice and do not disrupt company business. 
CONCLUSION 
Again, congratulations.  Forming your small business is probably a 
major event in your life.  Like all major decisions, you should proceed 
carefully and on a well-informed basis.  Hopefully, this document has 
alerted you to some issues that you should consider and address with the 
other owners of the business.  While it may be unpleasant to discuss 
what will happen in the event of future conflicts, we believe that all of 
the business’s owners will benefit by having this discussion now, instead 
of later. 
Finally, do not procrastinate!  Studies have shown that people 
often repeatedly delay taking actions that they believe are in their best 
interests – sometimes until it’s too late.  To help you make sure that you 
follow through with the actions that you’ve decided to take or at least 
consider, we have included a worksheet for you to use following the 
signature page. 
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SIGNATURES 
(Detach and Return to Department of Energy,  
Labor and Economic Growth) 
All prospective owners of the business must sign below and return 
this page to the Michigan Department of Energy, Labor and Economic 
Growth with the articles of incorporation, articles of organization, or 
other applicable charter document.  Your business may not be formed 
until these signatures are received and all of the undersigned return 
the Confidential Questionnaire for Prospective Owners of Closely 
Held Businesses.  (No questionnaire is necessary if there will be only 
one owner of the business.) 
 
By signing below, the owners represent that the undersigned constitute 
all of the persons who are currently contemplated to be owners of 
____________________________________________. 
              [Name of Business] 
 
Do not sign unless you have actually read this document! 
 
_______________________________  Date:  _____________________ 
 
_______________________________  Date:  _____________________ 
 
_______________________________  Date:  _____________________ 
 
_______________________________  Date:  _____________________ 
 
_______________________________  Date:  _____________________ 
 
_______________________________  Date:  _____________________ 
594 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
WORKSHEET 
List below the advance planning actions that you wish to take in 
connection with the formation of your business.  Again, we strongly 
encourage you to consult an attorney. 
 
Action  Deadline  Comments 
Contact attorney     
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APPENDIX B 
Confidential Questionnaire for Prospective Owners 
 of Closely Held Businesses 
The information gathered in this questionnaire is strictly confidential.  It 
will be used only for statistical purposes.  After we process your 
questionnaire, it will be destroyed. 
 
Name of Business: 
 
Your Name: 
 
Which type of entity are you forming? (check one): 
□ Corporation 
□ Limited liability company (LLC) 
□ Partnership 
□ Limited liability partnership (LLP) 
□ Other (explain) 
_____________________________________________ 
 
How many owners of the business do you expect there will be? 
 
Please choose which of the following that best describes the 
anticipated ownership and management characteristics of your 
business: 
 
□ All of the equity owners (e.g., shareholders or LLC 
members) will be active in the business as employees 
and/or managers 
 
□ Some of the equity owners (e.g., shareholders or LLC 
members) will be active in the business as employees 
and/or managers but some of the equity owners will be 
passive (non-active) investors 
 
□ Other (explain) 
_____________________________________________ 
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What type of owner do you expect to be (check one)?   
□ Active employee/manager 
□ Passive investor 
FOR CORPORATIONS ONLY: 
Please check all of the following forms of “advance planning” 
that you have obtained prior to formation of the corporation: 
□ Employment Agreement   
□ Buy-Sell Agreement 
□ Dissolution At-Will Provision  
□ Shareholder Voting Agreements 
□ Cumulative Voting   
□ Supermajority Shareholder Voting 
□ Preemptive Rights   
□ Arbitration Agreement 
□ Provisional Director Provisions   
□ Stock Transfer Restrictions 
□ Other (explain briefly): 
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________ 
FOR LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (LLCS) ONLY: 
Please check all of the following forms of “advance planning” 
that you have obtained prior to formation of the LLC: 
□ Employment Agreement  
□ Buy-Sell Agreement 
□ Dissolution At-Will Provision  
□ Supermajority Vote Provisions 
□ Fiduciary-Duty Provisions  
□ “Oppression” Provisions 
□ Preemptive Rights   
□ Arbitration Agreement 
□ Provisional Manager Provisions 
□ Other (explain briefly): 
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________ 
